At least you can protect yourself from corporate espionage; unless it's intel On Sat, Mar 11, 2017 at 1:36 PM <biggran...@tds.net> wrote:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TRESOR > > A Linux kernel patch which provides CPU-only based encryption > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encryption> to defend against cold boot > attacks <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_boot_attack> on computer > systems by performing encryption outside usual random-access memory > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Random-access_memory> (RAM > > > https://software.intel.com/en-us/blogs/2016/02/26/memory-encryption-an-intel-sgx-underpinning-technology > > The Intel SGX Memory Encryption Engine: > > > You just have to ask yourself, Intel, who has the keys to the Intel ME... > Paranoia^2 > There is no perfect security, especially when one can touch the hardware. > > > > > On 3/11/2017 11:44 AM, Luke Small wrote: > > Is there a way to encrypt memory and keep the key on the CPU like a > transparent partition so that if the ram cards are physically accessed, hey > can't be read? Is it reasonable?