This defines SELinux enforcement of the 2 new LSM hooks.

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c        |  125 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------
security/selinux/include/xfrm.h |    5 +
security/selinux/ss/mls.c | 2 security/selinux/ss/services.c | 2 security/selinux/xfrm.c | 28 ++++++
5 files changed, 136 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 5a66c4c..044e452 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3449,8 +3449,12 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(s

                err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
                                   sock_class, recv_perm, ad);
+               if (err)
+                       goto out;
        }

+       err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb, ad);
+
out:
        return err;
}
@@ -3489,10 +3493,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(s
                goto out;

        err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, &ad);
-       if (err)
-               goto out;
-
-       err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
out:    
        return err;
}
@@ -3626,13 +3626,16 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(str
                return 0;
        }

-       err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &peersid, 0);
-       BUG_ON(err);
+       if (selinux_compat_net) {
+               err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &peersid, 0);
+               BUG_ON(err);

-       if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
-               req->secid = sksec->sid;
-               return 0;
-       }
+               if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
+                       req->secid = sksec->sid;
+                       return 0;
+               }
+       } else
+               peersid = skb->secmark;

        err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
        if (err)
@@ -3662,6 +3665,78 @@ static void selinux_req_classify_flow(co
        fl->secid = req->secid;
}

+static int selinux_skb_policy_check(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned short family)
+{
+       u32 xfrm_sid, trans_sid;
+       int err;
+
+       if (selinux_compat_net)
+               return 1;
+
+       err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &xfrm_sid, 0);
+       BUG_ON(err);
+
+       err = avc_has_perm(xfrm_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+                                       PACKET__FLOW_IN, NULL);
+       if (err)
+               goto out;
+
+       if (xfrm_sid) {
+               err = security_transition_sid(xfrm_sid, skb->secmark,
+                                               SECCLASS_PACKET, &trans_sid);
+               if (err)
+                       goto out;
+
+               skb->secmark = trans_sid;
+       }
+
+       /* See if CIPSO can flow in thru the current secmark here */
+
+out:
+       return err ? 0 : 1;
+};
+
+static int selinux_skb_netfilter_check(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 nf_secid)
+{
+       u32 xfrm_sid;
+       u32 trans_sid;
+       int err;
+
+       if (selinux_compat_net)
+               return 1;
+
+       if (!skb->secmark && skb->sk) {
+               struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
+               skb->secmark = sksec->sid;
+       }
+
+       selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
+
+       err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, xfrm_sid, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+                               PACKET__FLOW_OUT, NULL);
+
+       if (err)
+               goto out;
+
+       if (xfrm_sid) {
+               err = security_transition_sid(xfrm_sid, skb->secmark,
+                                               SECCLASS_PACKET, &trans_sid);
+               if (err)
+                       goto out;
+
+               skb->secmark = trans_sid;
+       }
+
+       err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, nf_secid, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+                               PACKET__FLOW_OUT, NULL);
+
+out:
+       /* Signal postroute_last that we are done with this skb */
+       skb->secmark = SECSID_WILD;
+
+       return err ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
        int err = 0;
@@ -3700,7 +3775,8 @@ out:

#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER

-static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device 
*dev,
+static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff 
*skb,
+                                           struct net_device *dev,
                                            struct avc_audit_data *ad,
                                            u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
{
@@ -3710,6 +3786,9 @@ static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_com
        struct inode *inode;
        struct inode_security_struct *isec;

+       if (!sk)
+               goto out;
+
        sock = sk->sk_socket;
        if (!sock)
                goto out;
@@ -3768,7 +3847,11 @@ static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_com

                err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
                                   send_perm, ad);
+               if (err)
+                       goto out;
        }
+
+       err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(isec->sid, skb, ad);
out:
        return err;
}
@@ -3782,18 +3865,13 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
{
        char *addrp;
        int len, err = 0;
-       struct sock *sk;
        struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
        struct avc_audit_data ad;
        struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
-       struct sk_security_struct *sksec;

-       sk = skb->sk;
-       if (!sk)
+       if (!selinux_compat_net && skb->secmark == SECSID_WILD)
                goto out;

-       sksec = sk->sk_security;
-
        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
        ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
        ad.u.net.family = family;
@@ -3803,16 +3881,11 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
                goto out;

        if (selinux_compat_net)
-               err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, &ad,
+               err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(skb->sk, skb, dev, &ad,
                                                       family, addrp, len);
        else
-               err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
-                                  PACKET__SEND, &ad);
-
-       if (err)
-               goto out;
-
-       err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
+               err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
+                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FLOW_OUT, &ad);
out:
        return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
}
@@ -4719,6 +4792,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinu
        .inet_conn_request =            selinux_inet_conn_request,
        .inet_csk_clone =               selinux_inet_csk_clone,
        .req_classify_flow =            selinux_req_classify_flow,
+       .skb_policy_check =             selinux_skb_policy_check,
+       .skb_netfilter_check =          selinux_skb_netfilter_check,

#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
        .xfrm_policy_alloc_security =   selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 81eb598..ed07f92 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec
u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk);
u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb);
int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
+void selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid);
#else
static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
                        struct avc_audit_data *ad)
@@ -68,6 +69,10 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_se
        *sid = SECSID_NULL;
        return 0;
}
+static inline void selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+{
+       *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+}
#endif

#endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 119bd60..c551def 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -548,6 +548,8 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scon
                                }
                        }
                }
+               else if (tclass == SECCLASS_PACKET)
+                       return mls_copy_context(newcontext, scontext);
                /* Fallthrough */
        case AVTAB_CHANGE:
                if (tclass == SECCLASS_PROCESS)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 27ee28c..f9cd484 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -832,6 +832,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid

        if (!ss_initialized) {
                switch (tclass) {
+               case SECCLASS_PACKET:
                case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
                        *out_sid = ssid;
                        break;
@@ -876,6 +877,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid

        /* Set the role and type to default values. */
        switch (tclass) {
+       case SECCLASS_PACKET:
        case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
                /* Use the current role and type of process. */
                newcontext.role = scontext->role;
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 3e742b8..3a68723 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct
}

/*
- * LSM hook implementation that determines the sid for the session.
+ * LSM hook implementation that checks/returns the xfrm sid for the incoming 
packet.
 */

int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
@@ -193,6 +193,32 @@ int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct s
}

/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that returns the xfrm sid for the outgoing packet.
+ */
+
+void selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+{
+       struct dst_entry *dst;
+
+       *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+       dst = skb->dst;
+       if (dst) {
+               struct dst_entry *dst_test;
+               for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0;
+                       dst_test = dst_test->child) {
+                       struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
+
+                       if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
+                               struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+                               *sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
+                               break;
+                       }
+               }
+       }
+}
+
+/*
 * Security blob allocation for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state
 * CTX does not have a meaningful value on input
 */
-
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