On Sat, Jan 14, 2006 at 05:31:12PM -0500, Jeffrey I. Schiller wrote: > If registrars regularly checked for lame delegations (or checked on > demand). Then a way to attack a domain would be to forge DNS responses > to cause the registrar to remove the domain because it is lame. So > DNSSEC would be needed to be sure...
Something more than merely DNS-SEC. DNS-SEC is about proving zone contents ("object security"). To prove lame delegation you'd need a means to identify the nameserver ("channel security") that's supplying the response. The difference between "this zone contains (or doesn't) an RR" versus "this DNS packet is from the server named George." You could prove inconsistent delegation - that the parent and child differ. But this is not necessarily lame. -- David W. Hankins "If you don't do it right the first time, Software Engineer you'll just have to do it again." Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. -- Jack T. Hankins
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