As Ping points out in his blog, there are two steps in a typical phishing
attack: first the email message, then the website.  So when the end-user
clicks on the link to the website, (s)he has already accepted an authority
twice.  Unfortunately for us, the authority of the phisher...



People being people and all end-users being dumb ;) we now have a steep
mountain to climb to win back the user's trust.



Milgram not only raised the issue that Ping is describing here, but also
points us to a solution as he found out that when the immediacy of the
victim was increased, compliance decreased.  Therefore we are only faced
with establishing a higher authority to the end-user then the one of the
phisher in a way that can't be imitated.



The KISS solution (Keep It Simply Stupid) to getting this message across in
the GUI is:

1/ Use a funky background and font colour: GMail uses a white font on a red
background.

2/ Use sound: An authorative voice telling the end-user "SECURITY WARNING!
You are being ripped off!"

3/ Use animation: An animated GIF of a wallet being drained of money.

4/ All of the above



:)



Fabrizio
"Florian Weimer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> * Frank Hecker:
>
> > I thought this was an interesting blog post, with obvious implications
> > for the issue of warning dialogs in Firefox, Thunderbird, etc.
> >
> > http://usablesecurity.com/2005/07/19/obedience-to-authority/
>
> This is certainly a problem.  The more significant issue (and I
> believe it's been raised multiple times on this list) is that
> all-too-common security warnings are not effective at all because
> users tend to increase their productivity by blinding clicking away
> warnings.
>
> Even Emacs' yes-or-no-p quickly becomes equivalent to y-or-n-p, at
> least in my experience.


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