This reverts commit 222e83d2e0aecb6a5e8d42b1a8d51332a1eba960.
tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher really cannot be called from interrupt
context. It allocates the tcp_fastopen_context with GFP_KERNEL and
calls crypto_alloc_cipher, which allocates all kind of stuff with
GFP_KERNEL.
Thus, we might sleep when the key-generation is triggered by an
incoming TFO cookie-request which would then happen in interrupt-
context, as shown by enabling CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP:
[ 36.001813] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at
mm/slub.c:1266
[ 36.003624] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1016, name: packetdrill
[ 36.004859] CPU: 1 PID: 1016 Comm: packetdrill Not tainted 4.1.0-rc7 #14
[ 36.006085] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140602_164612-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014
[ 36.008250] 00000000000004f2 ffff88007f8838a8 ffffffff8171d53a
ffff880075a084a8
[ 36.009630] ffff880075a08000 ffff88007f8838c8 ffffffff810967d3
ffff88007f883928
[ 36.011076] 0000000000000000 ffff88007f8838f8 ffffffff81096892
ffff88007f89be00
[ 36.012494] Call Trace:
[ 36.012953] <IRQ> [<ffffffff8171d53a>] dump_stack+0x4f/0x6d
[ 36.014085] [<ffffffff810967d3>] ___might_sleep+0x103/0x170
[ 36.015117] [<ffffffff81096892>] __might_sleep+0x52/0x90
[ 36.016117] [<ffffffff8118e887>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x47/0x190
[ 36.017266] [<ffffffff81680d82>] ? tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher+0x42/0x130
[ 36.018485] [<ffffffff81680d82>] tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher+0x42/0x130
[ 36.019679] [<ffffffff81680f01>] tcp_fastopen_init_key_once+0x61/0x70
[ 36.020884] [<ffffffff81680f2c>] __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen+0x1c/0x60
[ 36.022058] [<ffffffff816814ff>] tcp_try_fastopen+0x58f/0x730
[ 36.023118] [<ffffffff81671788>] tcp_conn_request+0x3e8/0x7b0
[ 36.024185] [<ffffffff810e3872>] ? __module_text_address+0x12/0x60
[ 36.025327] [<ffffffff8167b2e1>] tcp_v4_conn_request+0x51/0x60
[ 36.026410] [<ffffffff816727e0>] tcp_rcv_state_process+0x190/0xda0
[ 36.027556] [<ffffffff81661f97>] ? __inet_lookup_established+0x47/0x170
[ 36.028784] [<ffffffff8167c2ad>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x16d/0x3d0
[ 36.029832] [<ffffffff812e6806>] ? security_sock_rcv_skb+0x16/0x20
[ 36.030936] [<ffffffff8167cc8a>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x77a/0x7b0
[ 36.031875] [<ffffffff816af8c3>] ? iptable_filter_hook+0x33/0x70
[ 36.032953] [<ffffffff81657d22>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x92/0x1f0
[ 36.034065] [<ffffffff81657f1a>] ip_local_deliver+0x9a/0xb0
[ 36.035069] [<ffffffff81657c90>] ? ip_rcv+0x3d0/0x3d0
[ 36.035963] [<ffffffff81657569>] ip_rcv_finish+0x119/0x330
[ 36.036950] [<ffffffff81657ba7>] ip_rcv+0x2e7/0x3d0
[ 36.037847] [<ffffffff81610652>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x552/0x930
[ 36.038994] [<ffffffff81610a57>] __netif_receive_skb+0x27/0x70
[ 36.040033] [<ffffffff81610b72>] process_backlog+0xd2/0x1f0
[ 36.041025] [<ffffffff81611482>] net_rx_action+0x122/0x310
[ 36.042007] [<ffffffff81076743>] __do_softirq+0x103/0x2f0
[ 36.042978] [<ffffffff81723e3c>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30
There does not seem to be a better way to handle this. We could try
to make the call to kmalloc and crypto_alloc_cipher during bootup, and
then generate the random value only on-the-fly (when the first TFO-SYN
comes in) with net_get_random_once in order to have the better entropy
that comes with doing the late initialisation of the random value. But
that's probably net-next material.
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <han...@stressinduktion.org>
Fixes: 222e83d2e0ae ("tcp: switch tcp_fastopen key generation to
net_get_random_once")
Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaa...@apple.com>
---
include/net/tcp.h | 1 -
net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c | 5 -----
net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c | 27 +++++++++++----------------
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
index 6d204f3f9df8..f27a4e6bae11 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -1359,7 +1359,6 @@ bool tcp_try_fastopen(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff
*skb,
struct request_sock *req,
struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc,
struct dst_entry *dst);
-void tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(bool publish);
#define TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH 16
/* Fastopen key context */
diff --git a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
index c3852a7ff3c7..46d6b3817b41 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
@@ -231,11 +231,6 @@ static int proc_tcp_fastopen_key(struct ctl_table *ctl,
int write,
ret = -EINVAL;
goto bad_key;
}
- /* Generate a dummy secret but don't publish it. This
- * is needed so we don't regenerate a new key on the
- * first invocation of tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen
- */
- tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(false);
tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(user_key, TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH);
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c
index 46b087a27503..67377acff6a5 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c
@@ -14,20 +14,6 @@ struct tcp_fastopen_context __rcu *tcp_fastopen_ctx;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock);
-void tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(bool publish)
-{
- static u8 key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH];
-
- /* tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher publishes the new context
- * atomically, so we allow this race happening here.
- *
- * All call sites of tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen also check
- * for a valid cookie, so this is an acceptable risk.
- */
- if (net_get_random_once(key, sizeof(key)) && publish)
- tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(key, sizeof(key));
-}
-
static void tcp_fastopen_ctx_free(struct rcu_head *head)
{
struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctx =
@@ -78,8 +64,6 @@ static bool __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(const void *path,
struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctx;
bool ok = false;
- tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(true);
-
rcu_read_lock();
ctx = rcu_dereference(tcp_fastopen_ctx);
if (ctx) {
@@ -313,3 +297,14 @@ fastopen:
return false;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_try_fastopen);
+
+static int __init tcp_fastopen_init(void)
+{
+ __u8 key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH];
+
+ get_random_bytes(key, sizeof(key));
+ tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(key, sizeof(key));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+late_initcall(tcp_fastopen_init);
--
2.1.2
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