On Thu, 16 Jan 2014 13:35:00 -0600, Jimmy Hess said:

> Then  the client's  UDP stack must  construct and send a  Hashcash   proof
> of work,  of sufficient difficulty  based on the estimated query plus
> response size,
> up to the first full round trip;
>   containing a message digest of the first UDP packet  the client will
> send,  before sending the packet,  or it will be silently discarded.

> An  out-of-band reply will come back to the claimed source,   that the
> client souce IP:Port has to acknowledge within 5 packets.
> Once the out-of-band reply is acknowledged,   the source is confirmed not
> to be spoofed.

How is this any better than a TCP 3-packet handshake with syncookies?

Attachment: pgpBLWmPZkfD_.pgp
Description: PGP signature

Reply via email to