I think the disconnect idea is actually a good one... I don't know that I want to DO IT, but :) it certainly seems like a reasonable disaster recovery planning exercise :) (likely doing it is the only way to really suss out the problems though)
On Sat, Nov 2, 2019 at 12:19 PM Mike Bolitho <mikeboli...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> I would imagine that the internet is a whole less resilient today in 2019 >> than it was back in the day before the cloud takeover. > > > It's far more resilient now than it has ever been. More sub-sea cables. > Multiple routes across continents. The very fact that there are > AWS/Azure/Google Cloud data centers located around the globe makes anything > hosted there even more resilient, not less (and for the most part, I still > prefer on prem DC so I'm not even pushing "To the cloud!"). > "as long as the customers (who need global reachability) build their cloud applications/etc without just sticking everything in the equivalent of us-east" :) There are a LOT of folk who ' tossed it in the cloud, all good now?' and .. .sadly did not plan on disaster/global-reachability very well :( > > - Mike Bolitho > > > On Fri, Nov 1, 2019 at 5:16 PM Constantine A. Murenin <muren...@gmail.com> > wrote: >> >> Unpopular opinion: other countries should do the same. >> >> If somehow all the transatlantic (and/or transpacific) cables are offline; >> will the whole internet outside of the US stop working, too? >> >> AWS and all the other providers have DCs all over the world, but would they >> still work if they can't contact the mothership, and for how long? (Has any >> of this ever been tested?) >> >> I would imagine that the internet is a whole less resilient today in 2019 >> than it was back in the day before the cloud takeover. You often can't even >> install OSS without an internet connection anymore. Would Golang stop >> working? What else? >> >> Would you and/or your corporation be able to access your own email? All >> these things may seem silly, until you actually encounter the situation >> where you're offline, and it's too late to do anything. >> >> C. >> >> On Fri, 1 Nov 2019 at 18:04, Scott Weeks <sur...@mauigateway.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> --- sur...@mauigateway.com wrote: >>> From: "Scott Weeks" <sur...@mauigateway.com> >>> >>> Anyone got any technical info on how Russia plans to execute >>> a disconnection test of the internet? >>> ------------------------------------ >>> >>> >>> Got crickets, so now I have to respond to my own post on >>> what I just found out about it. Is that like talking to >>> yourself? :) >>> >>> https://www.npr.org/2019/11/01/775366588/russian-law-takes-effect-that-gives-government-sweeping-power-over-internet >>> >>> "The "sovereign Internet law," as the government calls it, >>> greatly enhances the Kremlin's control over the Web. It was >>> passed earlier this year and allows Russia's government to >>> cut off the Internet completely or from traffic outside >>> Russia "in an emergency," as the BBC reported. But some of >>> the applications could be more subtle, like the ability to >>> block a single post." >>> >>> "The equipment would conduct what's known as "deep packet >>> inspection," an advanced way to filter network traffic. >>> >>> "Regardless of what the government intends, some experts >>> think it would be technically difficult for Russia to >>> actually close its network if it wanted to, because of the >>> sheer number of its international connections." >>> >>> "What I found was that there were hundreds of existing >>> Internet exchange points in Russia, some of which have >>> hundreds of participants...Many of them are international >>> network providers, he says, so "basically it's challenging >>> — if not impossible, I think — to completely isolate the >>> Russian Internet." >>> >>> Belson says that the requirement for Internet service >>> providers to install tracking software will very likely >>> also be challenging in practice. He adds that it will be >>> difficult to get hundreds of providers to deploy it and >>> hard to coordinate that they're all filtering the same >>> content. >>> >>> scott >>> >>> >>> >>> >>
