> > @@ -2703,10 +2837,22 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *pfkey_compile
> > (*dir = parse_ipsecrequests(xp, pol)) < 0)
> > goto out;
> >
> > + /* security context too */
> > + if (len >= (pol->sadb_x_policy_len*8 +
> > + sizeof(struct sadb_x_sec_ctx))) {
> > + char *p = (char *) pol;
> > + p += pol->sadb_x_policy_len*8;
> > + sec_ctx = (struct sadb_x_sec_ctx *) p;
> > + if (security_xfrm_policy_alloc(
> > + xp, (struct
xfrm_user_sec_ctx *)sec_ctx))
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> > +
> Do we really need socket-specific policies with security context?
Security context information is being used by some user-level appls, such
as XWindows, so I can see that applications may want to set security
contexts for their sockets based on the principal for whom the code is
being run. For example, we may want to prevent leakage of data from a
window in X to a remote client by setting the security context for a
socket which limits the receivers of such data.
Regards,
Trent.
PS -- This is all the questions/comments.
------------------------------------------------------------
Trent Jaeger
IBM T.J. Watson Research Center
19 Skyline Drive, Hawthorne, NY 10532
(914) 784-7225, FAX (914) 784-7225
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