On Tue, Jun 20, 2006 at 05:18:20PM -0700, Randy Bush wrote:
>
> >> The added cost for CPU-bound systems is that they have to try
> >> (potentially) multiple keys before getting the **right** key
> >> but in real life this can be easily mitigated by having a rating
> >> system on the key based on the frequency of success.
> >
> > This mitigates the effect of authenticating valid packets. However,
> > this does not appear to help at all in terms of minimizing the DOS
> > effect of an intentional DoS attack that uses authenticated packets
> > (with the processing time required to check the keys the intended
> > damage of the attack).
>
> gstm
this doesn't help if the vendor can't implement it
correctly and does the md5 calc before checking the ttl :(
- jared
--
Jared Mauch | pgp key available via finger from [EMAIL PROTECTED]
clue++; | http://puck.nether.net/~jared/ My statements are only mine.
