Re: Security gain from NAT (was: Re: Cool IPv6 Stuff)

[Owen DeLong]

On Jun 4, 2007, at 1:41 PM, David Schwartz wrote:

On Jun 4, 2007, at 11:32 AM, Jim Shankland wrote:

Owen DeLong <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:

There's no security gain from not having real IPs on machines.
Any belief that there is results from a lack of understanding.

This is one of those assertions that gets repeated so often people
are liable to start believing it's true :-).

Maybe because it _IS_ true.

*No* security gain? No protection against port scans from Bucharest?

No protection for a machine that is used in practice only on the
local, office LAN?  Or to access a single, corporate Web site?

Correct. There's nothing you get from NAT in that respect that you do

not get from good stateful inspection firewalls.  NONE whatsoever.

"[t]here's no security gain from not having real IPs on machines". If

that you don't get from posting armed guards round the clock?

Sorry, Owen, but your argument is ridiculous. The original statement was someone said, "there's no security gain from locking your doors", would you refute it by arguing that there's no security gain from locking your doors

Except that's not the argument.  The argument would map better to:

There's no security gain from having a screen door in front of your
door with a lock and dead-bolt on it that you don't get from a door
with a lock and dead-bolt on it.

I posit that a screen door does not provide any security. A lock and
deadbolt provide some security.  NAT/PAT is a screen door.
Not having public addresses is a screen door.  A stateful inspection
firewall is a lock and deadbolt.

Owen

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