Andrea to Chris
Andrea (previously):
[...] you go through a very detailed and rich picture of heavy-metal
ontologies. Right from the start, it seems
that you would include in this class of ontologies all those that insist on
precision and (absolute, non-local) truth.
This would include most philosophical systems appeared insofar, wouldn't it
[...] Also, I am curious how does
Heidegger fit in here, given the importance he gives to interpretation and
finiteness of being. (I would have
thought Heidegger was *against* the idea of absolute, precise truth.
Chris:
Heidegger was concerned with the 'pureness' of being as are most western
philosophers. Any emphasis on
ontology is immediately tied to single context thinking, there is a degree
of fascism in all of us :-) That part
of us that is single context is also that part of us that asserts a
*particular* interpretation, the 'true'
interpretation, the 'one' over all others, and with that process comes a lot
of aspects all of which relate to
single context, objectification, precision, the 'dot' and so on all very
LOCAL concepts.
Emphasising the importance of interpretation forces a single context
perspective and with that 'pops up'
us vs them distinctions etc etc
Heidegger's attraction to the artist more than the scientist reflected
his attraction to 'the one'. That
attraction can easly lead to 'tolerance' of a context that was also
interested in establishing 'the one'.
I'm a bit confused here. It is probably due to the fact that I regard
emphasizing interpretation as something that is closely
related to stating that truths are context-dependant, which is probably not the
case with MH. Anyway, since you often mention "childlike thinking", perhaps I
can clear some of my perplexity if I just plain ask you whether you would regard
all or most western philosophy to be childish in this sense.
Andrea (previously):
but I think the idea of eternal truths (absolute w.r.t. time) is possibly
even hardly defendable than that of
contextless truths (absolute w.r.t. contexts).
Chris:
:-) in single context thinking the fundamentalism associated with it
entangles the text/context distinctions, 'all is
one' emphasis and so a source for 'contextless' truths e.g. '1'. Perhaps it
is more that the context is
IMPLICITLY considered as infinite and so ignorable, no matter what context,
'1' is '1'. This favours 'purist'
thinking.
Andrea (previously):
your picture is in fact *too* general, too much zoomed out, too much about
the form of thought to be applicable
to discuss issues at the much finer-grained level that we have in the MOQ -
perhaps you're looking on
philosophy from too far to even distinguish the MOQ as something different
from something else [...]
Chris:
Then you miss the point -- what I talk about IS general in that it is
neurology based and we use metaphors to
particularise. In MOQ or any other discipline all your expressions are
pre-determined in form, you are talking
about the SAME patterns using DIFFERENT words. There is an emphasis on the
words being the meaning,
they are not, they are the carriers of meaning, a meaning FELT by us all and
created by the processing of
object/relationship distinctions.
Since as a species we all use the SAME template to assert 'meaning',
then to identify 'truths' you need to
look at the methodology used to derive it and that is not fundmentally based
on the use of logic or rhetoric etc
since these are linked to unconscious associations of words to feelings and
in particular the set of feelings
contained by the method of analysis of the brain and that method is making
object/relationship distinctions and
applying the distinctions recursively to get more 'detail'.
MOQ is an implicit structure reflecting the patterns of
object/relationship distinctions as made by the brain.
The articularisation process links the MOQ with a lexicon of seemingly
MOQ-only terminologies and so terms
that bjectify MOQ, turn it into a discipline. BUT the words are just
sounds/symbols that point to the SAME feelings;
in all disciplines the FEELING of wholeness is generally the same. Local
nuances allow for variations, 'novel'
associations etc but the feeling is the same.
Then I miss the point twice, because it also seems to me that you are actually
agreeing with my point. Since from your PoV MOQ is talking "about the same
patterns using different words", from that PoV there is nothing you can say
about MOQ that you couldn't as well say on any other discipline, or if you say
anything about the MOQ, this will be, in a sense, at the "wrong" abstraction
level. BTW, my overall perplexity towards a neurological-based approach to
philosophy is that, although I agree that brain workings are, roughly speaking,
the "implementation" of mind, the domain of discourse is different if you talk
about brain and about mind. Comparing dogs and quarks is just as useless as
comparing apples to oranges, so to speak, even if dogs happen to be somehow made
up of quarks. Dogs are systems and a dog trainer is interested in emerging
system properties, not in the properties of the subatomic particles dogs are
made of. Especially so if these are the same that comprise frogs, beetles, and
rhynos. Speaking of universal, underlying thought structures, as you seem to do,
is definitely interesting in its own right, but since these structures are
common to MOQ and almost-anything-else, they have little relevance to someone
who is interested in MOQ, where this interest relates to comparing MOQ to other
disciplines and evaluating the *differences* between them.
