April 5, 2010
Who is Responsible for Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Death?
By Saeed Qureshi
Evidently, there were four accomplices in the judicial murder of Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto, the first ever legendary prime minister and a charismatic political 
leader who phenomenally transformed the socio-economic and political landscape 
of Pakistan. One can see a clear demarcation between the previous dispensations 
both autocratic and democratic from that of Mr. Bhutto who pioneered and 
spearheaded a new era of liberalization and social emancipation in Pakistan. 
Mr. Bhutto, a true visionary as he was, utilized his God given genius to unite 
the Islamic fraternity on one platform. He is the architect of the nuclear 
program that virtually has saved Pakistan from a military imbalance with India. 
He fortified armed forces and build heavy ordnance and military hardware 
industries to make Pakistan a veritably strong bulwark for territorial defense 
of Pakistan. He introduced a constitution in 1973 that was essentially 
democratic, and a mix of secularism and Islam. 
Back to the question who was responsible for the judicial murder of Zulfikar 
Ali Bhutto.? These were four accomplices:  the Pakistan army under the command 
of General Ziaul Haq, the United States of America, the biased judiciary and 
the rancorous politicians of Pakistan. In my assessment more than other three 
parties, I hold the political forces opposed to Mr. Bhutto as the main culprit 
and catalyst for eventual physical elimination of an icon via a decidedly 
devious, sham, fraudulent and farcical judicial process. 
In order to substantiate this claim with evidence let us go back to the 
calamitous situation created by the rival political parties in Pakistan 
following the March 1977 elections. But more than the elections which the 
parties claimed were rigged or manipulated, the level of anti Bhutto agitation 
was raised by such catchy yet fictitious slogans as establishing Nizam-e- 
Mustafa.  It is an historical fact that more than any ultra right theocrat or 
religious bigot in power, it was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who took momentous 
decisions to Islamize Pakistan. The constitution was amended to accommodate the 
Islamic injunctions. Never before and after any ruler, even Ziaul Haq, who 
arrogated to himself the role of a caliph and kind a religious fanatic like 
Mughal emperor Aurgnzeb, could take giant steps in favor of an Islamic order as 
a patently secular Bhutto did.
Still, though he did so to appease the hostile and apprehensive ideological 
schools in the country for which the Islamic zealots should have been beholden 
to him. But when their demands were met, they opened another front against him 
at the behest of certain foreign powers and in collusion with the army. The 
COAS Gen Zia was waiting in wings with deceptive demeanor to stage a coup and 
seize power as the upheaval whipped up by rowdy politicians rapidly aggravated.
There is an enormous amount of bias on the part of several anti-Bhutto writers 
and historians while analyzing his personality, policies and tenure of 
government. These critics would dwell more pointedly on his imposition of 
martial law in response to the PNA’s sponsored countrywide civil disobedience 
movement after the March 1977 elections. With an unrest fueled and led by the 
hate-filled ultra right opposition parties as Jamat-I Islami in tandem with 
others, what was the way-out to restore law and order in the country? But 
despite a breakdown of law and order in Pakistan, Bhutto should have desisted 
from imposing martial law. By doing so he accepted the martial law as the 
viable option for maintenance of peace or curbing the burgeoning and 
proliferating lawlessness and anarchy in the country.
 Although finally he succumbed to the call of the PNA to hold fresh elections 
and almost settled terms and ironed out contentious issues with the opposition, 
but it too late and the martial law was clamped over Pakistan on July 5, 1977, 
by Gen Ziaul Haq  who was handpicked by Bhutto by superceding other senior 
generals. General Zia was covertly aligned more intimately with Jamat-i-Islami 
and implicitly with other religious and political parties, having common malice 
against Bhutto. Still Bhutto could have escaped death but the unrelenting 
campaigning by Jamat Islami joined by NAP, JUP and JUI and Tehrik-i-e-Istiqlal 
chief Air marshal Asghar Khan, an inveterate adversary of Bhutto, gave enough 
confidence to military regime to hang Mr. Bhutto.
But despite his extraordinary genius, immense sharpness of vision and 
exceptional political acumen, Mr. Bhutto couldn’t perceive the direction of the 
political wind blowing against him. He remained under the illusion that he 
could turn the tables against the army and revive his waned popularity. From 
the time of his release after Zia’s martial law on July 29, to the first arrest 
on September 3, bail on September13, to the final arrest on September17, 1977 
against a fabricated murder case, he toured the country and delivered fiery 
speeches that indeed started generating public sympathy and support in his 
favor. But a visible popular tilt in favor was no match to the brutal and 
oppressive apparatus of the army and the seething contempt that the political 
opposition had for him. 
Simultaneously, he overlooked the fact that among his enemies, the United 
States was also pulling her strings to keep the public discontent boiling 
against him via supporting the anti Bhutto political and religious forces. 
Bhutto was confronted with formidable opponents on several fronts which could 
not be beaten or overpowered simply by hard hitting public speeches or charisma 
of his personality. The result was that his supporters who staged rallies and 
resorted to sloganeering in his favor were brutally crushed by the army.
The animus of the opposition parties towards Bhutto did not recede even after 
his arrest and trial through an ostensibly spurious judicial process and by the 
custodians of law who were his committed enemies. There are very few examples 
in the history when the dignity of courts and sanctity of justice has been so 
blatantly and insolently violated as in the case of Bhutto. The army, the 
judges, the opposition parties and foreign powers collectively ensured that 
Bhutto was not only deposed through the military coup but was humiliated, 
tortured and finally sent to the gallows. The oppression of history is always 
dominant and determines its own course. Perhaps it was agreed upon between the 
domestic and foreign powers to replace Bhutto with a governmental set up that 
could launch a crusade against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The industrial, 
mercantile and feudal classes in Pakistan had also to settle their score with 
Bhutto for nationalizing their
 factories and lands. 
It would be putting the history in proper and correct perspective if the 
historians, the analysts, the commentators should mention both Bhutto’s 
weaknesses and his sterling accomplishments. There is no harm in acknowledging 
that Bhutto super-humanly managed the gubernatorial crisis that engulfed 
Pakistan following the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. With the total 
collapse of the defense system, the complete societal anarchy, battered 
economy, a demoralized nation; a most humiliating surrender by Pakistan army, 
the Indian armed forces knocking at West Pakistan; the reconstruction of 
Pakistan by Bhutto is a unique and stupendous achievement that alone entitles 
him to the highest esteem and adulation of Pakistani nation. Now in the 
hindsight, under a scant and much belated display of remorse, parties like 
Jamat-Islami not only acknowledge the brilliant achievements of Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto towards Islam and the country but berate the judicial process
 crafted against him for his physical elimination.
After his death,  Mr. Bhutto has emerged as a more revered and exalted icon, 
because his achievements outweigh his weaknesses. After all he was a human 
being and human beings are prone to err. But we must honestly acknowledge that 
Mr. Bhutto picked up the pieces and saved the remaining Pakistan.  The 
dismemberment of Pakistan was the result of the military action in former East 
Pakistan and refusal by the army to hand over power to Awami League, the winner 
of elections of December 1970.
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Saeed Qureshi

Website: http://www.uprightopinion.com

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