Concerning the role of Orthodoxy in the war over Ukraine, I just wanted to pass this link on, from the interesting online publication RD, or Religion Dispatches (FAQ: Is RD a religious publication? Answer: No. It's not. Q: Then why do you have "religion" in your name? A: Because it’s a magazine _ *on_* religion. It's the subject our writers cover):
https://religiondispatches.org/the-russian-patriarch-just-gave-his-most-dangerous-speech-yet-and-almost-no-one-in-the-west-has-noticed/ The Russian Patriarch Just Gave His Most Dangerous Speech Yet, And Almost No One In The West Has Noticed by Katherine Kelaidis There’s little doubt that Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill’s Forgiveness Sunday Sermon <https://religiondispatches.org/if-kirills-bizarre-sermon-blaming-war-on-pride-parades-comes-as-a-surprise-its-time-to-learn-the-history/> last month received more attention than any Orthodox cleric’s sermon has received in the Western media in a long time. Beyond its frightening absurdity, it’s likely this attention is due, in no small part, to its use of culture war rhetoric with which Western audiences are so familiar and about which they are so passionate. Therefore, it’s not necessarily surprising that yesterday’s sermon, delivered in the imposing and threatening Cathedral of the Armed Forces <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/20/orthodox-cathedral-of-the-armed-force-russian-national-identity-military-disneyland>, is receiving less attention, though this sermon was arguably far more dangerous <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5914188.html?fbclid=IwAR37VW4l-JKWsxj16MhepsDlU2K0kIRX__18KQNoA9IJRoJ78Ja8PjlkFP8> and might provide critical insight into what will come next for Russia, Ukraine, and the rest of us. The Fourth Sunday in Lent is dedicated to the commemoration of St. John Climacus (also known as St. John of the Ladder) in the Eastern Christian tradition. Little is known about this early Desert Father, except that he’s the author of one of Christianity’s most important ascetical texts, *The Ladder of Divine Ascent. *Divided into thirty parts, the treatise is meant to be a guidebook to a Christian life, with topics from *lying* to *the remembrance of death*. Patriarch Kirill ostensibly took St. John of the Ladder and his famed text as the basis for his sermon. And if we’re being frank, the first half of the sermon was fairly benign, if not a predictable, standard sermon from a Christian minister. Kirill even reminded his audience that, “The greatest and holiest feeling God has given to man is the feeling of love.” A sentiment that, tragically, sounds a bit shocking coming from a warmongering patriarch. But then, about halfway through, the sermon took a turn for the shocking and dangerous. It was at about the point that he acknowledged where he stood: in a cathedral built not so much for the glory of God as for the glory of Russian military might. Here the Patriarch said he had come to address the leaders of their Russian forces, and through them, their troops. He reminded the assembled congregation of Vladimir Putin’s favorite propaganda point in this war: that Russia was fighting fascism in Ukraine just as it had in the Second World War. And then the Patriarch, whose office was just a few centuries ago (a blink of the eye in the memory of the Christian East) located not in Moscow, but Kyiv, offered up a version of history that simply erases Ukraine from the map. Kirill blames “various forces” (i.e. outsiders, including—one would imagine—the West) that emerged in the Middle Ages for what he regards as a false division between Russia and Ukraine. In fact, he doesn’t even acknowledge there are such people as Ukrainians, referring to all involved parties (including, perhaps, one could speculate, Belarusians) as “Holy Russians.” Disregarding for a moment how simply, factually wrong Patriarch Kirill’s history is, this sermon does mark a dangerous escalation in the rhetoric coming from the Moscow Patriarchate—and, we can assume, by extension the Russian state. This rhetorical advance is made all the more dangerous by the fact that most in the West won’t even know the sermon *happened,* let alone be aware of its pernicious implications. In fact, as of this writing, there doesn’t seem to be a single readily available translation of the sermon online in English and it’s received little coverage by any major Western media outlet (this *Reuters* <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/patriarch-urges-soldiers-defend-peace-loving-russia-amid-ukraine-campaign-2022-04-03/> article might be the only exception). It’s understandable why. Patriarch Kirill isn’t deploying the familiar rhetoric of the Culture Wars, “gay pride parades,” and Western decadence. He’s speaking in terms of the obscure history of the Christian East, a history largely unknown in the West. But do not be fooled; what he’s saying is extremely dangerous. Patriarch Kirill’s sermon on the Sunday of St. John Climacus does no less than refuse to acknowledge the distinction between Russian and Ukrainian culture and identity, and it denies Ukraine’s right to exist as a sovereign nation, both historically and in the present. Furthermore, it legitimizes the ongoing violence as necessary and even, perhaps one could argue, holy. As the Patriarch says, recalling the words of the Gospel of John <https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=John%2015%3A13&version=NIV>, the Russian soldiers are “laying down their lives for a friend.” That’s right. The Ukrainians the Russians are bombing, shooting, and leaving dead at the side of the road <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60949791> are *friends*. Just like Jesus thought of his disciples. These are the words of a committed nationalist of the imperial variety and a man who thinks nothing of using the familiar words of a faith to their most egregious effect. As we should all know by now, this is a very dangerous combination. When we ignore his words (and when we’re too generous in our interpretation of them), we betray those he’s already harmed and we virtually ensure that he will do worse in the future. [END] *** Also a correction: it's been 368 years since the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654, not "almost 500," my bad. Best, Michael On Wed, 6 Apr 2022 at 16:27, <nettime-l-requ...@mail.kein.org> wrote: > Send nettime-l mailing list submissions to > nettime-l@mail.kein.org > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > nettime-l-requ...@mail.kein.org > > You can reach the person managing the list at > nettime-l-ow...@mail.kein.org > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of nettime-l digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: Further on Greg Yugin and Russian facism (Ted Byfield) > 2. Re: Further on Greg Yugin and Russian facism (Michael Benson) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Wed, 06 Apr 2022 14:22:01 -0400 > From: Ted Byfield <tedbyfi...@gmail.com> > To: Brian Holmes <bhcontinentaldr...@gmail.com> > Cc: Michael Benson <kinpix2...@gmail.com>, nettime > <nettim...@kein.org> > Subject: Re: <nettime> Further on Greg Yugin and Russian facism > Message-ID: <9b42d988-5df6-4252-b492-9007cf030...@gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Happy (and not not) to say I agree with all of this ? really well put, > Brian. Two thoughts: > > (1) As you probably know, "lustration" also refers to a more or less > formal process of governmental and social transformation ? basically, an > alternative to more rigorous truth-and-reconciliation processes. There are > many people on this list who know much more than I do, but it's my > understanding that lustration was the generic term for describing > "decommunization" processes in many Eastern Bloc countries after the fall > of the wall. Its use now, in addition to the religious connotations you > note, is also just trollish revanchism. > > (2) Much more US-centric: Mark Milley, the head of the US Joint Chiefs of > Staff, said a few days ago: "It's a bit early, still, even though we're a > month plus into the war. There is much of the ground war left in Ukraine, > but I do think this is a very protracted conflict. And I think it's at > least measured in years." I haven't seen the larger context of his > comments, so it could be that he clarified exactly what he meant; but it's > hard to imagine that high-ups, particularly in the US, see a viable path > toward peace and normal relations anytime soon. And the neocons, always > thirsty for war, are no doubt back in force telling everyone who'll listen > "I told you so." > > It's hard to speculate further without bumping into the 800-pound gorilla > of Russian interventions in US elections. Sanctions will make them more > difficult, and being associated with Russians and their wealth will be > d?class? for all but the most rightists. But the US has a habit of making > things about itself, and this is an especially inappropriate time for that. > Having said that, a great deal will hinge on which party wins in the > Congressional elections this year and, yes, the presidential ones two years > from now. > > Not all: Putin is older and (I think) much frailer than he looks, so the > question of who'll succeed him is surely in the air. The shortest path to > peace would be for Putin to be ousted and whatever regime follows to trade > on that transition to restore relations. Putin knows that, and will > escalate and exacerbate everything he can to make that impossible. > > Cheers, > Ted > > On 6 Apr 2022, at 13:01, Brian Holmes wrote: > > > On Mon, Apr 4, 2022, 12:53 Michael Benson wrote: > > > >> > >> Anyone doubting the truth of Yugin's allegation that Putinism is > directly > >> comparable to the German Nazism or Spanish and Italian fascisms of the > >> 1930's ... > >> > > > > Thank you Michael, I don't doubt it but the editorial from RIA Novosti is > > particularly brutal and reveals yet another element that has been thrown > in > > the historical cement mixer, namely decolonization. Thus the great > > struggles of the twentieth century are stripped of their meaning and > > enrolled in the ideological message machine. > > > > The use of the religious term lustration (ritual cleansing and > > purification) apparently refers to what they have done in Bucha, etc. But > > it also points to the centrality of the Orthodox Church, which may be a > far > > more effective pillar of population management than the mythical > constructs > > of the Nazis. > > > > Currently all this horror is funded by global energy consumerism. And the > > lack of action to stop such funding makes it appear that European > > governments do not see or cannot act on the totalitarian nature of the > > threat, which demands some sacrifice from citizens. This fear of economic > > disruption is absurd. If the war continues unopposed, the global facts on > > the ground will include an unprecedented refugee crisis, significant > > starvation among people in poor countries and a gradual hollowing-out and > > replacement of the current monetary order, or in other words, disruption > of > > a degree surpassing anything since WWII. Given the preview, do we really > > want to see a world system centered on and governed by Russia and China? > > > > The serious question is how far can an active totalitarianism go before > > world war begins in earnest. I don't think much further. The Russians > have > > engaged a whole-of-society strategy. To avoid both defeat, and a nuclear > > war that would be worse than defeat, democracies would need to mobilize > > their citizens in a deliberate project including direct military moves > > alongside effective economic ones, definitely involving sacrifice > > from individuals and corporations. This is as yet unimaginable, but > unless > > the Russian offensive halts and a retreat to the Donbas is confirmed, I > > think we will begin to see efforts toward such a mobilization very soon. > > How it plays out among civil societies will then become a central issue. > > > > Thoughtfully yours, Brian > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2022 16:22:35 -0400 > From: Michael Benson <kinpix2...@gmail.com> > To: "bhcontinentaldr...@gmail.com" <bhcontinentaldr...@gmail.com>, > nettim...@kein.org > Subject: Re: <nettime> Further on Greg Yugin and Russian facism > Message-ID: > < > caf3echhm6tjwsq3n9r+r4qmwveqgsr9yrtonpz9ezntdq12...@mail.gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > Brian, thanks for your thoughtful text. > > >Thus the great struggles of the twentieth century are stripped of their > meaning and enrolled in the ideological message machine. > > Or rather another colonization, that being the domination and subjugation > imposed by the Soviet Union on a long list of nations, hasn't been stripped > of meaning so much as absolutely suppressed and negated. (And previously, > the Russian Empire that Putin's been strenuously evoking and attempting to > reconstruct, something hard to do with a GDP smaller than Italy's and > extended across 11 time zones.) There's a great myopia in certain circles > concerning the Soviet empire. Colonization can only and exclusively mean > the malfeasance of western powers, something elements of the left seem to > adhere to quite religiously, though I take heart in Noam Chomsky bluntly > referring to Putin's war as "criminal aggression" in the New Statesman > today. (Chomsky who for decades has been a leading representative of a > strain of thought in which almost everything that happens in the world is > in direct or indirect relation to US and western malfeasance, a kind of > inverted white man's burden in which 'our' centrality is retained.) > > I grew up, in part, in the USSR. I never had any doubt Moscow was the > center of an empire and that the nations contained in that empire were > subjugated and exploited. But because that empire professed socialist > ideals and stood in opposition to a capitalist west led by the USA, the > crimes of that empire were largely ignored or explained away by those > rightfully opposed to another system with a long string of crimes under its > belt, from Iran, Guatemala, and Chile to Vietnam, Cambodia, and the list > goes on. (Let's not forget the unprovoked invasion of Iraq based on cooked > intelligence, with between 100,000 and 200,000 civilian casualties. More > than Putin has caused in Ukraine, at least so far. Etc.) > > But it's possible to contain both constructs in mind simultaneously. Some > of the contortions of the American and European left in attempting to > explain away Putin's war (eerily mirrored by neofascist right wing figures > in the Republican Party and Fox news in the US, or Marine Le Pen, Viktor > Orban and their ilk) put me in mind of bad science. Because we need to > examine things empirically. (Richard Feynman's admonishment to NASA > following the Challenger accident comes to mind: "For a successful > technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for Nature > cannot be fooled.") The enemy of our enemy isn't necessarily our friend. > Those who can't recognize Putin's war on Ukraine as an attempted > colonialist conquest may have problems processing empirical data due to > polarizing filters. (Glenn Greenwald springs to mind.) > > Add to that phantom limb syndrome, because what Russia is actually > attempting is the recolonization of Ukraine to reestablish a domination > dating back almost 500 years, to the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654. And > Sergeytsev's toxic editorial in which such reconquest is termed > decolonization (from European influence, as he explains it) puts me in mind > of Donald Trump's rhetorical technique of always accusing the other side of > the crimes one is about to commit or has already committed. > > Incidentally all this is why I have no patience for John Mearshimer's > assigning blame to the US for the war in Ukraine, though I think he's > arguing for it honestly, not duplicitously. > > >The use of the religious term lustration (ritual cleansing and > purification) apparently refers to what they have done in