Normally when mitigation is put in place, they advertise a more specific prefix from as26415, scrub the traffic and hand it back to you over a gre tunnel...
Obviously some design consideration goes into having services in prefixes you're willing to de-agg in such a fashion... I'd also recommend advertising the more specific out your own ingress paths before they pull your route otherwise the churn while various ASes grind through their longer backup routes takes a while. On May 30, 2011, at 7:43 AM, Rubens Kuhl wrote: > ms made by the product descriptions seem suspect to me. >> >> it claims to be "Carrier-agnostic and ISP-neutral", yet "When an event is >> detected, Verisign will work with the customer to redirect Internet traffic >> destined for the protected service to a Verisign Internet Defense Network >> site." >> >> anyone here have any comments on how this works, and how effective it will be >> vs. dealing directly with your upstream providers and getting them to assist >> in shutting down the attack? > > Anyone willing to announce your IP blocks under attack, receive the > traffic and then tunnel the non-attack traffic back to you can provide > such services without cooperation from your upstreams. I don't know > the details about this particular provider, such as if they announce > your blocks from yours or theirs ASN, if they use more specifics, > communities or is simply very well connected, but as BGP on the DFZ > goes, it can work. > > You might need to get your upstreams to not filter announcements from > your IP block they receive, because that would prevent mitigation for > attack traffic from inside your upstream AS. > > (RPKI could also be a future challenge for such service, but one could > previously sign ROAs to be used in an attack response) > > Rubens >
