Steven M. Bellovin wrote: > On Thu, 28 Aug 2008 10:16:16 -0500 > "Anton Kapela" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> I thought I'd toss in a few comments, considering it's my fault that >> few people are understanding this thing yet. >> >>>> On Thu, Aug 28, 2008 at 2:28 PM, Gadi Evron <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >>>> wrote: >>>>> People (especially spammers) have been hijacking networks for a >>>>> while >> I'd like to 'clear the air' here. Clearly, I failed at Defcon, WIRED, >> AFP, and Forbes. >> >> We all know sub-prefix hijacking is not news. What is news? Using >> as-path loop detection to selectively blackhole the hijacked route - >> which creates a transport path _back to_ the target. >> >> That's all it is, nothing more. All but the WIRED follow-up article >> missed this point *completely.* They over-represented the 'hijacking' >> aspects, while only making mention of the 'interception' potential. >> >> Lets end this thread with the point I had intended two weeks ago: >> we've presented a method by which all the theory spewed by academics >> can be actualized in a real network (the big-I internet) to effect >> interception of data between (nearly) arbitrary endpoints from >> (nearly) any edge or stub AS. That, I think, is interesting. >> > Indeed, and I thank you for it. As noted, I and others have been > warning about the problem for a long time. You've shown that it isn't > just an ivory tower exercise; maybe people will now get serious about > deploying a solution. > > To quote Bruce Schneier quoting an NSA maxim, attacks only get better; > they never get worse. We now have running code of one way to do this. > I think most NANOG readers can see many more ways to do it. A real > solution will take years to deploy, but it will never happen if we > don't start. And we want to have the solution out there *before* we > see serious attacks on BGP. > > Again, thank you -- it was really nice work.
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