At least you can protect yourself from corporate espionage; unless it's
intel
On Sat, Mar 11, 2017 at 1:36 PM <biggran...@tds.net> wrote:

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TRESOR
>
> A Linux kernel patch which provides CPU-only based encryption
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encryption> to defend against cold boot
> attacks <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_boot_attack> on computer
> systems by performing encryption outside usual random-access memory
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Random-access_memory> (RAM
>
>
> https://software.intel.com/en-us/blogs/2016/02/26/memory-encryption-an-intel-sgx-underpinning-technology
>
> The Intel SGX Memory Encryption Engine:
>
>
> You just have to ask yourself, Intel, who has the keys to the Intel ME...
> Paranoia^2
> There is no perfect security, especially when one can touch the hardware.
>
>
>
>
> On 3/11/2017 11:44 AM, Luke Small wrote:
>
> Is there a way to encrypt memory and keep the key on the CPU like a
> transparent partition so that if the ram cards are physically accessed, hey
> can't be read? Is it reasonable?

Reply via email to