Florian, Am 30.06.2017 um 21:35 schrieb Florian Westphal: > Richard Weinberger <rich...@nod.at> wrote: >> Hi! >> >> I noticed that nf_conntrack leaks kernel addresses, it uses the memory >> address >> as identifier used for generating conntrack and expect ids.. >> Since these ids are also visible to unprivileged users via network namespaces >> I suggest reverting these commits: > > Why not use a hash of the address?
Would also work. Or xor it with a random number. On the other hand, for user space it would be more useful when the conntrack id does not repeat that often. That's why I favor the good old counter method. Currently the conntrack id is reused very fast. e.g. in one of our applications we use the conntack id via NFQUEUE and watch the destroy events via conntrack. It happens regularly that a new connection has the same id than a different connection we saw some moments before, before we receive the destroy event from the conntrack socket. Thanks, //richard
