Hi Max (& nettime),

thank you for your thoughts! I have to admit that I´m not a specialist for the 
era of Leonardo but your insights and the idea of your book sound interesting. 
As well your comment about the kinda ‚premodern‘ indigenous view on the 
practices we divide into arts and sciences just as forms of ‚doing‘ which 
corresponds in a way to the practice turn in western science.

What I was thinking about in a quite speculative way are indeed rather the 
differences in circumstances and destination routes between that era of the 
awakening of ‚the human‘ and an era when the idea of this specific historical 
notion of humanity associated with modernity might blur again (quasi with 
Foucault´s image on that in the back of my mind). Just to note that I don´t 
think we´re on the way back to Leonardo´s times although it might seem so. Back 
then there was still an unfractured conviction of ‚wholeness‘ of the world that 
a bit later was considered as describable in mathematical ways and expressible 
in artistic forms derived from that domain. At least a bit later that was the 
case and Bach´s  music you´ve mentioned is an example for that I´d say.

Galileo was sure that god has written the ‚book of the world‘ in mathematical 
expressions. Hence it´s all about finding those mathematical relations because 
they´re the warrantors of truth and as such also the warrantors of beauty. 
Western music theory was convinced of that since Pythagoras. But with Riemann´s 
non-euclidean geometries and other mathematical and physical questions this 
conviction was gone, so to say. This is i.a. reflected in the fast acceptance 
of the term „model“ that Hertz invented in physics/science some years after 
Riemann´s discovery. Finally, with Einsteins theories of relativity the three 
Kantian notions (possibility of apriori knowledge from maths/logic, apriori 
space, apriori time) were deconstructed.

So from Hertz on you can build different models for the same phenomena but you 
cannot say which one is the right or ‚true‘ one. You might measure which one 
fits better in experiments but that´s not always possible and of course it 
doesn´t back the notion of an apriori truth and beauty. However, the ones who 
invent those models with their research and creativity are humans, or with 
Descartes a special kind of immaterial ‚essence‘ called res cogitans in 
opposition to the rest of the material world called res extensa. The mentioned 
deconstructions which are a serious problem for epistemology became the more a 
boost for the Kantian notion of an autonomy of art and the exceptionalism of 
humans within the world (as the creators of models, artworks and so on). The 
world itself was still considered to be a machine describable in mathematical 
terms.That´s in short the basis of the political and institutional logics of 
modernity.

Hence if there is any chance to find a ‚well-ordered universe‘ again like in 
the days of old – or in other words: a timeless mathematical apriori truth and 
beauty as quasi-metaphysical ‚safety ground‘ – then you have to include human 
creativity and contingency within your mathematical/formal descriptions, at 
least in this kind of logics and ideology. Or in cybernetic terms you have to 
include the observer. No other way to get back to the vision of an 
all-embracing unity. Turing by the way has called that special skill of humans 
which machines cannot perform ‚intuition‘ in his 1937 paper which is the 
blueprint for digital computers. Another term closely related to the arts… If 
you succeed in cracking this hard problem of creativity or intuition you would 
be able to automate it and hence innovation as well. (In the DARPA there is an 
attempt to do so within the development of a special AI system as far as I 
know.)

Since Gödel we know that cracking this hard problem is not possible – at least 
not in a supratemporal mathematical sense. However a key promise of cybernetics 
was nevertheless to tackle that, now with probabilistic models and with regard 
to the specific situation and context someone is acting in. For this you best 
need feedback loops which allow continuous real-time measurement to then be 
able to derive models of creativity on the basis of massive quantitative data. 
Neuroscience may be one attempt, big data extracted from social networks, smart 
gadgets and so on another. The more people articulate and produce data the 
better for attemps to make them computable (and hence controllable). That seems 
to be the point where we are right now. And in addition to that creativity 
plays a key role in the western societies of our days in an economic sense. 
Reckwitz, a famous german sociologist, spoke of the „dispositif of creativity“ 
which is the basis of the economy in postindustrial societies. 

So it is no coincidence that the arts as the representation of creativity are 
in focus – there are, as set out above, several reasons for this with 
utilitarian backgrounds and those do not always have liberating intentions but 
rather its opposite, namely negative post- and transhuman ones. This is a big 
difference to Leonardo´s times as I see it. I think it is important to have 
this in mind when being seized with questions about creativity and the research 
on it. 

Of course it is at least equally important to emphasize that there are (and to 
the best of my belief will be) many examples for liberating intentions and 
examples in art. But as this is usually emphasized strongly I didn´t mention it 
in my arguments because I assume we all agree in that. 

However, at exactly that point the dilemma which I stated with my question 
regarding Denzin´s approach appears on the scene. Because on the one hand under 
the conditions of modernity the autonomy of arts was always a guarantee for 
these kinds of possibilities and freedom. On the other hand that autonomy of 
art is deeply entangled with the conditions of modernity (see Kant) which are 
not only under pressure in the light of contemporary technological developments 
but which are also not sustainable in an ecological sense and on top of that 
tend to reduce humans to social atoms which in the end have to survive as 
individuals under the reign of all-pervasive markets.

The role of the artist in this picture can feel a bit like that of a court 
jester. In his existence the civic society insures itself traditionally about 
its liberty, so to say. And in recent times artists have become more and more a 
ressource for the development of new and ‚creative‘ technologies which are 
intended to perpetuate the economical and ideological status quo. What I want 
to say with that is that the arts may have to reflect themselves more in regard 
to the posed circumstances. That is also what Denzin (as a non artist as far as 
I know) is inviting us to do as I read him.
To taper it once more: the notion of an autonomy of art has itself a 
legitimization function for the conditions of an unsustainable modernity. It is 
not an innocent and purely idealistic playground like a sort of detached space. 
An example might be the success of Jackson Pollock which was a project of the 
CIA who arranged exhibitions in important galleries and so on to show how free 
and abstract the western world is in opposition to soviet realism.

