On 1/Aug/20 21:20, Owen DeLong wrote: > IP Prefix level filtering at the customer edge is not that hard, no > matter how large of a transit > provider you are. Customer edge filtration by Telia in this case would > have prevented this > problem from spreading beyond the misconfigured ASN. +1. There's simply no excuse - even if 100% of your eBGP sessions may be customers :-). Mark.
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Mark Tinka
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Nick Hilliard
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Sabri Berisha
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Nick Hilliard
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Owen DeLong
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Mark Tinka
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Rafael Possamai
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Mark Tinka
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Hank Nussbacher
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Owen DeLong
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Mark Tinka
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Mark Tinka
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Tom Beecher
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Mark Tinka
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Rich Kulawiec
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Hank Nussbacher
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Nick Hilliard
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Baldur Norddahl
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Mark Tinka
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Töma Gavrichenkov
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Job Snijders