> On Thu, Nov 16, 2023 at 9:31 PM Tom Samplonius <t...@samplonius.org> wrote:
>> The most surprising thing in the DE-DIX flow chart, was that they check >> that the origin AS exists in the IRR as-set, before doing RPKI, and if the >> set existence fails, they reject the route. I don’t see a problem with >> this, as maintaining as-sets is easy, but it does prevent an eventual 100% >> RPKI future with no IRR at all. I don't think the future is ever really 'no irr'. * RPKI provides: "a cryptographically verifiable method to determine authority to use ip number resources" * OriginValidation provides: "A route origin authorization 'database' for use eventually on BGP speakers" IRR filters provide control over whom is provided reachability through a particular peering/path. (dale points this out as well, particularly the part about paths he points out)
