On Mon, 23 Mar 2015 19:00:14 -0400 Yardiel D.Fuentes <yard...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Since there have been good feedback for this BCOP. The committee > decided to extend the "last-call period" for another two weeks to > give ample chance to further feedback. > > So, it is not late for more comments, Hi Yardiel, Nice work so far. A couple of additional ideas for you if you care to use them. If the attack is an infrastructure attack, say a routing interface that wouldn't normally receive or emit traffic from its assigned address except perhaps for network connectivity testing (e.g. traceroute) or control link local control traffic (e.g. local SPF adjacencies, BGP neighbors), you can "hide" those addresses, making them somewhat less easy to target by using something like unnumbered or unadvertised or ambiguous address space (e.g. RFC 1918). A second suggestion, if you want to add a reference to it is the UTRS project, which is a free community project that brings networks together for the purpose of exchanging RTBH announcements. We've recently enabled automated relay for IPv4 /32's that have a history of sole origination from a peer. This is another DDoS mitigation tool in the tool box that many may find helpful. More detail can be found here: <http://www.cymru.com/jtk/misc/utrs.html> John
