"Today, the effect of the Trump tariff embroglio is readily apparent to anyone looking at these two ports." Anyone, including me from about 8000 ft when I pass by Long Beach. Lot's of parking spaces down there. Eric
> On 06/25/2025 4:35 PM EDT Robert Ditchey via Mifnet <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > > I live in Los Angeles CA. There are two magnificent ports that are here – > Los Angeles and Long Beach. Together, they account for a very large fraction > of global shipping commerce in all of the US, if not the entire world. > Today, the effect of the Trump tariff embroglio is readily apparent to anyone > looking at these two ports. Trump’s comments (I opine, irresponsible > mouthings) can have enormous impact on global commerce and security. > > Mahan be-damned, a proclamation from a US President about tariffs, whether or > not they are going to be real, has a very profound effect. Mahan could not > possibly have imagined what see today. > > > > The same could be said about landing on the moon and Mars. Mahan was long > ago. Like Ancient Egypt or the history of Rome. > > > > Bob Ditchey > > > > From: Robert Ditchey via Mifnet <[email protected]> > Sent: Wednesday, June 25, 2025 12:42 PM > To: [email protected] > Cc: [email protected]; [email protected] > Subject: [Mifnet 🛰 72832] Re: NNN - MifNavy: America Is Finally Getting Its > Maritime Strategy Right - James Holmes - Naval War College 20250609 > > > > In truth, there are so many things that are commonplace today than would have > been incomprehensible to Mahan. Move ahead 50 years, and there will be > things that we just do not yet see. > > > > And yet we are led by the people present in the White House. Trump told us > (before hitting Iran’s nuclear facilities) that nobody could know his > thoughts, and that is the truth. Why even bother thinking about Mahan? > > > > Bob Ditchey > > > > From: [email protected] mailto:[email protected] <[email protected] > mailto:[email protected]> > Sent: Wednesday, June 25, 2025 12:24 PM > To: '[email protected]' <[email protected] > mailto:[email protected]> > Cc: '[email protected]' <[email protected] mailto:[email protected]> > Subject: RE: [Mifnet 🛰 72825] NNN - MifNavy: America Is Finally Getting Its > Maritime Strategy Right - James Holmes - Naval War College 20250609 > > > > I feel that Mahanian naval/military philosophy is as useless today as might > be studying the Peloponnesian War of 400 BC. Nevermind that at the US Naval > Academy they did require a study of that war as part of naval history. But > the trireme has been replaced by the SSBN. > > > > I am also reading today the history of the American Revolution, and how > Howe’s domination of the New York Harbor with British warships and their > control of the Hudson River basically overwhelmed Washington’s army. > > > > Today, we must not only consider the full impact of our missile carrying > submarines, but we must also consider our response to the Houti challenge to > the Suez Canal and the possible closure of Hormuz by Iran. If Iran tries to > close Hormuz, we will not likely hit Tehran with a nuclear weapon. We > decided not to carry out an amphibious assault on Yemen. Not yet anyway. > Where does Mahan come in here? > > > > The various assaults/attacks/campaigns of World War II just cannot happen > today because of the “end of civilization” that would follow thermo-nuclear > war. The Battle of Britain campaign will not be repeated. We could level > Tehran to ashes with a conventional air assault, but we will not do that, let > alone a nuclear strike, tactical or not. > > > > We have decided not to join Ukraine with “boots on the ground” – or something > similar. > > > > I feel that Mahan is long dead and replaced by something totally different – > maybe we could term it “Rickover Philosophy.” Or Strangeloveian. > > > > Mifnet might note that I have not brought up the topic of the nuclear > aircraft carrier, e.g. , USS Ford. And now we have certain militarism of > space. Future conflicts might (or will) involve shooting down satellites or > jamming GPS. Mahan just is inapplicable. > > > > Bob Ditchey > > > > From: David Wardell via Mifnet <[email protected] > mailto:[email protected]> > Sent: Tuesday, June 24, 2025 7:21 PM > To: [email protected] mailto:[email protected] > Cc: [email protected] mailto:[email protected] > Subject: [Mifnet 🛰 72825] NNN - MifNavy: America Is Finally Getting Its > Maritime Strategy Right - James Holmes - Naval War College 20250609 > > > > Sharing this rather lengthy MifNavy piece. It’s about a 20-minute read, but > serious, thoughtful, and