On Tue, 2017-10-10 at 17:09 -0700, Chenbo Feng wrote:
> From: Chenbo Feng <fe...@google.com>
>
> Introduce a bpf object related check when sending and receiving files
> through unix domain socket as well as binder. It checks if the
> receiving
> process have privilege to read/write the bpf map or use the bpf
> program.
> This check is necessary because the bpf maps and programs are using a
> anonymous inode as their shared inode so the normal way of checking
> the
> files and sockets when passing between processes cannot work properly
> on
> eBPF object. This check only works when the BPF_SYSCALL is
> configured.
> The information stored inside the file security struct is the same as
> the information in bpf object security struct.
>
> Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fe...@google.com>
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 17 ++++++++++
> include/linux/security.h | 9 ++++++
> kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 27 ++++++++++++++--
> security/security.c | 8 +++++
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 67
> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 9 ++++++
> 6 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 7161d8e7ee79..517dea60b87b 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -1385,6 +1385,19 @@
> * @bpf_prog_free_security:
> * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf prog.
> *
> + * @bpf_map_file:
> + * When creating a bpf map fd, set up the file security
> information with
> + * the bpf security information stored in the map struct. So
> when the map
> + * fd is passed between processes, the security module can
> directly read
> + * the security information from file security struct rather
> than the bpf
> + * security struct.
> + *
> + * @bpf_prog_file:
> + * When creating a bpf prog fd, set up the file security
> information with
> + * the bpf security information stored in the prog struct. So
> when the prog
> + * fd is passed between processes, the security module can
> directly read
> + * the security information from file security struct rather
> than the bpf
> + * security struct.
> */
> union security_list_options {
> int (*binder_set_context_mgr)(struct task_struct *mgr);
> @@ -1726,6 +1739,8 @@ union security_list_options {
> void (*bpf_map_free_security)(struct bpf_map *map);
> int (*bpf_prog_alloc_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
> void (*bpf_prog_free_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
> + void (*bpf_map_file)(struct bpf_map *map, struct file
> *file);
> + void (*bpf_prog_file)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux, struct file
> *file);
> #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
> };
>
> @@ -1954,6 +1969,8 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
> struct list_head bpf_map_free_security;
> struct list_head bpf_prog_alloc_security;
> struct list_head bpf_prog_free_security;
> + struct list_head bpf_map_file;
> + struct list_head bpf_prog_file;
> #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
> } __randomize_layout;
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 18800b0911e5..57573b794e2d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ extern int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct
> bpf_map *map);
> extern void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map);
> extern int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
> extern void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
> +extern void security_bpf_map_file(struct bpf_map *map, struct file
> *file);
> +extern void security_bpf_prog_file(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux, struct
> file *file);
> #else
> static inline int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
> unsigned int size)
> @@ -1772,6 +1774,13 @@ static inline int
> security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
>
> static inline void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
> { }
> +
> +static inline void security_bpf_map_file(struct bpf_map *map, struct
> file *file)
> +{ }
> +
> +static inline void security_bpf_prog_file(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux,
> + struct file *file)
> +{ }
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
> #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
>
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> index 1cf31ddd7616..aee69e564c50 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> @@ -324,11 +324,22 @@ static const struct file_operations
> bpf_map_fops = {
>
> int bpf_map_new_fd(struct bpf_map *map, int flags)
> {
> + int fd;
> + struct fd f;
> if (security_bpf_map(map, OPEN_FMODE(flags)))
> return -EPERM;
>
> - return anon_inode_getfd("bpf-map", &bpf_map_fops, map,
> + fd = anon_inode_getfd("bpf-map", &bpf_map_fops, map,
> flags | O_CLOEXEC);
> + if (fd < 0)
> + return fd;
> +
> + f = fdget(fd);
> + if (!f.file)
> + return -EBADF;
This seems convoluted and unnecessarily inefficient, since
anon_inode_getfd() has the struct file and could have directly returned
it instead of having to go through fdget() on a fd we just installed.
Also, couldn't the fd->file mapping have changed underneath us between
fd_install() and fdget()?
I would think it would be safer and more efficient to create an
anon_inode_getfdandfile() or similar interface and use that, so that we
can just pass the file it set up to the hook. Obviously that would
need to be reviewed by the vfs folks.