But would I have liked a kind of institutionalized Denzin in the form of, let´s 
say, an ‚ethics commission‘ that judges my art if it is „ethical“ as related to 
the prevailing consensus and norms of their money sources? Of course not! To be 
honest I wouldn´t have given a shit on that kind of judgement. The 
transgressive and ‚visionary‘ power of art is not least rooted in it´s 
self-authorization to do and/or arrange things differently which can mean to 
break norms. And if you break norms you might potentially ‚insult‘ people. If 
this shouldn´t be allowed anymore within art/PhD projects because it´s 
‚unethical‘ then art is wrapped up in cotton wool and looses its visionary 
power. It becomes negligible. Of course this is not Denzin´s desire (rather its 
opposite) but it may play out like this in institutional contexts. And needless 
to say that art should be ethical but this ethics cannot be decreed. Insofar 
it´s hard to defend the idea to surrender the autonomy of art like Denzin et al 
suggest it (in chapter6/7?).

On the other hand: Do I like the negative examples of artworks mentioned in 
Denzin which disrespect human dignity and then usually argue with the autonomy 
of art? Of course not! But in an „economy of attention“ (as Franck called the 
upcoming logics of the social in consideration of the internet society in the 
90s) provocation for the sake of provocation is profitable even if it´s 
pubertal in a way. Under that circumstances transgressive powers tend to reduce 
themselves to pure effect/affect aesthetics, by all means necessary. Put 
together with the modern ‚regime of artist´s subjectiviziation‘ as a court 
jester to perpetuate the status quo and its known unsustainability it´s hard to 
defend the idea of an autonomy of art.

That´s the dilemma. – But I have to admit that this might be a very Eurocentric 
view or question. A short while ago I was on an online conference with artists 
from all over the world who make their (communal) art projects not seldom under 
the danger of real oppression without any idea about elaborated art markets. 
That felt so different and showed the strength of art in a way that really 
touched me. Very different situation!

However, all told I had the impression that both ambiguities – the problem with 
the Vienna Declaration Florian was writing about and the problem to defend or 
reject Denzin´s idea of two forms of art from which only one form is legit in 
institutional contexts – point to the same spot, namely that vision of Foucault 
that the modern notion of ‚the human‘ might one day blur again like a picture 
in the sand when the waves roll over it. Or in more concrete words it points to 
the questions of posthumanism, not so much back to Leonardo´s era. In my 
perspective Leonardo and the recent developments appear more as outer borders 
of an era that gave birth to the idea of an autonomy of art signifying the 
modern notion of humanity and its hyperindividualized subjectivization 
processes, its ethics and its tendency to develop into a world of all-pervasive 
markets. In opposition to the days of Leonardo there are (at least) 
perspectives of second order going on today which result from the desire to 
find a mathematically well-ordered universe again – the big story of western 
metaphysics so to say – and which therefore tend to „bypass“ the contingent and 
for any sort of power basically dangerous human experience and dignity in a 
technological manner as Adam Curtis might phrase it. The metaphysics isn’t just 
there anymore like in Leonardo´s times, we have to instantiate it and 
technology is the preferred key. (I write that as somebody who really loves 
technology and worked extensively with it!)

If posthumanism is standing on the doorstep let´s not deny but face it. How 
could it look like in an ethical way that doesn´t have to be decreed? There 
still seem to be different ways of development: on the one side a posthumanism 
that is questioning the dualities of modernity (then including notions like the 
autonomy of art, its idealizations and remnants of avant-garde thinking and 
court jester artists as Denzin et al argue with Barad and others). Or on the 
other side a posthumanism that shows up as solutionism and neo-metaphysics with 
the attempts to bypass ‚human factors‘ (that is communal sensemaking, embodied 
experience and so on) except for the calculable ‚wow-trigger‘ effect of an 
superficial affect aesthetics as just another ‚market gimmick‘.
When I thought about my own thinking reflexes I had the impression that one 
might intuitively tend to defend modernity in some cases (e.g. in case of the 
freedom to be visionary as under the ‚regime‘ of an autonomy of art) while at 
the same time disliking it in other cases (all-pervasive markets which govern 
the processes of subjectivization to their inner core).

But what about the x standing on the doorstep? And how to deal with it within 
institutional contexts? A defence of some aspects of modernity might not be 
enough in the long run although it´s surely a legitimate thing to do from an 
institutional point of view. (That was the reason why I´ve mentioned last time 
that the liberty of the arts in modernity is in fact quite enclosed within 
specific institutionalized contexts and social classes. With my education 
biography I didn´t belong to those classes and their subjectivization games 
felt always a bit strange to me as I didn´t learn them. Nevertheless [well 
paid] art was coincidentaly open for me and I’m thankful for that.)

To me that x is a hard question I cannot answer at the moment. When I was 
reading Florians posted article (whose texts I appreciate a lot) and your 
comment on it I thought I take the chance to state that question in here. Maybe 
an artist habit: state the question ; ) But I have to admit that I´ve never 
posted something in a mailing list, I even didn´t know how to when I tried 
first and I also don´t read along in here for so long. Insofar maybe a bit 
overdone. However it helped me to clarify my thoughts.

Regards,
Martin ✌️
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