On Oct 27, 2006, at 10:03 AM, Chris L. Morrow wrote:
On Fri, 27 Oct 2006 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Or you could look at it as a weakness of SPF that should be used
as a justification for discouraging its use. After all if we
discourage botnets because they are DDoS enablers, shouldn't we
discourage other DDoS enablers like SPF?
under this assumption we should discourage user use of the
internet... :(
anyway, please let's get back to the original discussion :)
As Steve already pointed out, BCP38 is not a complete solution. Not
only does SPF prevent the source of a Botnet attack from being
detected, it also enables significantly greater amplification than
might be achieved with a spoofed source DNS reflective attack. In
addition, the Botnet resources are not wasted, as their spam is still
being delivered. This aspect alone dangerously changes the costs
related to such attacks. It seems wholly imprudent not to consider
SPF in the same discussion.
-Doug