On Oct 20, 2010, at 10:07 PM, Mark Smith wrote: > On Thu, 21 Oct 2010 06:38:33 +0200 > Graham Beneke <gra...@apolix.co.za> wrote: > >> On 21/10/2010 03:49, Matthew Kaufman wrote: >>> On 10/20/2010 5:51 PM, Owen DeLong wrote: >>>> >>>> Part 2 will be when the first provider accepts a large sum of money to >>>> route it within their public network between multiple sites owned by >>>> the same customer. >>> >>> Is this happening now with RFC 1918 addresses and IPv4? >> >> I have seen this in some small providers. Doesn't last long since the >> chance of collision is high. It then becomes a VPN. >> >>>> Part 3 will be when that same provider (or some other provider in the >>>> same boat) takes the next step and starts trading routes of ULA space >>>> with other provider(s). >>> >>> Is this happening now with RFC 1918 addresses and IPv4? >> >> I've seen this too. Once again small providers who pretty quickly get >> caught out by collisions. >> >> The difference is that ULA could take years or even decades to catch >> someone out with a collision. By then we'll have a huge mess. >> > > I don't think there is a difference. The very small providers are > the ones who make the stupid mistakes, it's the larger ones that do the > right thing because it is in their operational interests. Operational > competence, and the resulting increased reliability, is one of the > attributes customers of ISPs value highly. > > If any of the Tier-1s don't route ULA address space, then it is useless > compared to global addresses that *are* routed by *all* the Tier-1s. As > the Tier-1s also hire competent networking people, they'll also > understand the scaling issues of the ULA address space, and why it > shouldn't be globally routed. Competent networking people also exist at > the lower tiers as well. > Ah, but, since statistically probable Uniqueness is present, I'm betting eventually some combination of Tier-1s will get bought off to route ULA and then the flood gates open.
Tier-1s are famous for having their sales and accounting departments override good engineering practices on a somewhat regular basis. With RFC-1918 this couldn't happen because collisions meant it simply wouldn't work. ULA has no such impediment. > If operators just blindly accept and implement what sales people tell > them to, then those operators aren't operators. They're mindless drones > - and the rest of the people operating the Internet will protect the > Internet from them. Darwin eventually gets rid of those operators > and the ISP that employ them. > There's a difference between blind acceptance and adherence to a direct overriding order from the guy that signs your paycheck. I'm sure they will attempt to fight the good fight, but, in the end, $$ tend to trump good engineering unless what the $$ want simply can't be made to work. > Since ULAs could be used as DoS attack sources, they'll also likely be > filtered out by most people as per BCP38. > Maybe... Given what I've seen with RFC-1918 and other BCP38 violations, I lack your faith. Owen