[ unthreaded to encourage discussion ] On Sat, Jul 26, 2008 at 04:55:23PM -0500, James Hess wrote: > Nameservers could incorporate poison detection... > > Listen on 200 random fake ports (in addition to the true query ports); > if a response ever arrives at a fake port, then it must be an attack, > read the "identified" attack packet, log the attack event, mark the > RRs mentioned in the packet as "poison being attempted" for 6 hours; > for such domains always request and collect _two_ good responses > (instead of one), with a 60 second timeout, before caching a lookup. > > The attacker must now guess nearly 64-bits in a short amount of time, > to be successful. Once a good lookup is received, discard the normal > TTL and hold the good answer cached and immutable, for 6 hours (_then_ > start decreasing the TTL normally).
Is there any reason which I'm too far down the food chain to see why that's not a fantastic idea? Or at least, something inspired by it? Cheers, -- jr 'IANAIE' a -- Jay R. Ashworth Baylink [EMAIL PROTECTED] Designer The Things I Think RFC 2100 Ashworth & Associates http://baylink.pitas.com '87 e24 St Petersburg FL USA http://photo.imageinc.us +1 727 647 1274 Those who cast the vote decide nothing. Those who count the vote decide everything. -- (Josef Stalin)