And now:Ish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >Date: Mon, 14 Dec 1998 10:12:13 -0600 (CST) >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Chiapas95-english) >Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Subject: En;A YEAR AFTER THE MASSACRE IMPUNITY'S NAME IS ACTEAL,Dec 13 > >This message is forwarded to you as a service of Zapatistas Online. > > >From: "NUEVO AMANECER PRESS" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >To: "N.A.P. E-2" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Date: Sun, 13 Dec 1998 16:53:30 +0000 >Subject: A YEAR AFTER THE MASSACRE IMPUNITY'S NAME IS ACTEAL >Reply-to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > >TRANSLATED BY ROSALVA BERMUDEZ-BALLIN >FOR NUEVO AMANECER PRESS >************************************************ > >----------------------------Original message---------------------------- > >> Masiosare, Sunday, December 13, 1998 >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> A Year After the Massacre >> Impunity's name is >> Acteal >> >> Jesus Ramirez Cuevas >> Translated by Rosalva Bermudez-Ballin > >The killing was a State crime. Christmas of last year, a Priista para- >military group from the Chenalho municipality killed a group of 45 >defenceles Tzotziles. The attack was planned and executed according to >military counterinsurgency manuals. The purpose for the genocide was to >combat the rebellious communities. > >Acteal, Chiapas. In the killing of 21 women, 15 childen and 9 men, committed >in the the mountainous area of Chenalho on the 22nd of December of last >year, "there are responsabilities on the part of state and federal >governments which have not been studied thoroughly. The PGR has >limited itself to point to low level functionaries", maintains Jose >Antonio Montero, the victims' attorney who is also a member of the Human >Rights Center Fray Bartolome de las Casas. > >"Functionaries from state and federal governments have not been >investigated, neither have members of the Armed Forces and Intelligence >Forces who committed some type of mistake either by omission or by >comission, before, during and after the killing". Montero adds. > >There is evidence and testimonies in judicial records that point to >official responsibility. The freedom enjoyed by the assassins in order >to carry out their crime was incredible. More than 60 people--90 >according to the Fray Bartolome Center--armed with AK-47 guns, 22 >rifles and UZI machine guns fired their guns for seven hours against >these people who had been praying at a hermitage. > >The outcome: 45 dead, 22 wounded... and a people hurt forever. >There are proofs that "40 members of the police were 200 meters away >from the place where the crime took place and didn't do anything while >the indigenous people were being massacred". The young attorney >gives additional data: "At the moment when the crime was taking place, >Julio Cesar Santiago, a retired Brigade General was at Acteal, he is >a coordinator for the Advisors to the State Public Security Council. > >The general agreed before the Public Affairs Ministry (MP) that he >had stayed there four hours. He was accompanied by to Commandants >from the Public Security Police (PSP) with their respective >contingent forces. >The records have testimonies by state functionaries who show their >knowledge--before the 22nd of December--that there were paramilitary >groups working in Chenalho. > >The responsibilities of functionaries--at least by omission--go from >those by the state government all the way up to the Ministry of the >Interior (SG). In his ministerial testimony, Homero Tovilla Cristiani, >General Secretary of State government, claims that a CISEN (Center >of Investigations of National Security) agent informed the State >Council of Public Security, that at 12:30, on the 22nd of December, >two hours after the beginning of the massacre, there were disturbances >taking place in Chenalho--. However, no one ever tried to find out >who were the CISEN agents who provided the information to the functionary, >what is it that they reported, if Emilio Chuayffet knew what was happening, >if, on its part, the SG informed President Ernesto Zedillo. Those CISEN >members, about whom there are the least information in the records, must >be investigated also. >The Council, the highest branch in charge of decisions in Chiapas, >has branches throughout the state territory. It is formed by >representatives of state government and the general in charge of the >7th military area. A few months before the massacre, the Chenalho >Committee was formed by some municipal Priista authorities, the high >command of Public Security, a military intelligence network and CISEN >representatives. > >The passivity or complicity with which diverse authorities acted in the >Acteal case involves the then governor Julio Cesar Ruiz Ferro and all >his cabinet, in addition to members of the Armed Forces and functionaries >of the federal government, including the then Secretary of the Interior, >Emilio Chuayffer. > >The legal process has served to punish many of the material authors of >the crime, but also to exempt from any responsibility any state or >federal authority, as well as the members of the Armed Forces, who >were the ones who tolerated of participated in the formation of >paramilitary groups. > >"I think that Acteal is a State crime", the young attorney insists, >who adds: "There are many indications that tie the Armed Forces to >the paramilitaries. The only thing missing is the declaration from >President Zedillo, the confessions of General Cervantes and General >Mario Renan Castillo and Governor Ruiz Ferro. Also those of the >people who buy the weapons, and of those who dissseminate counter- >insurgency politics. The only things missing from the investigation >would be those. > >The Color of Impunity >The Republic's General Attorney Office (PGR) has led the investigation >of the massacre to the idea of the supposed interfamilial and intra- >communitarian conflicts. > >The PGR, either consciously or