https://blog.cloudflare.com/how-verizon-and-a-bgp-optimizer-knocked-large-parts-of-the-internet-offline-today
Keep mind rpki only solves misorigination. > I'm very well aware that RPKI only solves misorigination. But misorigination is a significant problem, so that's a good problem to be solved. Not engaging with RPKI because it doesn't perfectly solve every BGP-adjacent issue is a poor argument. On Fri, May 17, 2024 at 7:24 PM Ca By <cb.li...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Fri, May 17, 2024 at 4:20 PM Tom Beecher <beec...@beecher.cc> wrote: > >> RPKI is not a good solution for all networks, especially those that are >>> non-transit in nature and take reasonable mitigation actions like IRR >>> prefix lists. >>> >> >> Some of the largest , most impactful route leaks have come from >> non-transit networks reliant on IRR managed prefix lists. >> > > Can you be more specific? > > Was it malicious? > > Who in the usa was impacted ? > > Keep mind rpki only solves misorigination. > > >> On Fri, May 17, 2024 at 5:21 PM Ca By <cb.li...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, May 17, 2024 at 2:02 PM Sean Donelan <s...@donelan.com> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> Sigh, industry hasn't solved spoofing and routing insecurity in two >>>> decades. If it was easy, everyone would have fixed it by now. >>>> >>>> Industry has been saying 'don't regulate us' for decades. >>> >>> >>> I hope the regulations are more outcome focused. >>> >>> RPKI is not a good solution for all networks, especially those that are >>> non-transit in nature and take reasonable mitigation actions like IRR >>> prefix lists. >>> >>> >>> >>>>
