Netscape, AOL, mozilla, or anyone else but me.)

There is a certain amount of liability associated with putting a root CA 
cert into a browser and making it trusted.  Users put their trust into 
any and all web sites that manage to get the lock icon locked without 
overriding security.  If a "rogue" CA's cert is put into their browser,
their trust may be abused, and they may have (in some countries) cause
against the supplier of their browser software.

Recall that mozilla is supposed to be a generic implementation that 
other parties take and customize and re-release under their own name.
Examples of these customized versions of mozilla include Netscape 7
and (if I'm not mistaken) Beonex.  The versions of mozilla distributed
with various Linux distributions may also be examples.  I don't know 
if those are customized or not.

Any party who produces their own mozilla-derivative browser product is 
free to add new trusted root CA certs to their derivative product.  NSS
even includes software tools to facilitate the process.  (These are the
same tools used to add new CA certs into mozilla's NSS source base.)

A CA cert that is added to mozilla's source base becomes a part of all
browser products that are derived from that source base, unless the 
developers of the derivative products take the steps to remove them.
Therefore, it seems to me that it is in the mutual interests of all 
parties who develop derivative products that the root CAs in the 
common mozilla source base be quite trustworthy, enough so that no 
producer of a mozilla derivative should need to remove any CA certs 
from their product.

I'd guess that the money Netscape collects for putting a root CA cert 
into mozilla is used to attempt to ascertain that the CA is truely 
legitimate, and not a rogue CA, and is still alive and well.
In some sense, the mere fact that the CA is willing to pay this money 
is a measure of their legitimacy, I think.  (Few rogue CAs are willing 
to pay anything.)

So, IMO, those who wish to distribute browsers that contain new CA certs 
should produce their own mozilla-derivative browser products, and add 
the CA certs to their own products.

For one's own individual and personal use, it's not necessary to change
any code or produce any derivative product, of course, because mozilla
allows any user to add his own trusted CA certs.  

--
Nelson Bolyard      (speaking only for myself)

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