informative. Worth your time. > > > > Old Man Wardell > > > > > > David Wardell > > (757) 561-0582 > > [email protected] mailto:[email protected] https://wardell.us/url/b5s86 > https://wardell.us/url/s9qvz > > > > > > > --------------------------------------------- > > https://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-is-finally-getting-its-maritime-strategy-right > > > > The US Navy vacated the Mahanian world of sea battle at almost precisely the > historical instant China entered it. A long-overdue course correction is > underway. > > [The following essay is adapted from Dr. Holmes’ remarks at the Current > Strategy Forum of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, on June 9, > 2025. It has been lightly edited for clarity.] > > The organizers asked me to look at the past, present, and future of U.S. > maritime strategy, all in fifteen minutes, so let’s start with the basics. > What is “maritime strategy?” I define “strategy” as the art and science of > using power to fulfill purposes, and “maritime strategy” as the art and > science of using sea power to fulfill purposes relating to the sea. > > So what is “sea power?” > > Two things. It’s a “virtuous cycle” among commerce, policy, and military > might that makes a seafaring society rich and powerful, and it’s an implement > of maritime strategy employed for geopolitical gain. We forge the tool > through the cycle, then political and military leaders wield the tool for > purposes they and the larger society deem fruitful. > > How “Sea Power” Really Works > > First, the virtuous cycle. Mahan spelled out the classic definition of sea > power, defining it as a “chain” connecting industrial production at home, > with merchant and naval shipping, with commercial, diplomatic, and military > access to harbors or naval stations in important trading regions. Commerce, > ships, and bases are shorthand for sea power. > > Commerce is king for Mahan. All three links in the sea-power chain—domestic, > nautical, and foreign—must be solid for the maritime enterprise to prosper. > Without production, you have nothing to sell overseas, so you need neither a > merchant fleet nor a navy to protect it. Without merchantmen and warships, > you’re dependent on others to safeguard the goods you manufacture to sell to > foreign customers. Dependency entrusts national well-being to the whims of > others. And without access to foreign harbors, it doesn’t matter what you’re > making at home, or can transport across the sea; no one will consume your > wares, and you will not profit from seaborne commerce. > > Now—at the risk of offending the ghost of Mahan—I’ve taken to amending his > formula to distinguish more clearly between mercantile and military sea power > and, hopefully, clarify how the virtuous cycle among commerce, shipping, and > bases works. He merges the two, and thus obscures how the cycle works. I > define sea power as twin, parallel supply chains. The first is the familiar > commercial supply chain connecting domestic manufacturers, with a merchant > fleet to carry goods manufactured at home across the transport network that > is the sea to harbors overseas for offloading and sale, so buyers can satisfy > their wants and needs. The second is a naval supply chain connecting domestic > naval shipbuilding, to an armed fleet to safeguard trade, to foreign harbors > or naval bases to defend commercial and diplomatic access while supporting > fleet operations logistically. > > So the commercial supply chain enriches a seagoing society, the government > skims off tax revenue from commercial transactions, and some of that revenue > goes into a navy to protect the commercial supply chain. In turn, commerce > funds its own guardian via the naval supply chain, which in turn ensures the > free flow of commerce. And on and on the virtuous cycle turns—into the > indefinite future, provided political and military leaders remain mindful of > their duty to act as executors of maritime statecraft. > > What do we do with sea power as an implement? Maritime strategy puts sea > power to a variety of uses, harnessing the familiar logic of ends, ways, and > means. Canvassing the United States’ diplomatic and military history, four > constants in maritime strategy stand out. One, the Monroe Doctrine placed the > Americas off-limits to European empires as a zone of future conquest or proxy > rule. We seldom cite Monroe by name any more, but the proprietary impulse > persists. Witness the recent talk about Greenland and the Panama Canal. > > Two, the Open Door sought to keep the rimlands of East Asia—China in > particular—open