Kevin J. McCarthy wrote: > The interface issues can be discussed and implemented later. The > purpose of this patchset is simply to allow the user to enter a > fingerprint when searching for a key. > > Putting it in a pgp_uid_t is the easiest approach, but it's not the > correct approach. I'd really rather have it done right the first time.
This was a little more involved than just changing the fingerprint field to an array of length 41, so I thought I'd step up and do what I was asking for. Attached are three patches. The first changes the fingerprint to "char *" and modifies pgppubring.c as needed. The second adds fpr parsing to get_candidates() and stores it in the new fingerprint field in the key. The last patch is a folded version of your two patches, slightly cleaned up with the pgp_uid_t stuff removed. (I didn't touch the crypt_get_fingerprint_or_id() function). If you are okay with my modifications to your patches, I'll push these after some more testing and giving others a chance to review them. -Kevin
# HG changeset patch
# User Kevin McCarthy <ke...@8t8.us>
# Date 1423882226 28800
# Fri Feb 13 18:50:26 2015 -0800
# Node ID 92c80d8bb14487e155a51b5e18646a655c506c28
# Parent 385d7434c9d6f44c732fd12fc76d543f9d5d7233
Convert pgp_key_t fingerprint to a char* (see #3695)
Currently only pgppubring.c is using the fingerprint field, and is using
it to store a binary version of the fingerprint.
Convert the field to store a null-terminated string.
Modify pgppubring.c to use to use the new field.
diff --git a/pgplib.c b/pgplib.c
--- a/pgplib.c
+++ b/pgplib.c
@@ -178,16 +178,17 @@
if (!kpp || !*kpp)
return;
kp = *kpp;
pgp_free_uid (&kp->address);
FREE (&kp->keyid);
+ FREE (&kp->fingerprint);
/* mutt_crypt.h: 'typedef struct pgp_keyinfo *pgp_key_t;' */
FREE (kpp); /* __FREE_CHECKED__ */
}
pgp_key_t pgp_remove_key (pgp_key_t *klist, pgp_key_t key)
{
pgp_key_t *last;
pgp_key_t p, q, r;
diff --git a/pgplib.h b/pgplib.h
--- a/pgplib.h
+++ b/pgplib.h
@@ -29,32 +29,26 @@
unsigned long sid1;
unsigned long sid2;
}
pgp_sig_t;
struct pgp_keyinfo
{
char *keyid;
+ char *fingerprint;
struct pgp_uid *address;
int flags;
short keylen;
time_t gen_time;
int numalg;
const char *algorithm;
struct pgp_keyinfo *parent;
struct pgp_signature *sigs;
struct pgp_keyinfo *next;
-
- short fp_len; /* length of fingerprint.
- * 20 for sha-1, 16 for md5.
- */
- unsigned char fingerprint[20]; /* large enough to hold SHA-1 and RIPEMD160
- hashes (20 bytes), MD5 hashes just use the
- first 16 bytes */
};
/* Note, that pgp_key_t is now pointer and declared in crypt.h */
typedef struct pgp_uid
{
char *addr;
short trust;
int flags;
diff --git a/pgppubring.c b/pgppubring.c
--- a/pgppubring.c
+++ b/pgppubring.c
@@ -151,16 +151,33 @@
snprintf (kring, sizeof (kring), "%s/pubring.%s", pgppath, version == 2
? "pgp" : "pkr");
}
pgpring_find_candidates (kring, (const char**) argv + optind, argc - optind);
return 0;
}
+static char *binary_fingerprint_to_string (unsigned char *buff, size_t length)
+{
+ int i;
+ char *fingerprint, *pf;
+
+ pf = fingerprint = (char *)safe_malloc ((length * 2) + 1);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
+ {
+ sprintf (pf, "%02X", buff[i]);
+ pf += 2;
+ }
+ *pf = 0;
+
+ return fingerprint;
+}
+
/* The actual key ring parser */
static void pgp_make_pgp2_fingerprint (unsigned char *buff,
unsigned char *digest)
{
struct md5_ctx ctx;
