On 1/23/18, 3:26 PM, "Alexei Starovoitov" <alexei.starovoi...@gmail.com> wrote:

    On Tue, Jan 23, 2018 at 08:19:54PM +0000, Lawrence Brakmo wrote:
    > On 1/23/18, 11:50 AM, "Eric Dumazet" <eric.duma...@gmail.com> wrote:
    > 
    >     On Tue, 2018-01-23 at 14:39 -0500, Neal Cardwell wrote:
    >     > On Tue, Jan 23, 2018 at 2:20 PM, Lawrence Brakmo <bra...@fb.com> 
wrote:
    >     > > On 1/23/18, 9:30 AM, "Yuchung Cheng" <ych...@google.com> wrote:
    >     > > 
    >     > >     The original patch that changes TCP's congestion control via 
eBPF only
    >     > >     re-initializes the new congestion control, if the BPF op is 
set to an
    >     > >     (invalid) value beyond BPF_SOCK_OPS_NEEDS_ECN. Consequently 
TCP will
    >     > > 
    >     > > What do you mean by “(invalid) value”?
    >     > > 
    >     > >     run the new congestion control from random states.
    >     > > 
    >     > > This has always been possible with setsockopt, no?
    >     > > 
    >     > >    This patch fixes
    >     > >     the issue by always re-init the congestion control like other 
means
    >     > >     such as setsockopt and sysctl changes.
    >     > > 
    >     > > The current code re-inits the congestion control when calling
    >     > > tcp_set_congestion_control except when it is called early on 
(i.e. op <=
    >     > > BPF_SOCK_OPS_NEEDS_ECN). In that case there is no need to 
re-initialize
    >     > > since it will be initialized later by TCP when the connection is 
established.
    >     > > 
    >     > > Otherwise, if we always call tcp_reinit_congestion_control we 
would call
    >     > > tcp_cleanup_congestion_control when the congestion control has 
not been
    >     > > initialized yet.
    >     > 
    >     > On Tue, Jan 23, 2018 at 2:20 PM, Lawrence Brakmo <bra...@fb.com> 
wrote:
    >     > > On 1/23/18, 9:30 AM, "Yuchung Cheng" <ych...@google.com> wrote:
    >     > > 
    >     > >     The original patch that changes TCP's congestion control via 
eBPF only
    >     > >     re-initializes the new congestion control, if the BPF op is 
set to an
    >     > >     (invalid) value beyond BPF_SOCK_OPS_NEEDS_ECN. Consequently 
TCP will
    >     > > 
    >     > > What do you mean by “(invalid) value”?
    >     > > 
    >     > >     run the new congestion control from random states.
    >     > > 
    >     > > This has always been possible with setsockopt, no?
    >     > > 
    >     > >    This patch fixes
    >     > >     the issue by always re-init the congestion control like other 
means
    >     > >     such as setsockopt and sysctl changes.
    >     > > 
    >     > > The current code re-inits the congestion control when calling
    >     > > tcp_set_congestion_control except when it is called early on 
(i.e. op <=
    >     > > BPF_SOCK_OPS_NEEDS_ECN). In that case there is no need to 
re-initialize
    >     > > since it will be initialized later by TCP when the connection is 
established.
    >     > > 
    >     > > Otherwise, if we always call tcp_reinit_congestion_control we 
would call
    >     > > tcp_cleanup_congestion_control when the congestion control has 
not been
    >     > > initialized yet.
    >     > 
    >     > Interesting. So I wonder if the symptoms we were seeing were due to
    >     > kernels that did not yet have this fix:
    >     > 
    >     >   27204aaa9dc6 ("tcp: uniform the set up of sockets after successful
    >     > connection):
    >     >   
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next.git/commit/?id=27204aaa9dc67b833b77179fdac556288ec3a4bf
    >     > 
    >     > Before that fix, there could be TFO passive connections that at SYN 
time called:
    >     >   tcp_init_congestion_control(child);
    >     > and then:
    >     >   tcp_call_bpf(child, BPF_SOCK_OPS_PASSIVE_ESTABLISHED_CB);
    >     > 
    >     > So that if the CC was switched in the
    >     > BPF_SOCK_OPS_PASSIVE_ESTABLISHED_CB handler then there would be no
    >     > init for the new module?
    >     
    >     
    >     Note that bpf_sock->op can be written by a malicious BPF filter.
    >     
    >     So, a malicious filter can switch from Cubic to BBR without re-init,
    >     and bad things can happen.
    >     
    >     I do not believe we should trust BPF here.
    >     
    > Very good point Eric. One solution would be to make bpf_sock->op not 
writeable by
    > the BPF program. 
    > 
    > Neal, you are correct that would have been a problem. I leave it up to 
you guys whether
    > making bpf_sock->op not writeable by BPF program is enough or if it is 
safer to always
    > re-init (as long as there is no problem calling 
tcp_cleanup_congestion_control when it
    > has not been initialized.
    
    I think allowing write into 'op' and 'replylong' was a mistake.
    Only 'reply' field is used by tcp_call_bpf().
    No reason to let programs write into other fields.
    I think we have to fix it now before programs start to rely
    on this undefined behavior.
    
write into ‘op’ is a mistake. Writing to replylong is a mistake until we have a 
calling op
that uses the longer reply. I will do a patch to fix this once my outstanding 
patch is
accepted since otherwise I would need to update my current patch.


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