In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within usa, can. Inferred improvements during Nov 2025: ASN Name Fixed-By 20119 ARROW 2025-11-01 19935 CRRS 2025-11-02 214639 2025-11-15 61461 Airtek Solutions C.A. 2025-11-21 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during Nov 2025: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 4901 CAAREN 2017-04-23 2025-11-30 33363 BHN-33363 2018-11-29 2025-11-22 22883 CONDENAST 2019-05-29 2025-11-18 21804 ACCESS-SK 2019-06-09 2025-11-27 55016 IMPER-AS-1 2021-05-18 2025-11-29 22773 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC 2021-10-24 2025-11-26 12183 TALKIE-COMMUNICATIONS 2022-12-10 2025-11-28 855 CANET-ASN-4 2023-04-26 2025-11-17 400282 2023-04-27 2025-11-28 393577 SCCNET 2023-05-03 2025-11-25 394684 AS-GOLD 2024-01-17 2025-11-29 27425 ASN-IDK-27425 2024-02-21 2025-11-16 53755 IOFLOOD 2024-02-23 2025-11-28 393530 TLU 2024-05-22 2025-11-30 54334 ROYA 2025-03-13 2025-11-27 273843 2025-04-02 2025-11-25 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=usa,can&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to [email protected] _______________________________________________ NANOG mailing list https://lists.nanog.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/SGTA7LEF7DFPCZ2MIB63MS5UDQT3NJPU/