unsigned int size = 0;
@@ -216,22 +233,19 @@
p->numalg = alg;
p->algorithm = pgp_pkalgbytype (alg);
p->flags |= pgp_get_abilities (alg);
if (dump_fingerprints)
{
/* j now points to the key material, which we need for the fingerprint */
- p->fp_len = MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
pgp_make_pgp2_fingerprint (&buff[j], digest);
- memcpy (p->fingerprint, digest, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ p->fingerprint = binary_fingerprint_to_string (digest, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH);
}
- else /* just to be usre */
- memset (p->fingerprint, 0, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH);
expl = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++)
expl = (expl << 8) + buff[j++];
p->keylen = expl;
expl = (expl + 7) / 8;
@@ -337,17 +351,20 @@
if (alg >= 1 && alg <= 3)
skip_bignum (buff, l, j, &j, 2);
else if (alg == 17 || alg == 16 || alg == 20)
skip_bignum (buff, l, j, &j, 1);
pgp_make_pgp3_fingerprint (buff, j, digest);
- p->fp_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ if (dump_fingerprints)
+ {
+ p->fingerprint = binary_fingerprint_to_string (digest, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ }
for (k = 0; k < 2; k++)
{
for (id = 0, i = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 8 + k * 4;
i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + (k - 1) * 4; i++)
id = (id << 8) + digest[i];
snprintf ((char *) scratch + k * 8, sizeof (scratch) - k * 8, "%08lX", id);
@@ -824,23 +841,20 @@
putchar (*id);
else
printf ("\\x%02x", (*id) & 0xff);
}
}
static void print_fingerprint (pgp_key_t p)
{
- int i = 0;
+ if (!p->fingerprint)
+ return;
- printf ("fpr:::::::::");
- for (i = 0; i < p->fp_len; i++)
- printf ("%02X", p->fingerprint[i]);
- printf (":\n");
-
+ printf ("fpr:::::::::%s:\n", p->fingerprint);
} /* print_fingerprint() */
static void pgpring_dump_signatures (pgp_sig_t *sig)
{
for (; sig; sig = sig->next)
{
if (sig->sigtype == 0x10 || sig->sigtype == 0x11 ||
# HG changeset patch
# User Kevin McCarthy <ke...@8t8.us>
# Date 1423882239 28800
# Fri Feb 13 18:50:39 2015 -0800
# Node ID 6213c21607b79b1faab74ce39573c17a08011fb8
# Parent 92c80d8bb14487e155a51b5e18646a655c506c28
Add fingerprint record parsing for pgp list keys. (see #3695)
Modify parse_pub_line to parse fpr records and add the fingerprint to
the pgp_key_t's fingerprint field.
Add "--with-fingerprint --with-fingerprint" to the
pgp_list_pubring_command and pgp_list_secring_command commands in
contrib/gpg.rc. The second invocation generates fpr records for subkeys
too.
diff --git a/contrib/gpg.rc b/contrib/gpg.rc
--- a/contrib/gpg.rc
+++ b/contrib/gpg.rc
@@ -60,20 +60,20 @@
# export a key from the public key ring
set pgp_export_command="gpg --no-verbose --export --armor %r"
# verify a key
set pgp_verify_key_command="gpg --verbose --batch --fingerprint --check-sigs
%r"
# read in the public key ring
-set pgp_list_pubring_command="gpg --no-verbose --batch --quiet --with-colons
--list-keys %r"
+set pgp_list_pubring_command="gpg --no-verbose --batch --quiet --with-colons
--with-fingerprint --with-fingerprint --list-keys %r"
# read in the secret key ring
-set pgp_list_secring_command="gpg --no-verbose --batch --quiet --with-colons
--list-secret-keys %r"
+set pgp_list_secring_command="gpg --no-verbose --batch --quiet --with-colons
--with-fingerprint --with-fingerprint --list-secret-keys %r"
