Why couldn't the network device do an AH check in hardware before passing the packet to the receive path? If you can get to a point where all connections or traffic TO the router should be AH, then, that will help with DOS.
If you can limit what devices _SHOULD_ talk to the router and at least define some subset of that from which you demand AH on every packet, that helps but isn't a complete solution. Owen --On June 23, 2006 11:49:33 AM -0700 "Barry Greene (bgreene)" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > >> If DOS is such a large concern, IPSEC to an extent can be >> used to mitigate against it. And IKEv1/v2 with IPSEC is not >> the horribly inefficient mechanism it is made out to be. In >> practice, it is quite easy to use. > > IPSEC does nothing to protect a network device from a DOS attack. You > know that. > > DOS prevention on a network device needs to happen before the TCP/Packet > termination - not the Key/MD5/IPSEC stage. The signing or encrypting of > the BGP message protects against Man in the Middle and replay attacks - > not DOS attacks. Once a bad packet gets terminated, your DOS stress on > the router kicks in (especially on ASIC/NP routers). The few extra CPU > cycles it takes for walking through keys or IPSEC decrypt are irrelevant > to the router's POV. You SOL if a miscreant can get a packet through > your classification & queuing protections on the router and have it > terminated. > > The key to DOS mitigation on a network device is to have many fields in > the packet to classify as possible before the TCP/Packet termination. > The more you have to classify on, the more granular you can construct > your policy. This is one of the reasons for GTSM - which adds one more > field (the IP packet's TTL) to the classification options. > > Yes Jared - our software does the TTL after the MD5, but the hardware > implementations does the check in hardware before the packet gets punted > to the receive path. That is exactly where you need to do the > classification to minimize DOS on a router - as close to the point where > the optical-electrical-airwaves convert to a IP packet as possible. -- If it wasn't crypto-signed, it probably didn't come from me.
pgpYN2wZJ65ox.pgp
Description: PGP signature