to American trading interests, preserving commercial access. > > Three, geopolitical balancing in the rimlands of Western Europe and East Asia > sought to keep any aggressor from unifying one or both rimlands under its > control—and thus constituting a threat to the United States across the > oceans. This was forward defense of the Western Hemisphere. > > And four—and closely related to the previous point—containment sought to keep > aggressors from projecting their sway beyond Eurasia to the detriment of U.S. > interests and purposes. > > These were all uses of sea power as an implement of geostrategy. They remain > recurring themes, even though the language to express them changes. > > “Mahanian” and “Post-Mahanian” Maritime Strategy > > Which brings us to contemporary U.S. maritime strategy. I would propose four > metrics for evaluating a maritime strategy. First, how “Mahanian” or > “post-Mahanian” is it? In other words, how adversarial is it? In the casual > sense, a Mahanian maritime power takes a bare-knuckles approach to the > profession of arms at sea, girding to face a peer challenger. By contrast, a > post-Mahanian sea power tends to assume peer challengers are at bay more or > less permanently, if they exist at all, and thus that compelling outmatched > state adversaries while suppressing substate lawbreakers is what navies exist > to do. > > Professor Geoff Till of King’s College London crafted the > Mahanian/post-Mahanian lingo in the journal Orbis circa 2007, positing that > Western and Asian powers are on opposite cultural trajectories, and that > there are ramifications of serious gravity to this mismatch. Geoff also hints > at an important question. Namely, do you need to have an adversary to have a > strategy? I would say yes. An adversary supplies an indispensable benchmark > for the adequacy of your strategy, operational design, and fleet design. > > Think about it. Mahan articulates a formula for sizing and configuring fleets > or fleet detachments. He declares that you need a fleet adequate to take to > the sea and fight, with reasonable prospects of success, the largest force it > is likely to meet at the place and time of battle. Force, space, time, as > operational artists put it. But how do you run that calculation unless you > identify your most likely antagonist? You cannot. There is no substitute for > naming an opponent, sizing up its forces, and estimating what fraction of its > forces the hostile leadership will commit to action at the place and time of > battle, and how long it will keep its combat power on scene to enforce its > will. > > As Captain Harry Yarnell put it in 1919—when the U.S. Navy was surveying the > post-World War I seascape to divine the next big thing in naval > warfare—designing a force with no enemy in mind is like forging a machine > tool without knowing whether you intend to manufacture hair pins or > locomotives. An opponent lends focus. Or, as the Roman philosopher Seneca > wrote, no wind is fair if you have no idea what port you’re steering for. > With no idea what it’s preparing for, a navy drifts around aimlessly, > uncertain whether its forces and methods fit the times and circumstances. > > In short, a post-Mahanian force inhabits a different intellectual universe > than a Mahanian one. It lacks that focus. The two are guided by conflicting > assumptions about the saltwater arena. > > Let’s hold up the mirror to start with. End-of-history thinking swept this > nation—and the sea services—amid triumphalism over the Cold War’s outcome. In > 1992, a directive called “…From the Sea,” the services’ first effort at > framing post-Cold War strategy, in effect proclaimed that peer enemies were > no more. The United States and its allies ruled the sea, no one could resist > them, and thus they could more or less set aside their first and foremost > function—preparing to fight for command of the sea. That declaration gave > American naval operations a post-Mahanian cast for well over a decade. > > Contrast that with the mindset in China. China resolved to construct a navy > of serious heft by the mid-1990s, around the time the United States stood > down. By 2004, a State Council defense white paper announced that China > intended to bid for command of the sea and sky in an ever-widening offshore > belt. The 2004 white paper was deeply Mahanian in tenor. China wanted control > of maritime space, by force of arms if necessary. Subsequent statements of > purpose out of Beijing have only entrenched that battle-minded outlook. > > Bottom line: the US Navy vacated the Mahanian world of sea battle at