In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within usa, can. Inferred improvements during Jan 2026: none inferred Source Address Validation issues inferred during Jan 2026: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 27364 ACS-INTERNET 2016-09-27 2026-01-09 22883 CONDENAST 2019-05-29 2026-01-27 21804 ACCESS-SK 2019-06-09 2026-01-29 52643 N&G Tecnologia LTDA 2019-09-24 2026-01-27 393397 LREC-LRT 2020-08-02 2026-01-24 36352 AS-COLOCROSSING 2020-10-08 2026-01-29 55016 IMPER-AS-1 2021-05-18 2026-01-25 22773 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC 2021-10-24 2026-01-27 12183 TALKIE-COMMUNICATIONS 2022-12-10 2026-01-30 855 CANET-ASN-4 2023-04-26 2026-01-18 400282 2023-04-27 2026-01-31 393577 SCCNET 2023-05-03 2026-01-31 394684 AS-GOLD 2024-01-17 2026-01-31 27425 ASN-IDK-27425 2024-02-21 2026-01-22 53755 IOFLOOD 2024-02-23 2026-01-30 393530 TLU 2024-05-22 2026-01-28 19935 CRRS 2024-05-29 2026-01-22 273143 2025-01-22 2026-01-24 54334 ROYA 2025-03-13 2026-01-29 273843 2025-04-02 2026-01-28 271951 IT PRONETWORK C.A. 2026-01-21 2026-01-21 399439 ATV-PUBLIC 2026-01-28 2026-01-28 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=usa,can&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to [email protected] _______________________________________________ NANOG mailing list https://lists.nanog.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/FMRNNKETAKDQLCRXYXOTEH7GRD5H7ZSB/