Chris:
In any discipline we will use 1:many dichotomisations, we will use the
local/general dichotomy, the
quantitative/qualitative dichotomy, the object/relationship dichotomy and so
on. The particular terms all map
to the SAME general set of feelings. Thus analysis of the concepts of
'local', 'quantitative', 'object' etc etc
will bring out '1' type biases as compared to the concepts of 'general' or
'qualitative' or 'relationship' bring
out the 'many' type biases.
When we analyse the template in detail we find that we use the template
at all scales of analysis. Thus
your reference to "your picture is in fact *too* general, too much zoomed
out, too much about the form of thought
to be applicable to discuss issues at the much finer-grained level that we
have in the MOQ" is in fact false.
How so? It is probably imprecise, but I don't think it's false. One thing is
talking about the MOQ in terms of recurring neurobiological-based thought
patterns. One thing is adopting MOQ terminology and participate in a discussion
to defend or attack propositions made in that terminology within the MOQ
context, or attack MOQ itself from an extended general-metaphysics context. My
opinion was that the neurobiological perspective cannot add much in this second
kind of discussion, at least if it is (only) applied to the MOQ itself, from a
MOQ- and metaphysics-external context.
Chris:
The template was identifed at the general level and then refined in that the
process of recursion leading to
complexity/chaos and with this emerges the SAME GENERAL patterns with local
nuances derived from the
development of a context that can support them.
These 'novel' expressions are in fact contained in the method that
created them from the start, they do
not 'pop' out of nowhere (as many seem to believe).
What the material does bring out is illusions/delusions in thinking in
that at times the so-called 'fine grain'
is false based on fundamental misconceptions. Given the fundamentals,which
allow for 'misconceptions' in
that they can possible lead to a 'novel' survival path within a local
context, we can work backwards and identify
a 'better' path.
This is pretty interesting, and I agree. Again, you seem to be doing
meta-metaphysics here. I also whole heartedly agree that what we lack, and would
benefit from, is such a meta-metaphysics prior to any metaphysics. Also, there
is plenty of meta-metaphysics PoVs to choose from or adopt simultaneously
(neurobiological, historical, etc.)
Andrea (previously):
The "flocking" concept seems to me roughly equivalent to the idea of
emerging properties in systems theory [...]
Applying this to truth... that appears interesting because it throws the
(usual) concept of (human-intellectual)
truth in the social realm, where I also believe it belongs.
Chris:
Yes... but there is the retention of individual 'truths'. The flocking
behavior, based on making local distinctions,
allows for the emergence of patterns that are not directly linked to
individuals. These patterns can become
'socal' truths, 'univeral' truths if they become strongly established, if
the context can support them over long
timespans.
Yes, right. In a sense, systems theory often takes the point of view of an
external observer of the system. The retention of individual truths is a concept
that applies if you take the point of view of the elements of the system. Of
course whatever emerges from the system, while it cannot be traced back to
individuals, is based on properties/behavior of individuals, some of which
contribute to properties/behavior of the system, while others may not
(individual truths that are not social truths, as yet at least).
Also, flocking suggests something that is not necessarily present in systems
theory, that is, individuals influence each other by imitation and introjection
of the others' properties/behavior (eg, truths).
Chris (previously):
Overall the assertion of an absolute truth outside of the local is not
possible using the traditional methods we
use to analyse. The moment we move into non-local analysis so there is a
loss of resolution at the explicit,
local level [...]
Imagine the brain as a huge eye. This brain, like the eye, consists of a
highly precision oriented, high
detail, FM-like bandwidth, 'center' (called the fovea) surrounded by a low
bandwidth (AM-like), rough detail
but good pattern matching [...] Now abstract these distinctions to
information processing in general where the
neural parts of the sensory cortices are also used in abstract thought. Do
you 'get the picture'? :-)
Andrea (previously):
As a single comment on your specific positions, it seems to me, you are not
proving (provide arguments) that
precise non-local reasoning is impossible (or perhaps that it is an absurd
concept).