# fetch keys
# set pgp_getkeys_command="pkspxycwrap %r"
# pattern for good signature - may need to be adapted to locale!
# set pgp_good_sign="^gpgv?: Good signature from "
diff --git a/gnupgparse.c b/gnupgparse.c
--- a/gnupgparse.c
+++ b/gnupgparse.c
@@ -116,16 +116,17 @@
}
}
static pgp_key_t parse_pub_line (char *buf, int *is_subkey, pgp_key_t k)
{
pgp_uid_t *uid = NULL;
int field = 0, is_uid = 0;
int is_pub = 0;
+ int is_fpr = 0;
char *pend, *p;
int trust = 0;
int flags = 0;
struct pgp_keyinfo tmp;
*is_subkey = 0;
if (!*buf)
return NULL;
@@ -143,36 +144,41 @@
for (p = buf; p; p = pend)
{
if ((pend = strchr (p, ':')))
*pend++ = 0;
field++;
if (!*p && (field != 1) && (field != 10))
continue;
+ if (is_fpr && (field != 10))
+ continue;
+
switch (field)
{
case 1: /* record type */
{
dprint (2, (debugfile, "record type: %s\n", p));
if (!mutt_strcmp (p, "pub"))
is_pub = 1;
else if (!mutt_strcmp (p, "sub"))
*is_subkey = 1;
else if (!mutt_strcmp (p, "sec"))
;
else if (!mutt_strcmp (p, "ssb"))
*is_subkey = 1;
else if (!mutt_strcmp (p, "uid"))
is_uid = 1;
+ else if (!mutt_strcmp (p, "fpr"))
+ is_fpr = 1;
else
return NULL;
- if (!(is_uid || (*is_subkey && option (OPTPGPIGNORESUB))))
+ if (!(is_uid || is_fpr || (*is_subkey && option (OPTPGPIGNORESUB))))
memset (&tmp, 0, sizeof (tmp));
break;
}
case 2: /* trust info */
{
dprint (2, (debugfile, "trust info: %s\n", p));
@@ -285,16 +291,24 @@
* We allow an empty field for a pub record type because it is
* possible for a primary uid record to have an empty User-ID
* field. Without any address records, it is not possible to
* use the key in mutt.
*/
if (!(pend && (*p || is_pub)))
break;
+ if (is_fpr)
+ {
+ /* don't let a subkey fpr overwrite and existing primary key fpr */
+ if (!tmp.fingerprint)
+ tmp.fingerprint = safe_strdup (p);
+ break;
+ }
+
/* ignore user IDs on subkeys */
if (!is_uid && (*is_subkey && option (OPTPGPIGNORESUB)))
break;
dprint (2, (debugfile, "user ID: %s\n", NONULL (p)));
uid = safe_calloc (sizeof (pgp_uid_t), 1);
fix_uid (p);
@@ -344,17 +358,17 @@
break;
default:
break;
}
}
/* merge temp key back into real key */
- if (!(is_uid || (*is_subkey && option (OPTPGPIGNORESUB))))
+ if (!(is_uid || is_fpr || (*is_subkey && option (OPTPGPIGNORESUB))))
k = safe_malloc (sizeof (*k));
memcpy (k, &tmp, sizeof (*k));
/* fixup parentship of uids after mering the temp key into
* the real key */
if (tmp.address)
{
for (uid = k->address; uid; uid = uid->next)
uid->parent = k;
# HG changeset patch
# User Eike Rathke <er...@erack.de>
# Date 1423687117 -3600
# Wed Feb 11 21:38:37 2015 +0100
# Node ID 15394c7694ca6780261e4bae5a2ce61429ba8d55
# Parent 6213c21607b79b1faab74ce39573c17a08011fb8
Allow fingerprint user input for key selection. (see #3695)
Accept and check input of a fingerprint and find the matching key.
Note that for both to work, match against and display of fingerprint, the
pgp_list_pubring_command and pgp_list_secring_command need to contain the
--with-fingerprint option, or have with-fingerprint in ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf.
diff --git a/crypt-gpgme.c b/crypt-gpgme.c
--- a/crypt-gpgme.c
+++ b/crypt-gpgme.c
@@ -4183,64 +4183,57 @@
static crypt_key_t *crypt_getkeybystr (char *p, short abilities,
unsigned int app, int *forced_valid)
{
LIST *hints = NULL;
crypt_key_t *keys;
crypt_key_t *matches = NULL;
crypt_key_t **matches_endp = &matches;
crypt_key_t *k;
- const char *ps, *pl;
+ const char *ps, *pl, *pfcopy, *phint;
mutt_message (_("Looking for keys matching \"%s\"..."), p);
*forced_valid = 0;
- hints = crypt_add_string_to_hints (hints, p);
+ pfcopy = crypt_get_fingerprint_or_id (p, &phint, &pl, &ps);
+ hints = crypt_add_string_to_hints (hints, phint);
keys = get_candidates (hints, app, (abilities & KEYFLAG_CANSIGN));
mutt_free_list (&hints);
if (!keys)
+ {
+ FREE (&pfcopy);
return NULL;
-
- /* User input may be short or long key ID, independent of OPTPGPLONGIDS.
- * crypt_key_t->keyid should always contain a long key ID without 0x.
- * Strip leading "0x" before loops so it doesn't have to be done over and
- * over again, and prepare pl and ps to simplify logic in the loop's inner
- * condition.
