In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within usa, can. Inferred improvements during Sep 2022: none inferred Source Address Validation issues inferred during Sep 2022: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 209 CENTURYLINK-US-LEGACY-QWEST 2016-08-16 2022-09-24 6128 CABLE-NET-1 2016-09-03 2022-09-19 20412 CLARITY-TELECOM 2016-09-30 2022-09-30 11427 TWC-11427-TEXAS 2016-10-21 2022-09-25 271 BCNET 2016-10-24 2022-09-29 546 PARSONS-PGS-1 2017-11-20 2022-09-24 33452 RW 2018-09-19 2022-09-09 20278 NEXEON 2019-03-05 2022-09-30 21804 ACCESS-SK 2019-06-09 2022-09-28 398836 NP-NETWORKS 2021-03-12 2022-09-18 397086 LAYER-HOST-HOUSTON 2022-06-16 2022-09-25 6124 MARIST 2022-09-10 2022-09-10 27500 ICANN-MEETINGS 2022-09-17 2022-09-22 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=usa,can&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-i...@caida.org
