On Tue, Sep 19, 2017 at 10:05 AM, Eric Dumazet <eric.duma...@gmail.com> wrote:
> From: Eric Dumazet <eduma...@google.com>
>
> Our recent change exposed a bug in TCP Fastopen Client that syzkaller
> found right away [1]
>
> When we prepare skb with SYN+DATA, we attempt to transmit it,
> and we update socket state as if the transmit was a success.
>
> In socket RTX queue we have two skbs, one with the SYN alone,
> and a second one containing the DATA.
>
> When (malicious) ACK comes in, we now complain that second one had no
> skb_mstamp.
>
> The proper fix is to make sure that if the transmit failed, we do not
> pretend we sent the DATA skb, and make it our send_head.
>
> When 3WHS completes, we can now send the DATA right away, without having
> to wait for a timeout.
>
> [1]
> WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 100189 at net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3117
> tcp_clean_rtx_queue+0x2057/0x2ab0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3117()
>
> WARN_ON_ONCE(last_ackt == 0);
>
> Modules linked in:
> CPU: 0 PID: 100189 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
> Google 01/01/2011
> 0000000000000000 ffff8800b35cb1d8 ffffffff81cad00d 0000000000000000
> ffffffff828a4347 ffff88009f86c080 ffffffff8316eb20 0000000000000d7f
> ffff8800b35cb220 ffffffff812c33c2 ffff8800baad2440 00000009d46575c0
> Call Trace:
> [<ffffffff81cad00d>] __dump_stack
> [<ffffffff81cad00d>] dump_stack+0xc1/0x124
> [<ffffffff812c33c2>] warn_slowpath_common+0xe2/0x150
> [<ffffffff812c361e>] warn_slowpath_null+0x2e/0x40
> [<ffffffff828a4347>] tcp_clean_rtx_queue+0x2057/0x2ab0 n
> [<ffffffff828ae6fd>] tcp_ack+0x151d/0x3930
> [<ffffffff828baa09>] tcp_rcv_state_process+0x1c69/0x4fd0
> [<ffffffff828efb7f>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x54f/0x7c0
> [<ffffffff8258aacb>] sk_backlog_rcv
> [<ffffffff8258aacb>] __release_sock+0x12b/0x3a0
> [<ffffffff8258ad9e>] release_sock+0x5e/0x1c0
> [<ffffffff8294a785>] inet_wait_for_connect
> [<ffffffff8294a785>] __inet_stream_connect+0x545/0xc50
> [<ffffffff82886f08>] tcp_sendmsg_fastopen
> [<ffffffff82886f08>] tcp_sendmsg+0x2298/0x35a0
> [<ffffffff82952515>] inet_sendmsg+0xe5/0x520
> [<ffffffff8257152f>] sock_sendmsg_nosec
> [<ffffffff8257152f>] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x110
>
> Fixes: 8c72c65b426b ("tcp: update skb->skb_mstamp more carefully")
> Fixes: 783237e8daf1 ("net-tcp: Fast Open client - sending SYN-data")
> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eduma...@google.com>
> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyu...@google.com>
> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardw...@google.com>
> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ych...@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ych...@google.com>
Thanks Eric for fixing this. The current arrangement of SYN plus data
packet seems to cause more code for error cases. I am wondering a
(subsequent) refactoring patch can make it simpler by updating the
states after a successful transmission (instead of update and revert).
> ---
> net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 9 +++++++++
> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
> index
> 517d737059d18d8821b65dcdf54d9bb3448784c2..0bc9e46a53696578eb6e911f2f75e6b34c80894f
> 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
> @@ -3389,6 +3389,10 @@ static int tcp_send_syn_data(struct sock *sk, struct
> sk_buff *syn)
> goto done;
> }
>
> + /* data was not sent, this is our new send_head */
> + sk->sk_send_head = syn_data;
> + tp->packets_out -= tcp_skb_pcount(syn_data);
> +
> fallback:
> /* Send a regular SYN with Fast Open cookie request option */
> if (fo->cookie.len > 0)
> @@ -3441,6 +3445,11 @@ int tcp_connect(struct sock *sk)
> */
> tp->snd_nxt = tp->write_seq;
> tp->pushed_seq = tp->write_seq;
> + buff = tcp_send_head(sk);
> + if (unlikely(buff)) {
> + tp->snd_nxt = TCP_SKB_CB(buff)->seq;
> + tp->pushed_seq = TCP_SKB_CB(buff)->seq;
> + }
> TCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_ACTIVEOPENS);
>
> /* Timer for repeating the SYN until an answer. */
>
>
