I think the actual risk is the opposite of transmitting signals to damage or sabotage.
I have read about many cases of receiving weak signals from things like monitors and wireless keyboards that could be snooped in by receiving and decoding them. I suppose routers and switches could leak signals representing actual data packets like this too. Perhaps even before they are encrypted. I could imagine a scenario where a neighboring cage in a DC attempted something like that. It would be much harder to detect than a physical breach. Brandon > On Nov 4, 2020, at 12:54 PM, William Herrin <b...@herrin.us> wrote: > > On Wed, Nov 4, 2020 at 11:37 AM Suresh Kalkunte <sskalku...@gmail.com> wrote: >> Your comments gives me an overall impression that data center equipment are >> on average adequately protected, that is good. Also, public discussion on >> the risk of intentional EMI is a big positive. > > I watched a T.V. program a few years ago where an investigative > reporter did a piece on the risks of malicious electromagnetic > interference (EMI). He did a demonstration where he tried to cause a > car to malfunction. A bad actor could cause highway crashes! He had a > great big apparatus about the size of the car's engine compartment and > pointed at the car. Nothing happened. So he moved it about 3 feet from > the car. Nothing happened. So he opened the car's hood and pointed it > right at the engine. Finally the engine started sputtering and the > dashboard electronics malfunctioned. The car, of course, remained > completely controllable and when the EMI generator was turned off it > resumed normal operation undamaged. > > I've also had lightning hit about 50 feet from my unshielded computer > room. It fried a little plastic COTS router that was connected by > about 100 feet of UTP ethernet to my core router. The core router > crashed but worked fine after a reboot. No other equipment was > affected. > > Vulnerability to EMI is a lot less than folks imagine. > >> However, targeting a human using powerful RF is uncharacterized (please see >> https://github.com/sureshs20/De_Risk_Technology). If the RF emitters >> conducive for getting re-purposed for malice were prohibitively expensive >> _or_ the expertise to re-purpose RF for malice was very complex _or_ if >> there were diagnostic/forensic tests to detect foul-play using powerful RF, >> I would not be pursuing this initiative to safeguard >> unsuspecting/defenseless targets of opportunity. > > Malicious use of EMI emitters to harm human health is definitely out > of scope for this list. > > Regards, > Bill Herrin > > -- > Hire me! https://bill.herrin.us/resume/