From: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 14:49:38 +0800
> In sctp_setsockopt_bindx()/__sctp_setsockopt_connectx(), it allocates
> memory with addrs_size which is passed from userspace. We used flag
> GFP_USER to put some more restrictions on it in Commit cacc06215271
> ("sctp: use GFP_USER for user-controlled kmalloc").
>
> However, since Commit c981f254cc82 ("sctp: use vmemdup_user() rather
> than badly open-coding memdup_user()"), vmemdup_user() has been used,
> which doesn't check GFP_USER flag when goes to vmalloc_*(). So when
> addrs_size is a huge value, it could exhaust memory and even trigger
> oom killer.
>
> This patch is to use memdup_user() instead, in which GFP_USER would
> work to limit the memory allocation with a huge addrs_size.
>
> Note we can't fix it by limiting 'addrs_size', as there's no demand
> for it from RFC.
>
> Reported-by: [email protected]
> Fixes: c981f254cc82 ("sctp: use vmemdup_user() rather than badly open-coding
> memdup_user()")
> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Applied and queued up for -stable, thanks Xin.