almost > precisely the historical instant China entered it. > > Professor Till would remind us that it is extremely hard for a post-Mahanian > navy steeped in constabulary duty to reinvent itself for Mahanian times. This > is true in the material sense. Why in the world are we celebrating having > developed a Maritime Strike Tomahawk now, in the eleventh hour in our > competition with China, when we had one in the armory thirty-plus years ago > and chose to discard it? Imagine what we would have now had we kept that and > improved on it. But it’s even more true in the human sense. It’s hard to > regenerate the fighting habit of thought, feeling, and deed once it has > atrophied—especially if senior leaders decreed that it atrophy. > > Fortunately, we have been edging back toward the Mahanian world, albeit > fitfully, since around 2012, with Xi Jinping’s ascent. I call that time of > transition America’s “Voldemort” moment. Everyone knew a new antagonist was > on the rise in the Western Pacific, but refused to speak its name for fear of > infernal consequences. Our reticence held us back. How do you convey a sense > of urgency to the services, lawmakers, and American taxpayers if you decline > to explain why urgency is imperative? > > Thankfully, we have exited that transitional phase. Since about 2015, with > the “refreshed,” more combative “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century > Seapower,” Voldemort’s name can be spoken aloud. But the hour is late. > Beijing took to naming us as the next likely foe three decades ago—and > preparing accordingly while we did other things. That suggests China retains > an edge in imagination and fervor for the competition at sea. Beijing claimed > the mantle of Mahan long ago, while we are trying to reclaim it. You > foreswear your primary function at your peril. > > The Navy Cannot Fight the Next Sea War Alone > > Second, how joint is US maritime strategy? This is an age of joint sea power, > when armies and aerospace and cyber forces are implements of maritime > strategy as surely as navies and marines. The reason is simple: the stronger > force gathered at the time and place of battle prevails, not necessarily the > stronger navy. China gets that; America seems to be belatedly getting it. At > the recent Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Secretary Hegseth announced that > we are posturing the joint force to defend the first and second island > chains. Doing so denies the islands, which are allied territory, to China. > Forces on and around the islands for territorial defense can also close the > straits between the islands, denying the PLA and Chinese merchant fleet > access to the vast maneuver space that is the Western Pacific. Joint sea > power can put the military and economic hurt on China. > > Consequently, our ground-based services have embraced, or re-embraced, their > heritage as sea services. Under the rubric of “Force Design 2030,” the US > Marine Corps is reinventing itself, in part, as an island-defense force to > help our fleet deny and win control of geographic space. In a similar vein, > the Army is pursuing “Multi-Domain Operations” in Asia’s island chains. And I > would be remiss not to mention the Air Force, which has pursued such > capabilities as Quickstrike precision minefields and Quicksink munitions for > antiship missions. This while the Space Force maintains sleepless overwatch, > helping us detect, track, and target the red team. It has been inspiring to > watch the joint force remake itself as an implement of maritime strategy. > > Someone Needs to Be in Charge of the Strategy > > Third, how “maritime” is the strategy? Does it span all government agencies > that play a part in seaborne endeavors, plus private-sector players? None of > ours do. America has never codified a true maritime strategy. Again, Mahan > views sea power as an all-encompassing national endeavor, and no one is in > charge of it all. Authority is dispersed among such agencies as the Navy > Department, the State Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and > the Transportation Department. And much of the endeavor lies beyond the > direct control of the government, most notably in the defense-industrial > complex. > > I have made the case that the National Security Council should become the > seat of U.S. maritime strategy, simply because the White House does wield > authority over government stakeholders in the maritime enterprise. It can > choreograph their efforts. The White House is also the logical actor to > oversee relations with private actors in the saltwater