And now:Ish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:

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       A - I N F O S  N E W S  S E R V I C E
             http://www.ainfos.ca/
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Major new statement from Noam Chomsky, Sept 10, on
Timor.... Comments On the Occasion of the Forthcoming APEC Summit

There are many topics of major long-term significance that should be addressed at the 
APEC conference, but one is of consuming importance and overwhelming urgency. We all 
know exactly what it is, and why it must be placed at the forefront of concern -- and 
more important, instant action. This conference provides an opportunity -- there may 
not be many more -- to terminate the tragedy that is once again reaching shocking 
proportions in East Timor. The Indonesian military forces who invaded East Timor 24 
years ago, and have been slaughtering and terrorizing its inhabitants ever since, are 
right now, as I write, in the process of sadistically destroying what remains: the 
population, the cities and villages. What they are planning, we cannot be sure: a 
Carthaginian solution is not out of the question.

The tragedy of East Timor has been one of the most awesome of this terrible century. 
It is also of particular moral significance for us, for the simplest and most obvious 
of reasons. Western complicity has been direct and decisive. The expected corollary 
also holds: unlike the crimes of official enemies, these can be ended by means that 
have always been readily available, and still are.

The current wave of terror and destruction began early this year, under the pretense 
that the atrocities were the work of "uncontrolled militias." It was quickly revealed 
that these were paramilitary forces armed, organized, and directed by the Indonesian 
army, who also participated directly in their "criminal activities," as these have 
just been described by Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, still maintaining the 
shameful pretense that the "military institution" that is directing the crimes is 
seeking to stop them.

The Indonesian military forces are commonly described as "rogue elements." That is 
hardly accurate. Most prominent among them are Kopassus units sent to East Timor to 
carry out the actions for which they are famed, and dreaded. They have "the job of 
managing the militias, many observers believe, veteran Asia correspondent David 
Jenkins reported as the terror was mounting. Kopassus is the "crack special forces 
unit" modeled on the U.S. Green Berets that had "been training regularly with US and 
Australian forces until their behaviour became too much of an embarrassment for their 
foreign friends." These forces are "legendary for their cruelty," observes Benedict 
Anderson, one of the leading Indonesia scholars. In East Timor, Anderson continues, 
"Kopassus became the pioneer and exemplar for every kind of atrocity," including 
systematic rapes, tortures and executions, and organization of hooded gangsters.

Jenkins wrote that Kopassus officers, trained in the United States, adopted the 
tactics of the US Phoenix program in South Vietnam, which killed tens of thousands of 
peasants and much of the indigenous South Vietnamese leadership, as well as "the 
tactics employed by the Contras" in Nicaragua, following lessons taught by their CIA 
mentors that it should be unnecessary to review. The state terrorists were "not simply 
going after the most radical pro-independence people but going after the moderates, 
the people who have influence in their community." "It's Phoenix," a well-placed 
source in Jakarta reported: the aim is "to terrorise everyone" -- the NGOs, the Red 
Cross, the UN, the journalists.

All of this was well before the referendum and the atrocities conducted in its 
immediate aftermath. As to these, there is good reason to heed the judgment of a 
high-ranking Western official in Dili. "Make no mistake," he reported: "this is being 
directed from Jakarta. This is not a situation where a few gangs of rag-tag militia 
are out of control. As everybody here knows, it has been a military operation from 
start to finish."

The official was speaking from the UN compound in which the UN observers, the last few 
reporters, and thousands of terrified Timorese finally took refuge, besieged by 
Indonesia's paramilitary agents. At that time, a few days ago, the UN estimated that 
violent expulsions had perhaps reached 200,000 people, about a quarter of the 
population, with unknown numbers killed and physical destruction running to billions 
of dollars. At best, it would take decades to rebuild the territory's basic 
infrastructure, they concluded. And the army may well have still more far-reaching 
goals.

In the months before the August 30 referendum, the horror story continued. Citing 
diplomatic, church, and militia sources, Australian journalists reported in July "that 
hundreds of modern assault rifles, grenades and mortars are being stockpiled, ready 
for use if the autonomy [within Indonesia] option is rejected at the ballot box." They 
warned that the army-run militias might be planning a violent takeover of much of the 
territory if, despite the terror, the popular will would be expressed. All of this was 
well understood by the "foreign friends," who also knew how to bring the terror to an 
end, but preferred to delay, hesitate, and keep to evasive and ambiguous reactions 
that the Indonesian Generals could easily interpret as a "green light" to carry out 
their grim work.

