On Wed, 9 Jul 2003, Eric Kuhnke wrote: > I recall reading, last year, about a "Cyber Bunker" outside London UK > which is being offered as colo to major banks. The banks were raving > praise about it. This facility is an ex-RAF centralized radar control > site, buried dozens of feet underground w/ thick concrete and designed > to withstand nuclear weapon overpressure. Blast doors, EMF shielding, > dual-redundant air filtered generators, the works.
In the US, American Tower is/was liquidating a number of cold war era ex-AT&T blast-proof sites. They are all in need of an upgrade, but the basics are there (underground, multiple layers of concrete, blast doors, etc. Even "blast toilets". I'm surprised some enterprising/paranoid soul has not snatched a few of these up and converted them into secure offsite storage. Even without diverse routes, you can ensure safe data storage. Charles > The people who bought it and turned it into a colo neglected to mention > one thing: It's in the middle of a farm field with a single homed fiber > route to Telehouse Docklands. > > Anyone have a backhoe? *snip* > > DIVERSE ROUTES, people! > > At 05:30 PM 7/9/2003 +0100, you wrote: > > >[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > >> However we can work to spread out the infrastructure more so that it > >> is harder for terrorists to find a single point of failure to attack. > >> If they have to coordinate an attack on 3 or 4 locations, there is an > >> increased probability that something will go wrong (as on 9/11) and > >> one or more of their targets will escape total destruction. > > > >I hate to be a doom sayer, but any chump with a couple of tools and > >rudimentary knowledge can lift manholes, cut cables and jump to another > >location in minutes. No amount of diversity could defend against a concerted > >attack like that unless you start installing very special low-level routes > >away from street level into many many buildings. Maybe you guys in the US > >are historically more paranoid, but London is just covered in single points > >of major failure for telecoms. > > > >Protecting the switching centres (IP or voice) looks great, but walk a few > >hundred feet and all senblence of physical security breaks. > > > >Peter > >