arena. Congress seems > to agree, judging from the “SHIPS for America Act” now making its way through > the House and Senate. Given the fragmented nature of America’s current > maritime strategy, I see little alternative to centralizing power over it. > Someone has to manage the Mahanian cycle among commerce, diplomacy, and > military might, lest maritime statecraft remain adrift. > > Dependable Allies Aid American Sea Power > > Fourth, and lastly, how multinational is a strategy? To one degree or > another, all US maritime strategies have been multinational since World War > II. We always fight alongside allies. But some have been more unilateral than > others. Because the United States was the dominant ally in hegemonic > alliances during the Cold War, it tended to set the agenda and allies tended > to follow. > > The sea services broke with that pattern, in part, with the 2007 and 2015 > “Cooperative Strategies for 21st Century Seapower,” which envisioned rallying > a seagoing consortium to police the sea. In theory our sea services founded > an alliance of equals, a “thousand-ship navy” as Admiral Mike Mullen called > it. If the United States expected allies, partners, and friends to contribute > the bulk of that multinational fleet, it would have to defer more to their > wishes. It would have to be more multilateral. > > The nature of the competitive setting, realities of power, and alliance > dynamics help determine how multinational, and unilateral, a US maritime > strategy is. > > America’s Naval Strategy Keeps Changing > > These are the four axes for classifying maritime strategy: adversarial (or > not), joint, maritime, and multinational. > > Looking back, America’s maritime strategy tends to oscillate between Mahanian > and post-Mahanian phases as the world changes around us. The danger is that > we are laggards when a post-Mahanian world witnesses the rise of a Mahanian > challenger. After all, it is easier to reconfigure a force built for high-end > combat to police substate lawbreakers, in a relatively low-threat > environment, than it is for a constabulary force to ramp up to meet a peer > competitor on some oceanic battleground. I think we can discern five distinct > generations of U.S. maritime strategy since 1945. > > First, though uncodified, the early Cold War strategy was a peculiar hybrid > of Mahanian and post-Mahanian strategy. On the one hand, we were competing > strategically against a designated peer foe, the Soviet Union. That’s the > Mahanian element. But on the other hand, the Soviet Navy did not emerge as a > serious rival until the 1970s. That interlude of calm lulled our navy into > thinking of the sea in post-Mahanian terms, as a safe sanctuary from which > our transoceanic fleet could project power into theaters like Korea and > Vietnam. After that strategic holiday, sea-service leaders were stunned in > the 1970s when the Soviet Navy seemingly burst out as a peer fighting force. > And early Cold War maritime strategy was not especially joint or maritime in > tone. As far as alliance politics went, the US Navy and Marine Corps more or > less set the agenda, and others followed. > > Second, the John Lehman/James Watkins “Maritime Strategy” unveiled in the > 1980s was staunchly Mahanian in outlook. Having surrendered our fighting edge > during the early Cold War, when command of the sea looked like a birthright, > we had to get it back in the late Cold War, when we realized we would once > again have to fight for maritime command before we could use the sea to > project power. The strategy announced that we would go after the Soviet Union > around its coastal periphery, stretching and thinning out Soviet resources > and thus easing the pressure along the inter-German frontier, assumed to be > the major combat theater. You will get some pushback from framers of that > strategy, but I would argue that the Lehman/Watkins strategy was not > particularly joint or maritime in outlook, while it remained multinational in > the sense that the United States headed hegemonic alliances within which our > leadership had the dominant say. > > Third, the “…From the Sea” strategy, which I have already picked on, > proclaimed that the Navy and Marine Corps would transform themselves into a > “fundamentally different naval force” with little need to prepare for pitched > battle at sea. The sea services lurched from a Mahanian into a post-Mahanian > world thanks to a mandate from sea-service leaders. Another strategic holiday > was at hand! In a sense, the 1990s saw a return to the 1950s and 1960s > approach, with the sea services deploying a