In a display of extraordinary courage and heroism, virtually the entire population 
made their way to the ballot-boxes, many emerging from hiding to do so. Braving brutal 
intimidation and terror, they voted overwhelming in favor of the right of 
self-determination that had long ago been endorsed by the United Nations Security 
Council and the World Court.

Immediately, the Indonesian occupying forces reacted as had been predicted by 
observers on the scene. The weapons that had been stockpiled, and the forces that had 
been mobilized, conducted a well-planned operation. They proceeded to drive out anyone 
who might bring the terrible story to the outside world and cut off communications, 
while massacring, expelling tens of thousands of people to an unknown fate, burning 
and destroying, murdering priests and nuns, and no one knows how many other hapless 
victims. The capital city of Dili has been virtually destroyed. In the countryside, 
where the army can rampage undetected, one can only guess what has taken place.

Even before the latest outrages, highly credible Church sources had reported 3-5000 
killed in 1999, well beyond the scale of atrocities in Kosovo prior to the NATO 
bombings. The scale might even reach the level of Rwanda if the "foreign friends" keep 
to timid expressions of disapproval while insisting that internal security in East 
Timor "is the responsibility of the Government of Indonesia, and we don't want to take 
that responsibility away from them" -- the official position of the State Department a 
few days before the August 30 referendum.

It would have been far less hypocritical to have said, early this year, that internal 
security in Kosovo "is the responsibility of the Government of Yugoslavia, and we 
don't want to take that responsibility away from them." Indonesia's crimes in East 
Timor have been vastly greater, even just this year, not to speak of their actions 
during the years of aggression and terror; Western-backed, we should never allow 
ourselves to forget. That aside, Indonesia has no claim whatsoever to the territory it 
invaded and occupied, apart from the claim based on support by the Great Powers.

The "foreign friends" also understand that direct intervention in the occupied 
territory, however justified, might not even be necessary. If the United States were 
to take a clear, unambiguous, and public stand, informing the Indonesian Generals that 
this game is over, that might very well suffice. The same has been true for the past 
quarter-century, as the US provided critical military and diplomatic support for the 
invasion and atrocities. These were directed by General Suharto, compiling yet another 
chapter in his gruesome record, always with Western support, and often acclaim. He was 
once again praised by the Clinton Administration. He is "our kind of guy," the 
Administration declared as he visited Washington shortly before he fell from grace by 
losing control and dragging his feet on IMF orders.

If changing the former green light to a new red light does not suffice, Washington and 
its allies have ample means at their disposal: termination of arms sales to the 
killers; initiation of war crimes trials against the army leadership -- not an 
insignificant threat; cutting the economic support funds that are, incidentally, not 
without their ambiguities; putting a hold on Western energy corporations and 
multinationals, along with other investment and commercial activities. There is also 
no reason to shy away from peacekeeping forces to replace the occupying terrorist 
army, if that proves necessary. Indonesia has no authority to "invite" foreign 
intervention, as President Clinton urged, any more than Saddam Hussein had authority 
to invite foreign intervention in Kuwait, or Nazi Germany in France in 1944 for that 
matter. If dispatch of peacekeeping forces is disguised by such prettified 
terminology, it is of no great importance, as long as we do not succumb to illusions 
that pr!
!
even
t us from understanding what has happened, and what it portends.

What the U.S. and its allies are doing, we scarcely know. The New York Times reports 
that the Defense Department is "taking the lead in dealing with the crisis,...hoping 
to make use of longstanding ties between the Pentagon and the Indonesian military." 
The nature of these ties over many decades is no secret. Important light on the 
current stage is provided by Alan Nairn, who survived the Dili massacre in 1991 and 
barely escaped with his life in Dili again a few days ago. In another stunning 
investigative achievement, Nairn has just revealed that immediately after the vicious 
massacre of dozens of refugees seeking shelter in a church in Liquica, U.S. Pacific 
Commander Admiral Dennis Blair assured Indonesian Army chief General Wiranto of US 
support and assistance, proposing a new U.S. training mission.