Bucha, etc. But > it also points to the centrality of the Orthodox Church, which may be a far > more effective pillar of population management than the mythical constructs > of the Nazis. > > Yes and speaking of Orthodoxy, another aspect of this struggle that isn't > getting much attention, because such matters are generally considered > incomprehensibly wreathed in incense, is a power dynamic in which a spurned > Russian Orthodox church is seeking to punish and reestablish control over > the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which asserted autocephalous status in 1992, > resulting in a complicated process that lasted for decades and was finally > completed in 2018. Pissing off Russian Orthodox prelates no end. > > >Currently all this horror is funded by global energy consumerism. And the > lack of action to stop such funding makes it appear that European > governments do not see or cannot act on the totalitarian nature of the > threat, which demands some sacrifice from citizens. > > Yes but interestingly, and following revelations from Bucha and other areas > the Russian were forced to withdraw from over the last few days, today EU > Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell pointed out pretty remarkably bluntly > that while the EU has sent Ukraine about one billion Euros in support since > the invasion on February 24, it sends almost that much _per day_ to Russia > for oil and gas. Or 35 billion euros since the invasion. And evidently some > pretty draconian ideas are being seriously considered concerning truly > drastic cuts to Russian gas and oil consumption by the EU. But there's > absolutely no doubt that our addiction to hydrocarbons isn't just > destroying the environment but also empowering extreme authoritarianism in > Russia, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere. (By contrast concerning where I > currently live, 6.4 % of Canada's economy comes from gas and oil, and they > have a defense budget that's only 1.36 % of their GDP. The Russian defense > budget being 4.3 % of its GDP at least officially, but probably more, and > oil and gas something like 15 % of its GDP but also likely more.) > > >The serious question is how far can an active totalitarianism go before > world war begins in earnest. I don't think much further. The Russians have > engaged a whole-of-society strategy. > > Right, which takes us back to the question of when did the war start, > really? And speaking of a whole-of-society strategy, one decision Putin's > currently facing is whether to declare his 'special' military project an > actual war, which would enable him to truly mobilize the society, send > conscripts to Ukraine without question, etc. (They sent conscripts already, > but it was deemed a mistake and officially they're not supposed to unless > they sign an agreement to go. That changes if this is officially deemed a > war.) > > If he decides to declare this an actual war, and further mobilize the > society, all bets are off regarding WW-3. But in my view either way the > Ukrainians can scarcely afford to lose, or even make a questionable deal in > the interests of short-term peace, not with a Russia intent on erasing them > from the map. Something Sergeytsev envisioned and gave voice to, clearly > fleshing out Putin's doctrine. > > Best, > Michael > > > > On Wed, 6 Apr 2022 at 13:01, Brian Holmes <bhcontinentaldr...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > > On Mon, Apr 4, 2022, 12:53 Michael Benson wrote: > > > >> > >> Anyone doubting the truth of Yugin's allegation that Putinism is > directly > >> comparable to the German Nazism or Spanish and Italian fascisms of the > >> 1930's ... > >> > > > > Thank you Michael, I don't doubt it but the editorial from RIA Novosti is > > particularly brutal and reveals yet another element that has been thrown > in > > the historical cement mixer, namely decolonization. Thus the great > > struggles of the twentieth century are stripped of their meaning and > > enrolled in the ideological message machine. > > > > The use of the religious term lustration (ritual cleansing and > > purification) apparently refers to what they have done in Bucha, etc. But > > it also points to the centrality of the Orthodox Church, which may be a > far > > more effective pillar of population management than the mythical > constructs > > of the Nazis. > > > > Currently all this horror is funded by global energy consumerism. And the > > lack of action to stop such funding makes it appear that European > > governments do not see or cannot act on the totalitarian nature of the > > threat, which demands some sacrifice from citizens. This fear of economic > > disruption is absurd. If the war continues unopposed, the global facts on > > the ground will include an unprecedented refugee crisis, significant > > starvation among people in poor countries and a gradual hollowing-out and > > replacement of the current monetary order, or in other words, disruption > of > > a degree surpassing anything since WWII. Given the preview, do we really > > want to see a world system centered on and governed by Russia and China? > > > > The serious question is how far can an active totalitarianism go before > > world war begins in earnest. I don't think much further. The Russians > have > > engaged a whole-of-society strategy. To avoid both defeat, and a nuclear > > war