> On Wed, 17 Sep 2003, [ISO-8859-1] Mathias Körber wrote: > > > > If we take a step back, we could say that the whole Verisign incident > > > demonstrated pretty clearly that the fundamental DNS premise of having no > > > more than one root in the namespace is seriously wrong. This is the > > > fallacy of "universal classification" so convincingly trashed by > > > J.L.Borges in "The Analytical Language of John Wilkins". Sigle-root > > > classifications simply do not work in real-world contexts. > > > ... for objects which are created outside said classification and need > > to/ want to/should be classified in it. However, the DNS does not > > pretend to classify anything existing outside it in the real-world but > > implements a namespace with the stated goal of providing unique > > identification (which still requires a single-root) > > Technically, DNS encodes the authority delegation, _and_ tries to attach > human-readable labels to every entity accessible by the Internet. > > If the goal were unique identification, MAC addresses would do just fine. > No need for DNS.
MAC addresses are not without authority delegation. The IEEE is the ultimate authority in said case. Any solution which requires uniqueness also requires a singular ultimate authority.