> + security_bpf_map_file(map, f.file);
> + fdput(f);
> + return fd;
> }
>
> int bpf_get_file_flag(int flags)
> @@ -975,11 +986,23 @@ static const struct file_operations
> bpf_prog_fops = {
>
> int bpf_prog_new_fd(struct bpf_prog *prog)
> {
> + int fd;
> + struct fd f;
> +
> if (security_bpf_prog(prog))
> return -EPERM;
>
> - return anon_inode_getfd("bpf-prog", &bpf_prog_fops, prog,
> + fd = anon_inode_getfd("bpf-prog", &bpf_prog_fops, prog,
> O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
> + if (fd < 0)
> + return fd;
> +
> + f = fdget(fd);
> + if (!f.file)
> + return -EBADF;
> + security_bpf_prog_file(prog->aux, f.file);
> + fdput(f);
> + return fd;
> }
>
> static struct bpf_prog *____bpf_prog_get(struct fd f)
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 1cd8526cb0b7..dacf649b8cfa 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1734,4 +1734,12 @@ void security_bpf_prog_free(struct
> bpf_prog_aux *aux)
> {
> call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux);
> }
> +void security_bpf_map_file(struct bpf_map *map, struct file *file)
> +{
> + call_void_hook(bpf_map_file, map, file);
> +}
> +void security_bpf_prog_file(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux, struct file
> *file)
> +{
> + call_void_hook(bpf_prog_file, aux, file);
> +}
> #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 94e473b9c884..0a6ef20513b0 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -1815,6 +1815,10 @@ static inline int file_path_has_perm(const
> struct cred *cred,
> return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
> +static int bpf_file_check(struct file *file, u32 sid);
> +#endif
> +
> /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
> access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
> descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
> @@ -1845,6 +1849,14 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred
> *cred,
> goto out;
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
> + if (fsec->bpf_type) {
> + rc = bpf_file_check(file, cred_sid(cred));
> + if (rc)
> + goto out;
> + }
> +#endif
> +
> /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
> rc = 0;
> if (av)
> @@ -2165,6 +2177,14 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct
> task_struct *from,
> return rc;
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
> + if (fsec->bpf_type) {
> + rc = bpf_file_check(file, sid);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> + }
> +#endif
> +
> if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
> return 0;
>
> @@ -6288,6 +6308,33 @@ static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
> return av;
> }
>
> +/* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or
> binder to see
> + * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on
> the bpf
> + * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like
> other files and
> + * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as
> their inode.
> + * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have
> privilege to
> + * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this
> additional check in
> + * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
> + */
> +static int bpf_file_check(struct file *file, u32 sid)
> +{
> + struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (fsec->bpf_type == BPF_MAP) {
> + ret = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->bpf_sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
> + bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file-
> >f_mode), NULL);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> + } else if (fsec->bpf_type == BPF_PROG) {
> + ret = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->bpf_sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
> + BPF__PROG_USE, NULL);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
> {
> u32 sid = current_sid();
> @@ -6351,6 +6398,24 @@ static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct
> bpf_prog_aux *aux)
> aux->security = NULL;
> kfree(bpfsec);
> }
> +
> +static void selinux_bpf_map_file(struct bpf_map *map, struct file
> *file)
> +{
> + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
> + struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
> +
> + fsec->bpf_type = BPF_MAP;
> + fsec->bpf_sid = bpfsec->sid;
> +}
> +
> +static void selinux_bpf_prog_file(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux, struct
> file *file)
> +{
> + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
> + struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
> +
> + fsec->bpf_type = BPF_PROG;
> + fsec->bpf_sid = bpfsec->sid;
> +}
> #endif
>
> static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init
> = {
> @@ -6581,6 +6646,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list
> selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security,
> selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security,
> selinux_bpf_prog_free),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_file, selinux_bpf_map_file),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_file, selinux_bpf_prog_file),
> #endif
> };
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> index 3d54468ce334..0162648761f9 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> @@ -67,11 +67,20 @@ struct inode_security_struct {
> spinlock_t lock;
> };
>
> +enum bpf_obj_type {
> + BPF_MAP = 1,
> + BPF_PROG,
> +};
> +
> struct file_security_struct {
> u32 sid; /* SID of open file description */
> u32 fown_sid; /* SID of file owner (for
> SIGIO) */
> u32 isid; /* SID of inode at the time of file
> open */
> u32 pseqno; /* Policy seqno at the time of
> file open */
> +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
> + unsigned char bpf_type;
> + u32 bpf_sid;
> +#endif
> };
Can you check how this impacts the size of the file_security_cache
objects, and thus the memory overhead imposed on all open files?
If it is significant, do we need to cache the bpf_sid here or could we
just store the bpf_type and then dereference the bpfsec if it is a map
or prog?
>
> struct superblock_security_struct {
