Ben Bucksch wrote:
What about the model I proposed? First cert for a person is either CA-based or self-signed, subsequent certs *must* be authorized and signed by the previous cert or will be treated as attack.
If the key for the first cert was compromised (fell into the wrong hands), and that cert was self-signed, how can you possibly do revocation on it?
Let's say I can't and that would have been my price for using a self-signed cert. You may have pointed out a good reason to use CA-signed certs.
But it doesn't change my proposal to enforce "continuity" of certs and warn the user, if that's no longer given. I.e. the reaction of the software to a new cert changes depending on if I already have another cert for that correspondent or not.
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