strategy that perceived no enemy > and was neither especially joint nor maritime nor multinational in outlook. > We rested on our laurels. > > Fourth, the “Cooperative Strategy” era, which spanned from about 2005 to > 2015, saw an ardently post-Mahanian strategy, even though the 2007 and 2015 > strategy documents had some Mahanian flourishes. Of note, the word China > appears not once in the 2007 edition. These strategies were not especially > joint, or maritime as I have defined it, but they were intensely > multinational in outlook, premised on multilateral trusteeship over the > system of liberal trade and commerce at sea. This did not last. Following the > transitional “Voldemort” phase, the 2015 “refresh” strategy heralded a > competitive turn. Sea-service chieftains now acknowledged that while > cooperation remained desirable, great-power rivals would have to be > outcompeted, and perhaps defeated. > > And fifth, the “Advantage at Sea” strategy, under which the sea services have > operated since 2020—the Biden administration neither disavowed it nor > replaced it with another—marks a return to the world of Mahan. It names > names, stating outright that strategic competition is upon the sea services. > “Advantage at Sea” genuflects to joint sea power, making mention of the US > Air Force, Army, and Space Force on a number of occasions. But the joint > dimension does not stand at the strategy’s forefront. Similarly, the document > raises the importance of commerce from time to time, imparting a maritime > inflection. In my judgment, however, the directive does not fully reflect the > Mahanian centrality of trade and commerce, or of the nonmilitary elements of > sea power. However, the strategy is deeply, deeply multinational in > character. It makes clear, time and again, that allies, partners, and friends > are crucial to American success on the high seas. > > So what are the trendlines? We are trending toward joining China as a > Mahanian competitor; we are increasingly joint in our maritime operations; > our leadership is sidling toward our first genuinely maritime strategy; and > we acknowledge our reliance on allies, partners, and friends in the region. > > All of which is good. We have our minds right. Now we just need to execute. > And fast. > > About the Author: James Holmes > > James Holmes https://www.usni.org/people/james-holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of > Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College, a Distinguished Fellow at the > Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare, and a Faculty Fellow at > the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. A > former U.S. Navy surface-warfare officer and combat veteran of the first Gulf > War, he served as a weapons and engineering officer in the battleship > Wisconsin, engineering and firefighting instructor at the Surface Warfare > Officers School Command, and military professor of strategy at the Naval War > College. He holds a PhD in international affairs from the Fletcher School of > Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and MAs in mathematics and > international relations from Providence College and Salve Regina University. > The views voiced here are his alone. > > Image: Shutterstock. > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Revised: 20250507 > > You are receiving The Mifnet because you requested to join this list. > > The Mifnet is largely a labor of love, however the infrastructure isn't > exactly cost-free. If you'd care to make a small contribution to the effort, > please know that it would be greatly appreciated: > https://wardell.us/url/mifbit > > All posts sent to the list should abide by these policies: > > 1) List members acknowledge that participation in Mifnet is a privilege--not > a right. > 2) Posts are always off the record, absent specific permission from the > author. > 3) The tone of discussions is collegial. > 4) Posts are expected to be in reasonably good taste. > 5) We discuss ideas and not personalities, and we don't speak ill of other > Mifnet members. > > * The Mifnet WEB SITE is: > https://www.mifnet.com/ > > * To UNSUBSCRIBE from this list at any time please visit: > https://lists.mifnet.com/ > OR: SEND THIS MESSAGE via email: [email protected]?subject=leave > > * Send Mifnet mailing list POSTS/SUBMISSIONS to: > [email protected] > > * You may reach the person managing The Mifnet at: > [email protected] > > * Please consider the DIGEST version of The Mifnet, which consolidates all > list traffic into 1-3 > messages daily. 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