Philip, That's serious security.. I guess I'm depending on the network/security people to keep out IP spoofers. All these queue managers will only be administered from one box, which is also a server and has a fixed address. I don't know if I (MQ admin) should have to worry about 'internal' spoofers.
Implementing a userid and password scheme would involve different operating system's security interfaces. Sounds like a big hurdle. Thanks Peter Heggie -----Original Message----- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, August 12, 2003 12:02 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: MQExplorer Security - Another way Peter, "Can my Server-Connection channel security exit get access to the MQCD's ConnectionName?" Yes, the remote IP address, the ip address of the mqclient, is available. "Can I then compare this value to a known list, supplied in the Send Exit Data attribute, of authorized client machines?" Yes, we do that here... We've even updated it to look at the Distinguished Name if it's an SSL channel. "If the connection name of the client is not a match, then I can terminate the channel?" Yes. We terminate by setting the MCAUSER to an invalid userid which then returns a 2035 (Not Auth) reason code. "Do I have to install a matching exit on the admin server, or can I just have exits on the remote servers?" I think you would only need it on the connection queue manager. "How much of the loophole am I closing? What's left?" Well really there's alot. For instance if your client has its IP address set using DHCP, then maintaining an appropriate list would be difficult. Also, IP spoofing is possible. We're actually doing both IP validation and SSL DN checking. We also have an exit which accepts a username and password. This is a VERY big topic and depending upon your security requirements can become quite difficult. Philip DiStefano IBM Certified Solutions Expert - MQSeries IBM Certified Developer - MQSeries IBM Certified Specialist - MQSeries |---------+----------------------------> | | "Heggie, Peter" | | | <[EMAIL PROTECTED]| | | NGRID.COM> | | | Sent by: MQSeries| | | List | | | <[EMAIL PROTECTED]| | | n.AC.AT> | | | | | | | | | 08/12/2003 10:16 | | | AM | | | Please respond to| | | MQSeries List | | | | |---------+----------------------------> >----------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------| | | | To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] | | cc: | | Subject: MQExplorer Security - Another way | >----------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------| I'm looking for the easiest way to continue using MQExplorer, for myself and others in a Windows user group, while preventing others from taking advantage of a a server-connection channel. I could try writing a channel exit; I'm not sure I want to get into SSL; that would be part of a bigger implementation than I want to deal with. What I'm thinking of doing is using the authentication and authorization functionality of a logon to a Windows server, and then only allowing remote administration to take place from that server. That means that all other (distributed) queue managers would have to verify that an incoming server connection is coming from this (MQ admin) particular server. You know, if Server-Connection channels had the Connection Name property of a Requester channel, I wouldn't need exits... My questions are: Can my Server-Connection channel security exit get access to the MQCD's ConnectionName? Can I then compare this value to a known list, supplied in the Send Exit Data attribute, of authorized client machines? If the connection name of the client is not a match, then I can terminate the channel? Do I have to install a matching exit on the admin server, or can I just have exits on the remote servers? How much of the loophole am I closing? What's left? I still need to think about the Command Server. I can't just disable SYSTEM.ADMIN.COMMAND.QUEUE because then I can't use MQExplorer. As long as I have the local server-connection channel disabled, then have I closed the remaining remote access loopholes? Then I just have to worry about sneaky local applications.. Peter Heggie -----Original Message----- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, August 11, 2003 2:36 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: MCAUSER - conflicting descriptions? FYI... There's another wrinkle to the MCAUSER field. This field is also available on SENDER/SERVER channels, implying that a security exit could change the id to something other than mqm. Unfortunately, that's not how it works and therefore, the affect of setting the MCAUSER field on the these channel types is nothing at all. That is, the authority taken by the MCA is that which started the MCA. The MCAUSER field is ignored. IBM will be changing the documentation... Phil |---------+----------------------------> | | "Heggie, Peter" | | | <[EMAIL PROTECTED]| | | NGRID.COM> | | | Sent by: MQSeries| | | List | | | <[EMAIL PROTECTED]| | | n.AC.AT> | | | | | | | | | 08/08/2003 01:36 | | | PM | | | Please respond to| | | MQSeries List | | | | |---------+----------------------------> >----------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------| | | | To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] | | cc: | | Subject: Re: MCAUSER - conflicting descriptions? | >----------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------| Thanks Rob, Great summary and a full answer. Peter Heggie -----Original Message----- From: Wyatt, T. Rob [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, August 08, 2003 1:30 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: MCAUSER - conflicting descriptions? Peter, There is a resolution process that is used when the MCAUSER is blank. The client will generally inherit the UserID from its process. When this happens, the ID is passed to the SVRCONN channel MCA which uses it to check authority on the CONNECT and OPEN calls. If no UserID is presented by the client, then the UserID that gets authorized is that of the MCA itself, which is usually mqm. It is trivially easy for a client to present the mqm UserID to the SVRCONN channel. In Java the value is set in the code. For some platforms it is set in an environment variable. Even on some platforms that enforce logon (NT, W2K) the user can usually create a local ID called "mqm" and