"really isn't a whole lot different from 'lock your damned doors and windows' brick/mortar security."
Except it's *massively* more expensive. On Sun, Dec 27, 2015 at 11:26 AM, Christopher Morrow <morrowc.li...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Sun, Dec 27, 2015 at 1:59 PM, <valdis.kletni...@vt.edu> wrote: >> On Sun, 27 Dec 2015 05:35:19 +0100, Baldur Norddahl said: >> >>> SSH password + key file is accepted as two factor by PCI DSS auditors, so >>> yes it is in fact two factor. >> >> They also accept NAT as "security". If anything, PCI DSS is yet another >> example >> of a money grab masquerading as security theater (not even real security). > > is it that? or is it that once you click the checkboxes on /pci audit/ > 'no one' ever does the daily due-diligence required to keep their > security processes updated/running/current/etc ? > > I'm not a fan of the compliance regimes, but their goal (in a utopian > world where corporations are not people and such) is the equivalent of > the little posterboard person 42" tall before the roller-coaster > rides, right? > > "You really, REALLY should have at least these protections/systems/etc > in place before you attempt to process credit-card transactions..." > > In the utopian world this list would be sane, useful and would include > daily/etc processes to monitor the security controls for issues... I > don't think there's a process bit in PCI about: "And joey the firewall > admin looks at his logs daily/hourly/everly for evidence of > compromise" (and yes, ideally there's some adaptive/learning/AI-like > system that does the 'joey the firewall admin' step... but let's walk > before running, eh?) > > so, it's not really a mystery why failures like this happen. > >> I remember seeing a story a while ago that stated that of companies hit >> by a data breach on a system that was inside their PCI scope, something >> insane like 98% or 99% were in 100% full PCI compliance at the time of >> the breach. The only conclusion to be drawn is that the PCI set of >> checkboxes >> are missing a lot of really crucial things for real security. (And let's >> not forget the competence level of the average PCI auditor, as the ones >> I've encountered have all been very nice people, but more suited to checking >> boxes based on buzzwords than actual in-deopth security analysis). > > people toss pci/sox/etc auditors under the bus 'all the time', and i'm > guilty of this i'm sure as well, but really ... if you put systems on > the tubes and you don't take the same care you would for your > brick/mortar places ... you're gonna have a bad day. 'cyber security' > really isn't a whole lot different from 'lock your damned doors and > windows' brick/mortar security. > >> So excuse me for not taking "is accepted by PCI auditors" as grounds for >> a claim of strong actual security. -- 09 F9 11 02 9D 74 E3 5B D8 41 56 C5 63 56 88 C0