- */
- pl = (!mutt_strncasecmp (p, "0x", 2) ? p + 2 : p);
- ps = (mutt_strlen (pl) == 16 ? pl + 8 : pl);
-
- /* If ps != pl it means a long ID (or name of 16 characters) was given, do
- * not attempt to match short IDs then. Also, it is unnecessary to try to
- * match pl against long IDs if ps == pl as pl could not be a long ID. */
-
+ }
+
for (k = keys; k; k = k->next)
{
if (abilities && !(k->flags & abilities))
continue;
dprint (5, (debugfile, "crypt_getkeybystr: matching \"%s\" against "
"key %s, \"%s\": ", p, crypt_long_keyid (k), k->uid));
if (!*p
- || (ps != pl && mutt_strcasecmp (pl, crypt_long_keyid (k)) == 0)
- || (ps == pl && mutt_strcasecmp (ps, crypt_short_keyid (k)) == 0)
+ || (pfcopy && mutt_strcasecmp (pfcopy, crypt_fpr (k)) == 0)
+ || (pl && mutt_strcasecmp (pl, crypt_long_keyid (k)) == 0)
+ || (ps && mutt_strcasecmp (ps, crypt_short_keyid (k)) == 0)
|| mutt_stristr (k->uid, p))
{
crypt_key_t *tmp;
dprint (5, (debugfile, "match.\n"));
*matches_endp = tmp = crypt_copy_key (k);
matches_endp = &tmp->next;
}
}
+ FREE (&pfcopy);
crypt_free_key (&keys);
if (matches)
{
k = crypt_select_key (matches, NULL, p, app, forced_valid);
crypt_free_key (&matches);
return k;
}
diff --git a/crypt.c b/crypt.c
--- a/crypt.c
+++ b/crypt.c
@@ -895,8 +895,86 @@
if (s->flags & M_DISPLAY && sigcnt)
state_attach_puts (_("\n[-- End of signed data --]\n"), s);
return rc;
}
+/* Obtain pointers to fingerprint or short or long key ID, if any.
+ * See mutt_crypt.h for details.
+ */
+const char* crypt_get_fingerprint_or_id (char *p, const char **pphint,
+ const char **ppl, const char **pps)
+{
+ const char *ps, *pl, *phint;
+ char *pfcopy, *pf, *s1, *s2;
+ char c;
+ int isid;
+
+ /* User input may be partial name, fingerprint or short or long key ID,
+ * independent of OPTPGPLONGIDS.
+ * Fingerprint without spaces is 40 hex digits (SHA-1) or 32 hex digits
(MD5).
+ * Strip leading "0x" for key ID detection and prepare pl and ps to indicate
+ * if an ID was found and to simplify logic in the key loop's inner
+ * condition of the caller. */
+
+ pf = mutt_skip_whitespace (p);
+ if (!mutt_strncasecmp (pf, "0x", 2))
+ pf += 2;
+
+ /* Check if a fingerprint is given, must be hex digits only, blanks
+ * separating groups of 4 hex digits are allowed. Also pre-check for ID. */
+ isid = 2; /* unknown */
+ s1 = s2 = pf;
+ do
+ {
+ c = *(s2++);
+ if (('0' <= c && c <= '9') || ('A' <= c && c <= 'F') || ('a' <= c && c <=
'f'))
+ {
+ ++s1; /* hex digit */
+ if (isid == 2)
+ isid = 1; /* it is an ID so far */
+ }
+ else if (c)
+ {
+ isid = 0; /* not an ID */
+ if (c == ' ' && (((s1 - pf) % 4) == 0))
+ ; /* skip blank before or after 4 hex digits */
+ else
+ break; /* any other character or position */
+ }
+ } while (c);
+
+ /* If at end of input, check for correct fingerprint length and copy if. */
+ pfcopy = (!c && (((s1 - pf) == 40) || ((s1 - pf) == 32)) ? safe_strdup (pf)
: NULL);
+
+ if (pfcopy)
+ {
+ /* Use pfcopy to strip all spaces from fingerprint and as hint. */
+ s1 = s2 = pfcopy;
+ do
+ {
+ *(s1++) = *(s2 = mutt_skip_whitespace (s2));
+ } while (*(s2++));
+
+ phint = pfcopy;
+ ps = pl = NULL;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ phint = p;
+ ps = pl = NULL;
+ if (isid == 1)
+ {
+ if (mutt_strlen (pf) == 16)
+ pl = pf; /* long key ID */
+ else if (mutt_strlen (pf) == 8)
+ ps = pf; /* short key ID */
+ }
+ }
+
+ *pphint = phint;
+ *ppl = pl;
+ *pps = ps;
+ return pfcopy;
+}
diff --git a/mutt_crypt.h b/mutt_crypt.h
--- a/mutt_crypt.h
+++ b/mutt_crypt.h
@@ -148,16 +148,26 @@
/* Check that we have a usable passphrase, ask if not. */
int crypt_valid_passphrase (int);
/* Write the message body/part A described by state S to a the given
TEMPFILE. */
int crypt_write_signed(BODY *a, STATE *s, const char *tempf);
+/* Obtain pointers to fingerprint or short or long key ID, if any.