run under that. If you leave a SVRCONN channel open with no exit and no MCAUSER, then ANYONE CAN CONNECT TO THE CHANNEL AND OPERATE WITH FULL ADMIN AUTHORITY. If you set the MCAUSER and do not use a channel exit, this is the value that is always used for authority. This is a great way to restrict client channels to specific IDs but it is usually used with a low-privileged ID. If your client program needs a high-privileged ID (for example, it needs to access the command queue) and you set MCAUSER to mqm, then ANYONE CAN CONNECT TO THE CHANNEL AND OPERATE WITH FULL ADMIN AUTHORITY. In the Clients manual, check out the section on Access Control: http://publibfp.boulder.ibm.com/epubs/html/csqzaf07/csqzaf071m.htm#HDRZS CACC Upshot of all this is that a SVRCONN channel opens your QMgr up so that anyone with a client can gain administrative access. You can use an exit, SSL or a low-privileged ID in the MCAUSER to restrict the channel or you can run the listener under a low-privileged ID. SSL or an exit are the only two of these options that allow you to have secure administrator-level access while restricting others. -- T.Rob -----Original Message----- From: Heggie, Peter [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, August 08, 2003 10:15 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: MCAUSER - conflicting descriptions? I'm looking into the security / access aspects of using MQ Explorer for remote administration. In the System Administration Guide, under Using Snap-Ins to administrate Websphere MQ, Setting up the Websphere MQ Explorer, it says if the MCAUSER is blank, it is possible for a malicious application (as MQI client app) can connect to the same server-conn channel and gain access to qm objects with unlimited authority. In the Security manual, under Providing your own link level security, Security exit, Access control, it says provided there is no security exit at the client end of an MQI channel, a user ID associated with the MQ client application flows from the client connection MCA to the server connection MCA when the client app issues an MQCONN call. The server connection MCA stores this user ID in the RemoteUserIdentifier field in the MQCD. If the MCAUserIdentifier is blank at this time, the MCA stores the same user ID in MCAUserIdentifier. The first excerpt tells me that using a blank MCAUSER on a serverconn channel allows default authority (starting process ID) to be given to anyone who connects. The second excerpt is telling me that the userid of the client application is used by the serverconn MCA (if it is blank). Is the MCAUSER (from first paragraph) is the same as the MCAUserIdentifier (in the second paragraph)?? If so, then why is enabling a queue manager for remote MQ Explorer access dangerous? How can I test this? Do I have to write a PCF - client application? Thanks, Peter National Grid USA Syracuse, NY This e-mail and any files transmitted with it, are confidential to National Grid and are intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. If you have received this e-mail in error, please contact the National Grid USA Enterprise Support Center on 508-389-3375 or 315-428-6360. Instructions for managing your mailing list subscription are provided in the Listserv General Users Guide available at http://www.lsoft.com Archive: http://vm.akh-wien.ac.at/MQSeries.archive Instructions for managing your mailing list subscription are provided in the Listserv General Users Guide available at http://www.lsoft.com Archive: http://vm.akh-wien.ac.at/MQSeries.archive This e-mail and any files transmitted with it, are confidential to National Grid and are intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. If you have received this e-mail in error, please contact the National Grid USA Enterprise Support Center on 508-389-3375 or 315-428-6360. Instructions for managing your mailing list subscription are provided in the Listserv General Users Guide available at http://www.lsoft.com Archive: http://vm.akh-wien.ac.at/MQSeries.archive This communication is for informational purposes only. It is not intended as an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any financial instrument or as an official confirmation of any transaction. All market prices, data and other information are not warranted as to completeness or accuracy and are subject to change without notice. Any comments or statements made herein do not necessarily reflect those of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., its subsidiaries and affiliates. Instructions for managing your mailing list subscription are provided in the Listserv General Users Guide available at http://www.lsoft.com Archive: http://vm.akh-wien.ac.at/MQSeries.archive This e-mail and any files transmitted with it, are confidential to National Grid and are intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. If you have received this e-mail in error, please contact the National Grid USA Enterprise Support Center on 508-389-3375 or 315-428-6360. Instructions for managing your mailing list subscription are provided in the Listserv General Users Guide available at http://www.lsoft.com Archive: http://vm.akh-wien.ac.at/MQSeries.archive This communication is for informational purposes only. It is not intended as an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any financial instrument or as an official confirmation of any transaction. All market prices, data and other information are not warranted as to completeness or accuracy and are subject to change without notice. Any comments or statements made herein do not necessarily reflect those of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., its subsidiaries and affiliates. Instructions for managing your mailing list subscription are provided in the Listserv General Users Guide available at http://www.lsoft.com Archive: http://vm.akh-wien.ac.at/MQSeries.archive This e-mail and any files transmitted with it, are confidential to National Grid and are intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. If you have received this e-mail in error, please contact the National Grid USA Enterprise Support Center on 508-389-3375 or 315-428-6360. Instructions for managing your mailing list subscription are provided in the Listserv General Users Guide available at http://www.lsoft.com Archive: http://vm.akh-wien.ac.at/MQSeries.archive
