On Wed, Jul 22, 2026 at 12:01:23PM -0000, Stuart Henderson wrote:
> On 2026-07-22, Raimo Niskanen <[email protected]> wrote:
> > Hello misc@!
> >
> > I have some security department in my Company breathing down my neck because
> > I run an OpenBSD 7.9 public server that has got OpenSSH 10.3, and their
> > vulnerability scanning tool Black Kite reports that it is vulnerable to
> > CVE-2026-59999 (high), CVE-2026-60000 (high), and CVE-2026-6002 (critical).
> >
> > I can find matching descriptions on
> > https://openssh.org/releasenotes.html, but those OpenSSH release
> > notes do not list the CVE numbers:
> >
> > CVE-2026-59999 (high), should be:
> > * sshd(8): DisableForwarding=yes didn't override PermitTunnel=yes
> >   as it was documented to do. Note that PermitTunnel is not enabled
> >   by default. Reported independently by Huzaifa Sidhpurwala of
> >   Redhat and Marko Jevtic.
> 
> not relevant unless you have PermitTunnel enabled, DisableForwarding
> enabled, and were expecting the latter to override the former.
> 
> > CVE-2026-60000 (high), should be:
> > * sshd(8): avoid a potential pre-authentication denial of service
> >   when GSSAPIAuthentication was enabled (this feature is off by
> >   default). This was not mitigated by MaxAuthTries, but would be
> >   penalised by PerSourcePenalties. This was reported by Manfred Kaiser
> >   of the milCERT AT (Austrian Ministry of Defence).
> 
> not relevant to OpenBSD's builds which are done without GSSAPI
> (ypu would need to build yourself with KERBEROS5=yes).
> 
> > CVE-2026-60002 (critical), should be:
> > * ssh(1): fix a possible client-side use-after-free if the server
> >   changes its host key during a key reexchange. This was reported by
> >   Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin of Depthfirst.
> 
> ssh(1) i.e. cloent-sode.only. I think that's this one,
> 
> Date: 2026/07/06 08:49:58
> Author: djm
> Branch: HEAD
> Tag: (none)
> Log:
> fix ownership and lifetime of several bits of client state that
> need to persist for the life of the connection, especially the
> cached hostkey that was being incorrectly freed early on some
> paths, possibly allowing its use after free.
> 
> Reported by Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin from depthfirst.com
> 
> Members:
>       ssh.c:1.633->1.634
>       sshconnect.c:1.383->1.384
>       sshconnect.h:1.50->1.51
>       sshconnect2.c:1.387->1.388
> 
> 
> > From what I see none of these fixes has been backported to a syspatch for
> > OpenBSD 7.9, so I guess they are not deemed severe enough.
> >
> > Still, Black Kite dares to call them "high" and "critical", and my Company's
> > security department gives me 30 business days for the "high" and 10 for the
> > "critical" to remedy by upgrading to OpenSSH 10.4.
> >
> > I suppose neither of these will be backported to OpenBSD 7.9, and I dare
> > say that none of these bugs is one that the server will encounter...
> >
> > Does misc@ have any advice on how I should handle my security department,
> > or possibly on how to "remedy these CVE:s"...?
> 
> https://www.openssh.org/openbsd.html

That looks promising!

If I follow that HowTo and upgrade to OpenSSH 10.4 by updating the openssh
source tree and compile - could that conflict with future syspatch:es?

Should I then skip all syspatches that target OpenSSH and continue
doing manual source code upgrades until the next release?

Just want to be sure...

/ Raimo

> 
> 
> -- 
> Please keep replies on the mailing list.

-- 

/ Raimo Niskanen, Erlang/OTP, Ericsson AB

Reply via email to