On Feb 24, 2012, at 2:26 14PM, Danny McPherson wrote: > > On Feb 24, 2012, at 1:10 PM, Steven Bellovin wrote: > >> But just because we can't solve the whole problem, does that >> mean we shouldn't solve any of it? > > Nope, we most certainly should decompose the problem into > addressable elements, that's core to engineering and operations. > > However, simply because the currently envisaged solution > doesn't solve this problem doesn't mean we shouldn't > acknowledge it exists. > > The IETF's BGP security threats document [1] "describes a threat > model for BGP path security", which constrains itself to the > carefully worded SIDR WG charter, which addresses route origin > authorization and AS_PATH "semantics" -- i.e., this "leak" > problem is expressly out of scope of a threats document > discussing BGP path security - eh? > > How the heck we can talk about BGP path security and not > consider this incident a threat is beyond me, particularly when it > happens by accident all the time. How we can justify putting all > that BGPSEC and RPKI machinery in place and not address this > "leak" issue somewhere in the mix is, err.., telling.
I repeat -- we're in violent agreement that route leaks are a serious problem. No one involved in BGPSEC -- not me, not Randy, not anyone -- disagrees. Give us an actionable definition and we'll try to build a defense. Right now, we have nothing better than what Justice Potter Stewart once said in an opinion: "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description ["hard-core pornography"]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it..." Again -- *please* give us a definition. --Steve Bellovin, https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb P.S. It was routing problems, including leaks between RIP and either EIGRP or OSPF (it's been >20 years; I just don't remember), that got me involved in Internet security in the first place. I really do understand the issue.