On September 8, the Pacific Command announced that Admiral Blair is once again being 
sent to Indonesia to convey U.S. concerns. On the same day, Secretary of Defense 
William Cohen reported that a week before the referendum in August, the US was 
carrying out joint operations with the Indonesian army -- "a U.S.-Indonesian training 
exercise focused on humanitarian and disaster relief activities," the wire services 
reported. The fact that Cohen could say this without shame leaves one numb with 
amazement. The training exercise was put to use within days -- in the standard way, as 
all but the voluntarily blind must surely understand after many years of the same 
tales, the same outcomes.

Every slight move comes with an implicit retraction. On the eve of the APEC meeting, 
on September 9, Clinton announced the termination of military ties; but without 
cutting off arms sales, and while declaring East Timor to be "still a part of 
Indonesia," which it is not and has never been. The decision was delivered to General 
Wiranto by Admiral Blair. It takes no unusual cynicism to watch the current secret 
interactions with a skeptical eye.

Skepticism is only heightened by the historical record: to mention one recent case, 
Clinton's evasion of congressional restrictions barring U.S. training of Indonesian 
military officers after the Dili massacre. The earlier record is far worse from the 
first days of the U.S.-authorized invasion. While the U.S. publicly condemned the 
aggression, Washington secretly supported it with a new flow of arms, which was 
increased by the Carter Administration as the slaughter reached near-genocidal levels 
in 1978. It was then that highly credible Church and other sources in East Timor 
attempted to make public the estimates of 200,000 deaths that came to be accepted 
years later, after constantly denial.

Every student in the West, every citizen with even a minimal concern for international 
affairs, should know by heart the frank and honest description of the opening days of 
the invasion by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, then America's U.N. Ambassador. The 
Security Council ordered the invaders to withdraw at once, but without effect. In his 
memoirs, published as the terror peaked 20 years ago, Moynihan explained the reasons: 
"The United States wished things to turn out as they did," and he dutifully "worked to 
bring this about," rendering the UN "utterly ineffective in whatever measures it 
undertook." As for how "things turned out," Moynihan comments that within a few months 
60,000 Timorese had been killed, "almost the proportion of casualties experienced by 
the Soviet Union during the Second World War." End of story, though not in the real 
world.

So matters have continued since, not just in the United States. England has a 
particularly ugly record, as do Australia, France, and all too many others. That fact 
alone confers on them enormous responsibility to act, not only to end the atrocities, 
but to provide reparations as at least some miserable gesture of compensation for 
their crimes.

The reasons for the Western stance are very clear. They are currently stated with 
brutal frankness. "The dilemma is that Indonesia matters and East Timor doesn't," a 
Western diplomat in Jakarta bluntly observed a few days ago. It is no "dilemma," he 
might have added, but rather standard operating procedure. Explaining why the U.S. 
refuses to take a stand, New York Times Asia specialists Elizabeth Becker and Philip 
Shenon report that the Clinton Administration "has made the calculation that the 
United States must put its relationship with Indonesia, a mineral-rich nation of more 
than 200 million people, ahead of its concern over the political fate of East Timor, a 
tiny impoverished territory of 800,000 people that is seeking independence." Their 
fate as human beings apparently does not even reach the radar screen, for these 
calculations. The Washington Post quotes Douglas Paal, president of the Asia Pacific 
Policy Center, reporting the facts of life: "Timor is a speed bump on t!
!
he r
oad to dealing with Jakarta, and we've got to get over it safely. Indonesia is such a 
big place and so central to the stability of the region."

Even without secret Pentagon assurances, Indonesian Generals can surely read these 
statements and draw the conclusion that they will be granted leeway to work their will.

The analogy to Kosovo has repeatedly been drawn in the past days. It is singularly 
inappropriate, in many crucial respects. A closer analogy would be to Iraq-Kuwait, 
though this radically understates the scale of the atrocities and the culpability of 
the United States and its allies. There is still time, though very little time, to 
prevent a hideous consummation of one of the most appalling tragedies of the terrible 
century that is winding to a horrifying, wrenching close. _




Reprinted under the Fair Use http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.html doctrine 
of international copyright law.
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