On Mon, Mar 15, 2021 at 4:04 PM Mel Beckman <m...@beckman.org> wrote: > > As I said, “DOD Network Information Center”: > > Source Registry ARIN Kind Org Full Name DoD Network Information Center Handle > DNIC Address 3990 E. Broad Street Columbus OH 43218 United States Roles > Registrant Last Changed Wed, 17 Aug 2011 14:45:37 GMT (Wed Aug 17 2011 local > time) Self https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/DNIC Alternate > https://whois.arin.net/rest/org/DNIC Port 43 Whois whois.arin.net > -mel
NetRange: 7.0.0.0 - 7.255.255.255 CIDR: 7.0.0.0/8 NetName: DISANET7 NetHandle: NET-7-0-0-0-1 Parent: () NetType: Direct Allocation OriginAS: Organization: DoD Network Information Center (DNIC) RegDate: 1997-11-24 Updated: 2006-04-28 Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/ip/7.0.0.0 OrgName: DoD Network Information Center OrgId: DNIC Address: 3990 E. Broad Street City: Columbus StateProv: OH it seems to still say that... This looks like any other sort of: "have my ISP announce my prefixes because I can't bgp" (or whatever other reason) > > On Mar 15, 2021, at 1:01 PM, Christopher Morrow <morrowc.li...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > On Mon, Mar 15, 2021 at 3:38 PM Mel Beckman <m...@beckman.org> wrote: > > > I also note that this reassignment isn’t reflected in ARIN’s Whois database. > > > where is it reflected? > > > -mel > > > On Mar 15, 2021, at 12:36 PM, Mel Beckman <m...@beckman.org> wrote: > > > Owen, > > > I think one cause for concern is why “almost all DOD prefixes > (7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8 and bunch of /22s) are now announced under > AS8003 (GRSCORP) which was just formed a few months ago,” which, according to > ARIN WHOIS, had a source registry of “DoD Network Information Center”. > > > I think it’s a general matter of public interest how this reassignment of a > massive government-owned block of well over sixteen million IP addresses > happened. Even if not fraudulent, the public has a right to know who is > behind this huge transfer of wealth. > > > > is it possible that the DoD: > 1) signed a lRSA (or really just an RSA) > 2) asked AS8003 to announce these prefixes (in certain sized blocks, maybe) > > under normal actions that arin does all the time for people? > If these were /24's and not parts/whole of /8's would anyone have noticed? > > it's entirely possible that 8003 is just a holding tank for the > prefixes while DoD/etc find a method to xfer the space to those that > may be willing to pay pesos per ip, right? > > Don’t you? > > > -mel beckman > > > On Mar 15, 2021, at 12:23 PM, Owen DeLong via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org> wrote: > > > According to the timeline posted to this list (by you, Siyuan), Globl > Resource Systems, LLC was registered in Delaware on September 8, 2020. > > Your timeline also shows the resources being issued to GRS by ARIN on > September 11, september 14, 2020 > > It looks to me like they subsequently registered the corporation in Florida > and moved the company address there. > > > I don’t see anything suspicious here based on your own statements, so I’m a > bit confused what you are on about. > > > Owen > > > On Mar 12, 2021, at 03:34 , Siyuan Miao <avel...@misaka.io> wrote: > > > Hi John, > > > My biggest concern is why the AS8003 was assigned to the company (GLOBAL > RESOURCE SYSTEMS, LLC) even before its existence. > > > When we were requesting resources or transfers, ARIN always asked us to > provide a Certificate of Good Standing and we had to pay the state to order > it. > > > However, it appears that a Certificate of Good Standing is not required or > ARIN didn't validate it in this case. > > > Regards, > > Siyuan > > > On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 7:17 PM John Curran <jcur...@arin.net> wrote: > > > On 11 Mar 2021, at 7:56 AM, Siyuan Miao <avel...@misaka.io> wrote: > > > > Hi Folks, > > > Just noticed that almost all DOD prefixes (7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8 > and bunch of /22s) are now announced under AS8003 (GRSCORP) which was just > formed a few months ago. > > > It looks so suspicious. Does anyone know if it's authorized? > > > > Siyuan - > > > If you have concerns, you can confirm whether these IP address blocks are > being routed as intended by verification with their listed technical contacts > - e.g. https://search.arin.net/rdap/?query=22.0.0.0 > > > As I noted on this list several weeks back - "lack of routing history is not > at all a reliable indicator of the potential for valid routing of a given > IPv4 block in the future, so best practice suggest that allocated address > space should not be blocked by others without specific cause. Doing otherwise > opens one up to unexpected surprises when issued space suddenly becomes more > active in routing and is yet is inexplicably unreachable for some > destinations." > > > Thanks! > > /John > > > John Curran > > President and CEO > > American Registry for Internet Numbers > > >