unconsciously, cancels the existence >of a previous violence initiated by a strategy of irregular war, as >well as the relationship of the "armed civil groups" affiliated to >the PRI with the Armed Forces and with functionaries of the government", >Jose Montero, points out. >Acteal's crime was not a feud between communities, neither was a >conflict between rival families who were fighting for political and >economic control of the municipality, least of all, was it a religious >conflict. More than anything, it was a political dispute to finish up >the dissidents through a dirty war. > >In the process, judicial power has spoiled the facts. According to >the Unitarian Tribunal Circuit, "A qualified homicide was committed at >Acteal and it took place by a series of circumstances different than >those that could qualify as a strategy of a low intensity war", Montero >informs. > >The tribunal also rejected the argument for the crime of criminal >association for the killers and accomplices. Then, the PGR did not >consider in its investigations, either, the responsibility of >public servants at work when the crimes imputed on to them were >committed. > >The National Commission on Human Rights (CNDH) issued a recommendation >to the state government and the PGR for the public functionaries in >Ruiz Ferro's Cabinet to be investigated for their responsibility in >these events. The recommendation has not proceeded. > >The PGR's special prosecutor has declared that he wants to fulfill >the CNDH's recommendation and that obligates him to open an investigation >against ex-functionaries such as Homero Tovilla, then the government's >General Secretary; Uriel Jarquin, Under-Secretary; Jorge Enrique >Hernandez aguilar, Coordinator of the State Council of Public >Security; Jorge Gamboa Solis, Chief of State Plice, among others. But >the prosecutor says that he has not charges against them. > >"The PGR has made an important effort, not very common in other cases", >Montero considers. "In comparison to other crimes where no results are >ever obtained, here advances have taken place. The PGR has followed the >prosecutions, has given proofs, has strengthened certain areas of the >processes that were weak with declarations from other trials of the same >policemen. However, there is nothing about the official responsibilities >nor about the dismantling of paramilitary groups in the area". > >The case's investigations are divided. On the one hand there is the >open prosecution of the material authors and their accomplices, on the >other, there is the case of the policemen accused of not stopping the >events and not stopping the members of the armed civil groups or >confiscating their weapons. Then another trial was opened against the > >people consigned for their participation in the criminal events. >"The PGR fragmented the investigation. This division implies the risk >of not knowing the facts in their fulness and to analyze the existence >of a criminal context repeated in the killing: the existence of armed >groups that mainained a relationship with the municipal and state >authorities, and with the Armed and Police Forces. The investigated >events have a relationship with each other, and for that reason they >should be considered together: from the conduct of the General present >there to the agressor who went from Tzajalucum to Acteal. This has not >been belittled by the tribunals." > >In the conclusions presented by the PGR not all the conducts of the >prosecuted are related. Instead of thinking--Jose Monero says--of >concrete simultaneous facts, planned and linked together, the judicial >authority judges the conducts to be individual and isolated. > >"The judge will surely sentence these people for homicide, for the >illegal possession of weapons; but the State wants to absolve itself of >all responsibility. We are conscious that justice is subject to a >political game, that all the prosecuting and juridical sides are subject >to this interpretation. The Acteal Case is politicized". > >The Manual and the Operation >In 1995, when the paramilitary groups started formin in the Northern >sone, and a month before the military offensive against the Zapatistas, >the Secretary of National Defence edited a manual of irregular war, >counterguerrilla operations and restoration of order. The intructive >was edited in the Graphics Shop of the 7th Section of the Army and >several of its sections fit the events that took place at Acteal. > >In the chapter entitled "Actions to control the population" it >mentions the formation of armed civil forces: > >Phase 1. The preparation will take place with the following activities: >organizing a neighborhood committee, organizing the counterarresting >forces, establishing security posts, searching for information, >developing psychological operations, and organizing secret meetings, >training civil, military and militarized forces. > >Phase 2. Here all the limitations to which the population will be >subject will be let known, indicate the correctives to those who violate >the given dispositions. Likewise, it must be stressed that these will > be imposed strongly and firmly. > >In the chapter entitled "Organization of Tactical Units of Counter- >guerrilla and Availability of Troops", the manual says: "The >Commandante of the Counterguerrilla can, in some cases, not have >control of the totality of the forces of the rearguard units to use >them. Given forces can include combat units and support combat and >service support units. Adding to this, the Commandante can have >paramilitary or irregular forces under his control in some > >_________________________________________________________________ >___________________________________________________ >NUEVO AMANECER PRESS-N.A.P.To know about us visit: >http://www.nap.cuhm.mx/nap0.htm (spanish) > ******************* >In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107,this material is distributed without profit or >payment to those who have expressed a prior interest. 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