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====================== NEW Materials =========================
Powersession on Core Security (4-6 May 2004)
http://www.ciscoeventreg.net/go/networkers/agenda9.lasso
CPN Summit SP Security Materials (April 2004)
ftp://ftp-eng.cisco.com/cons/isp/security/CPN-Summit-2004/
====================== Public Materials ========================
SP Security Materials
- ----------------------
Public On-Line ISP Security Bootcamp - Singapore Summer 2003
http://www.getitmm.com/bootcampflash/launch.html
Sign-On:
http://palomar.getitmm.com/bootcamp/
Much of the materials presented in the ISP Security Bootcamp builds
on and assumes a basic understanding of the principles in the ISP
Essentials materials. This whitepaper is now a book - ISP Essentials
which can be purchased through Cisco Press
(http://www.ciscopress.com/) or through another on-line book store.
The supplements for the book along with the tutorials, workshops, and
bootcamps presented by Philip and I are at:
ftp://ftp-eng.cisco.com/cons/
or
http://www.ispbook.com
TEAM CYMRU Templates and Tools
- ------------------------------
Team CYMRU provides configuration templates, security templates, and
other services to help make the Internet a safer place to network.
These can be found at:
http://www.cymru.com/
The Original Backscattered Traceback and Customer Triggered Remote
Triggered Black Hole Techniques
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
- ---------------------------
http://www.secsup.org/Tracking/
http://www.secsup.org/CustomerBlackHole/
What is a BOTNET?
- -----------------
One of the best write ups is from a freeware tool gone commercial (I
guess so they can scale).
http://swatit.org/bots/index.html
BGP 'Attack Tree' - Realities of BGP Security
- -------------------------------------------
Cisco's CIAG Team moves beyond the armchair hypothesizing of BGP
Security Risk and runs test again the industry's multiple
implementations of BGP
http://wwwin-people.cisco.com/sean/ciag-bgp-blackhatv2.pdf
Communities of People Working Together to Mitigate Miscreant
Activities
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
- -
+ Distributed Detection Systems Individuals and Organizations can
Participate:
Dshield - www.dshield.org
My Netwatchman - www.mynetwatchman.com
NANOG SP Security Seminars and Talks
- -------------------------------------
The NANOG Coordination Committee actively works to product sessions
and seminars to help foster security on the Internet. All sessions
are taped and converted to VOD for all to use for their personal
education. Over time, this effort has generated a valuable On-Line
Tutorial for engineers and organzations seeking to learn more about
running a more secure network.
NANOG Security Tutorial Series
Tutorial: Implementing a Secure Network Infrastructure (Part I)
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0310/kaeo.html
Tutorial: ISP Security - Real World Techniques I - Remote Triggered
Black Hole Filtering and Backscatter Traceback.
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0110/greene.html
Tutorial: ISP Security - Real World Techniques II - Secure the CPE
Edge
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0210/ispsecure.html
Tutorial: ISP Security: Deploying and Using Sinkholes
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0306/sink.html
Tutorial: Deploying IP Anycast
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0310/miller.html
NANOG Security Sessions
Watching Your Router Configurations and Detecting Those Exciting
Little Changes
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0310/rancid.html
Building a Web of Trust
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0310/abley.html
The Relationship Between Network Security and Spam
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0310/spam.html
Simple Router Security, What Every ISP Router Engineer Should Know
and Practice
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0310/routersec.html
Flawed Routers Flood University of Wisconsin Internet Time Server
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0310/plonka.html
Trends in Denial of Service Attack Technology
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0110/cert.html
Recent Internet Worms: Who Are the Victims, and How Good Are We at
Getting the Word Out?
` http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0110/moore.html
DoS Attacks in the Real World
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0110/irc.html
Diversion & Sieving Techniques to Defeat DDoS
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0110/afek.html
DNS Damage - Measurements at a Root Server
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0202/evi.html
Protecting the BGP Routes to Top Level DNS Servers
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0206/bush.html
BGP Security Update
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0206/barry.html
Industry/Government Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment:
Background and Recommendations
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0206/avi.html
A National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0210/sachs.html
How to 0wn the Internet in Your Spare Time
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0210/vern.html
ISP Security BOF I
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0210/securebof.html
The Spread of the Sapphire/Slammer Worm
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0302/weaver.html
ISP Security BOF II
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0302/securebof.html
The BGP TTL Security Hack
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0302/hack.html
Security Considerations for Network Architecture
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0302/avi.html
Lack of Priority Queuing on Route Processors Considered Harmful
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0302/gill.html
Interception Technology: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly!
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0306/schiller.html
The NIAC Vulnerability Disclosure Framework and What It Might Mean to
the ISP Community
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0306/duncan.html
Inter-Provider Coordination for Real-Time Tracebacks
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0306/moriarity.html
ISP Security BOF III
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0306/securitybof.html
S-BGP/soBGP Panel: What Do We Really Need and How Do We Architect a
Compromise to Get It?
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0306/sbgp.html
BGP Vulnerability Testing: Separating Fact from FUD
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0306/franz.html
BGP Attack Trees - Real World Examples
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0306/hares.html
NRIC Best Practices for ISP Security
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0306/callon.html
RIPE-46 NSP Security BoF
- ------------------------
RIPE-46 BoF: NSP-SEC (Hank Nussbacher)
http://www.ripe.net/ripe/meetings/ripe-46/presentations/ripe46-nspbof-
nsp-sec.pdf
IRT Object in the RIPE Database (Ulrich Kiermayr)
http://www.ripe.net/ripe/meetings/ripe-46/presentations/ripe46-nspbof-
irt.pdf
Operational Security Requirements (George M. Jones)
http://www.ripe.net/ripe/meetings/ripe-46/presentations/ripe46-techsec
- -ops-security.pdf
Infrastructure Security (Nicholas Fischbach)
http://www.ripe.net/ripe/meetings/ripe-46/presentations/ripe46-nspbof-
fischbach.pdf
===================== End Public Materials =========================
> -----Original Message-----
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On
> Behalf Of Abhishek Verma
> Sent: Wednesday, September 29, 2004 11:52 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Blackhole Routes
>
>
>
> Hi,
>
> There are ways to add static routes that can be blackholed. I
> can understand the utility of such routes if those are
> installed in my forwarding table. What bewilders me is why
> would anyone want to advertise "blackhole" routes using say, BGP?
>
> Is it only to prevent some sort of DoS attacks or are there
> other uses also of advertising black hole routes?
>
> Thanks,
> Abhishek
>
> --
> Class of 2004
> Institute of Technology, BHU
> Varanasi, India
>
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