+ Return: Copy of fingerprint, if any, stripped of all spaces, else NULL.
+ Must be FREE'd by caller.
+ *pphint Start of string to be passed to pgp_add_string_to_hints() or
+ crypt_add_string_to_hints().
+ *ppl Start of long key ID if detected, else NULL.
+ *pps Start of short key ID if detected, else NULL. */
+const char* crypt_get_fingerprint_or_id (char *p, const char **pphint,
+ const char **ppl, const char **pps);
+
/*-- cryptglue.c --*/
/* Show a message that a backend will be invoked. */
void crypt_invoke_message (int type);
diff --git a/pgpkey.c b/pgpkey.c
--- a/pgpkey.c
+++ b/pgpkey.c
@@ -927,39 +927,31 @@
LIST *hints = NULL;
pgp_key_t keys;
pgp_key_t matches = NULL;
pgp_key_t *last = &matches;
pgp_key_t k, kn;
pgp_uid_t *a;
short match;
size_t l;
- const char *ps, *pl;
+ const char *ps, *pl, *pfcopy, *phint;
if ((l = mutt_strlen (p)) && p[l-1] == '!')
p[l-1] = 0;
mutt_message (_("Looking for keys matching \"%s\"..."), p);
- hints = pgp_add_string_to_hints (hints, p);
+ pfcopy = crypt_get_fingerprint_or_id (p, &phint, &pl, &ps);
+ hints = pgp_add_string_to_hints (hints, phint);
keys = pgp_get_candidates (keyring, hints);
mutt_free_list (&hints);
if (!keys)
goto out;
- /* User input may be short or long key ID, independent of OPTPGPLONGIDS.
- * pgp_key_t->keyid should always contain a long key ID without 0x.
- * Strip leading "0x" before loops so it doesn't have to be done over and
- * over again, and prepare pl and ps to simplify logic in the loop's inner
- * condition.
- */
- pl = (!mutt_strncasecmp (p, "0x", 2) ? p + 2 : p);
- ps = (mutt_strlen (pl) == 16 ? pl + 8 : pl);
-
for (k = keys; k; k = kn)
{
kn = k->next;
if (abilities && !(k->flags & abilities))
continue;
/* This shouldn't happen, but keys without any addresses aren't selectable
* in pgp_select_key().
@@ -967,22 +959,20 @@
if (!k->address)
continue;
match = 0;
dprint (5, (debugfile, "pgp_getkeybystr: matching \"%s\" against key
%s:\n",
p, pgp_long_keyid (k)));
- /* If ps != pl it means a long ID (or name of 16 characters) was given, do
- * not attempt to match short IDs then. Also, it is unnecessary to try to
- * match pl against long IDs if ps == pl as pl could not be a long ID. */
if (!*p ||
- (ps != pl && mutt_strcasecmp (pl, pgp_long_keyid (k)) == 0) ||
- (ps == pl && mutt_strcasecmp (ps, pgp_short_keyid (k)) == 0))
+ (pfcopy && mutt_strcasecmp (pfcopy, k->fingerprint) == 0) ||
+ (pl && mutt_strcasecmp (pl, pgp_long_keyid (k)) == 0) ||
+ (ps && mutt_strcasecmp (ps, pgp_short_keyid (k)) == 0))
{
dprint (5, (debugfile, "\t\tmatch.\n"));
match = 1;
}
else
{
for (a = k->address; a; a = a->next)
{
@@ -1008,20 +998,22 @@
pgp_free_key (&keys);
if (matches)
{
if ((k = pgp_select_key (matches, NULL, p)))
pgp_remove_key (&matches, k);
pgp_free_key (&matches);
+ FREE (&pfcopy);
if (l && !p[l-1])
p[l-1] = '!';
return k;
}
out:
+ FREE (&pfcopy);
if (l && !p[l-1])
p[l-1] = '!';
return NULL;
}
#endif /* CRYPT_BACKEND_CLASSIC_PGP */
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
