Hi Jerry,
your remark is as charming as Georg Christoph Lichtenberg's aphorism:
"If a text and a head strike together and it sounds hollow - it's not
necessarily the text."
Matthias Baermann
----- Original Message -----
From: Gerald Flaherty
To: Matthias Bärmann
Sent: Thursday, January 11, 2007 3:54 PM
Subject: Re: [meteorite-list] Irons DON'T form Fusion Crust's - yes they DO
Don't allow your epistomology to piss you off.
Jerry Flaherty
----- Original Message -----
From: Matthias Bärmann
To: Thaddeus Besedin ; meteorite-list@meteoritecentral.com
Sent: Wednesday, January 10, 2007 6:32 PM
Subject: Re: [meteorite-list] Irons DON'T form Fusion Crust's - yes they DO
Hello Thaddeus & list,
I agree absolutely, my oppositional use of "phenomenoligical" and
"scientific" was meant in a more daily-life-sense and not in a philosophical
manner.
It's clear that the above mentioned opposition is included in phenomenology
itself. It's the merit of Merleau-Ponty that he postulated, against his
forfathers Heidegger and Husserl, a "field", a relationship, oscillating
between body and mind, empirism and intellectualism, with the "Leib" (in German
translation, unfortunately there's no equivalent in English) as a mediator
between body and mind.
The problem, and the main aspect of criticism of phenomenology is the fact,
that Husserl as well as Heidegger as well as Merleau-Ponty underlined the
necessity of experience - Husserl: tending towards "die Sachen selbst" (things
themselves) - , but failed in establishing a real pragmatic dimension. The
abyss between experience and science remained unbridged - even in the case
Merleau-Ponty, who went as far as western philosophy/science allowed him to go,
and who clearly fixed the problem, emphasizing the importance of the enbodiment
of human experience, but remained with his concept of phenomenology in a
theoritical dimension: it is, following the path of western philosophy with
it's Greek origins, still philosophy as theoretical reflection.
There's a very interesting reception and evolution of phenomenology in
contemporary cognitivism. In this context I'd like only to mention Francisco
Varela and his co-authors Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch) and his/their
concept of an "embodied mind" (as "embodied action") as a manifestation (or a
kind of synthesis) of "cognitive science" and "human experience".
Having reached this point I want to stop here. My starting point was to
criticize the completely different use of "glassy" in science and human
experience. The complete transformation on the atomic level of the orginal
matter at the surface of a meteorite via heat makes the scientist to qualify
the new status of matter as "glass". But "glass", as we all know from common
experience (which is closely connected to the empirical aspects of etymology),
mainly evocates "shining" as well as "being transparent" - qualities which
don't describe, regarding experience, the appearance of a frish fallen and
crusted meteorite at all, whether stone nor iron. But, as we know as well: such
a problematic use of language isn't the reason of, it's only symptomatic for
the main problem: the fissure between experience and intellect.
Regards,
Matthias
----- Original Message -----
From: Thaddeus Besedin
To: Matthias Bärmann
Cc: meteorite-list@meteoritecentral.com
Sent: Wednesday, January 10, 2007 1:03 AM
Subject: Re: [meteorite-list] Irons DON'T form Fusion Crust's - yes they
DO
Is there really any way of determining distinctions between
phenomenologicality and scientific knowledge, the ding an sich (noumenon)? We
are really speaking here of an epistemology of replicable phenomena. What is
seen by all is seen by one. Power inverts this relationship. The paradigmatic
phenomenologist Husserl ("zu den sachen selbst") was a positivistic empirical
verificationist with a Platonic heart; perhaps, as with the dialectical effect
of the conflict of Berkeley/Kant/Hume on their philosophical progeny, any
absolutely empirical criterion is in its end itself both a denial of analytic a
priori knowledge of a world - a denial of a world - and an affirmation of its
necessary presence - and the presence of such a conceivable possibility as
'presence.' To think of thought as it may have been preceding the acquisition
of extrinsic, codified communication - the invasion of signs - is impossible,
although this must have been the case: a catalytic reference, an initial logos,
possession by one's genome, by one's neurotransmitters. Husserl's
eidetic-geometric-intuitive presupposition articulating his ontology violated
at least one certain limit of certainty, of verification: infinite regress as
one continues to find the bottom of one's being. Meaning is constructed and
emerges and we become possessors of things and not the pressure, pitch, scent,
and nutrition of mothers in their progressively predictable places within
cyclical constellations of cooccurring events. Memory. Diachronic distances are
tantamount to spatial proximities, and we only approach a transcendent
synthesis of raw event and cooked history, processed by we intermediaries
called consciousnesses. We anticipate only potential - and have a sentence
ready. This is how we fulfill our prophesies.
Merleau-Ponty would have placed a non-phenomenalistic body between
itself and its context, an outside which is only outside of language,
ontologically incommensurable with apprehension by language itself,
peremptorily concealing the indeterminable nexus of definition ( if such a
concept - nexus - is not simply a necessary reification).
Certainly bodies are calibrated, and we enjoy or suffer from an
inscrutably enclosed conventional realism - indistinguishable from idealisms
from within our consciousness-as-temporality.
Well,
subjective appearances of glassy ('vitreous' as a macroscopic qualitative
label in petrology) of course are optical in nature because I see them.
Matthias Bärmann <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
I agree. But using an expression (also a scientific one) in a
phenomenological manner we should take care to avoid a contradiction (or
even tensions) between the phenomenological and the scientific
dimension.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Darren Garrison"
To: "Matthias Bärmann"
Cc:
Sent: Sunday, January 07, 2007 8:26 PM
Subject: Re: Re: [meteorite-list] Irons DON'T form Fusion Crust's - yes
they
DO
On Sun, 7 Jan 2007 20:17:25 +0100, you wrote:
>But it doesn't hit the point regarding meteorites. "Glassy" evokes the
>impression of something shiny, very smooth, mirror-like. But as we all
now
But the "laymen" use of the term isn't the scientific one. "Glassy"
means
something that cooled quickly enough that it didn't have time to
crystalize
and
is instead, on the atomic level, an amorphous mess.
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