Chris:
In our current methodology it isnt. The closest we come to non-local
reasoning is intuitions, based on
experience. The precision of local thinking is linked to the determination
of SAMENESS and sameness is not
precisely determinable in non-local realms. It is like the distinction of
syntax, of CORRECT order vs grammar
that is more correct FORM based on the linking of various elements to
produce a good paragraph etc etc
Consider Cantor's demonstration of transfinite numbers. Ordinal
transfinites have a totally different arithmatic
than Cardinal transfinites. The Cardinal transfinites, derived from the
concept of sets, deals with SIZE, with
exagerations of differences. There is no ordinality in this and to reason
you need ordinality. (logic has order IF
A then B, spoken/written word has ORDER, left-to-right, or right-to-left.)
These properties, of ordinality and
cardinality in transfinites reflect a more LOCAL bias to ordinality since
you need PRECISION, an object, a
discrete, emphasis. Sets etc are not so 'ordered' (until you get into
ordered pairs etc this reflects our mental
oscillations where we use both biases in our maps).
Cardinality is more associated with non-local thinking, it is like a
field of 'random' dots of varying sizes, there
is no rigid order, but there are possible 'patterns', intuitive 'spreads' of
dots that suggest 'something'.
'traditional' logic, mathematics, object assertion, syntax processing
are all tied to a more LOCAL perspective
but within these we also find local/non-local distinctions, the
discrete/continuous dichotomy.
The fundamental distinction in the context of reasoning is that
reasoning MUST HAVE ORDINALITY. Non
local reasoning is more intuitive and as such is not really accepted as
'reasoning' :-) Note how an intuitive
identification is an indentification that reflects RESONANCE. This is very
wave-like and the non-local IS the
realm of waves.
From a neurological perspective, that part of our mind associated with
ordinality happens to be that part
of our mind that favours internal linkage; the formation of the 'one',
coming to a POINT.
That part of our mind that is more cardinal in expression happens to be
that part of the mind associated with
external linkage; the joining of the POINTS and so an emphasis of the space
in-between the dots as well as
the exageration of aspects of dots.
Premise:
- One who believes in logic as a means to establish absolute truth acts within
the delusion that his/her logic is not a context, or is contextless, or is
infinite-context. Common sense associates the idea of a context to a set of
unspoken premises. The absolute-truth-supporter (let me call ATS this mythical
figure) will claim that certain truths have no need for unspoken premises.
My point, as regards context-dependence of truths, is that there really are
underlying, unspoken "premises", although the idea of "premises" itself is
misleading. Premises are assumed to be of the same nature of the propositions of
which one may debate truthfulness. This is not actually my point, and I will use
the term "premises" as an approximation. I feel these "premises" are hidden
within language and the dynamics of language interpretation. My belief is
supported by indirect arguments. I just look at the philosophy crytics. At the
history of debates over what some philosopher "really" meant to say. Each such
debate clearly reveal the cultural context where it took place. To me, it is
naive to associate these differences in interpretation to "progress", like
philosophical discussion is a purely logical process, and more recent thinkers
comment Plato in a new way just because we have "discovered more" (either
philosophically, historically, and so on). I see something much more subtle and
unspeakable in the general being-another-context working behind the scenes, and
much similar to the way my inconscious and your inconscious, being different,
will always prevent us from understanding each other completely.
Your point seems to be that "truth" is a name for a feeling of sameness. Nothing
cannot feel true other than because it feels the same as something else - hence,
there simply can be no end to the "implies" chain. (BTW, "it feels the same as"
means a feeling of sameness or sameness of feelings? :-) This is thus a much
more structural attack to the concept of truth than mine (which is admittedly
just a feeling/opinion, so a very weak "attack" at all). I still feel your point
is not proven, in my view, or more precisely, what I miss is to know how does
this sameness feeling come up. Why some
things feel the same and some don't. Thus, I hope to read more of your posts.
Anyway I already found several interesting bits in what we said insofar.
AS
--
Andrea Sosio
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