that would be worse than defeat, democracies would need to mobilize > > their citizens in a deliberate project including direct military moves > > alongside effective economic ones, definitely involving sacrifice > > from individuals and corporations. This is as yet unimaginable, but > unless > > the Russian offensive halts and a retreat to the Donbas is confirmed, I > > think we will begin to see efforts toward such a mobilization very soon. > > How it plays out among civil societies will then become a central issue. > > > > Thoughtfully yours, Brian > > > > > > > > > > might want to look at the bloodcurdling editorial "What Should Russia do > >> with Ukraine" by Timofey Sergeytsev published today by RIA Novosti: > >> > >> https://cryptodrftng.substack.com/p/day-40-what-russia-should-do-with > >> > >> The above link is to a translation with commentary at the top; the > >> original is here: > >> > >> https://ria.ru/20220403/ukraina-1781469605.html > >> > >> But fasten your seatbelts. (RIA Novosti of course being the Russian > state > >> media service that also inadvertently published that triumphant "mission > >> accomplished" piece by Petr Akopov on February 28th, the one clearly > >> written before the invasion of Ukraine and anticipating a swift victory. > >> > https://mil.in.ua/en/news/brave-new-world-of-putin-an-article-by-the-propaganda-publication-ria-novosti-which-was-to-be-published-after-the-occupation-of-ukraine/ > . > >> ) > >> > >> A couple things regarding the Sergeytsev piece, which I couldn't simply > >> cut-and-paste into Nettime as it calls to mind certain ultranationalist > >> texts published in the ex-Yugoslav space in the 1990's. But some key > points: > >> > >> 1) "Most likely" the majority of Ukrainians have been "Nazified." > >> "Technically" they can't be "directly punished as war criminals," but > they > >> require "reeducation" and their state must be destroyed. A "total > >> lustration" must be carried out. > >> 2) After the government and military are "liquidated," this > >> "reeducation... achieved by ideological supression" will take no less > than > >> a generation to complete. > >> 3) The name "Ukraine" cannot be retained to signify a successfully > >> "denazified" state entity on the territory that we now call Ukraine. > >> "Denazification" is synonymous with "de-Ukrainization." Ukraine as such > is > >> an "artificial, anti-Russian construction, which has no civilizational > >> content of its own." Accordingly it must be erased. > >> 4) The "Banderite element" [read Ukrainian right-wing nationalists] is a > >> "disguise for the European project of a Nazi Ukraine, so the > deNazification > >> of Ukraine is also its inevitable deEuropeanization." > >> 5) An astonishing conclusion is offered concerning this new deracinated > >> entity now under the complete control of Moscow and with its name and > >> identity erased: the "deNazification of Ukraine is at the same time its > >> decolonization." > >> > >> As I said, bloodcurdling ? but published not by some fringe publication, > >> but one of Russia's largest and most prestigious news sites, and > certainly > >> underlining the truth of some of Yugin's assertions. > >> > >> Best, > >> Michael > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Mon, 4 Apr 2022 at 02:57, <nettime-l-requ...@mail.kein.org> wrote: > >> > >>> Send nettime-l mailing list submissions to > >>> nettime-l@mail.kein.org > >>> > >>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > >>> http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l > >>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > >>> nettime-l-requ...@mail.kein.org > >>> > >>> You can reach the person managing the list at > >>> nettime-l-ow...@mail.kein.org > >>> > >>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > >>> than "Re: Contents of nettime-l digest..." > >>> > >>> > >>> Today's Topics: > >>> > >>> 1. 'A fascist regime looms in Russia - interview with Greg Yugin > >>> (patrice riemens) > >>> > >>> > >>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>> > >>> Message: 1 > >>> Date: Mon, 4 Apr 2022 08:54:35 +0200 (CEST) > >>> From: patrice riemens <patr...@xs4all.nl> > >>> To: nettime-l <nettim...@kein.org> > >>> Subject: <nettime> 'A fascist regime looms in Russia - interview with > >>> Greg Yugin > >>> Message-ID: <1880135703.440337.1649055275...@ox-webmail.xs4all.nl> > >>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > >>> > >>> Aloha, > >>> You may want to read this first, Greg Yudin in Open Democracy, just > two > >>> days before the war: > >>> > >>> > https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/russia-ukraine-most-senseless-war-nato-history/ > >>> > >>> 'A fascist regime looms in Russia - interview with Greg Yugin > >>> Moscow sociologist Greg Yudin on Putin?s unleashed power apparatus and > >>> the political motives behind the attack on Ukraine > >>> Interview: David Ernesto Garc?a Doell < > >>> https://www.akweb.de/autor-in/david-ernesto-garcia-doell/> > >>> Greg Yudin is a philosopher and sociologist at the Moscow School of > >>> Social and Economic Sciences. Two days before the Russian invasion of > >>> Ukraine began, he anticipated quite exactly what would happen, in an > >>> article for Open Democracy < > >>> > https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/russia-ukraine-most-senseless-war-nato-history/ > >. > >>> Greg Yudin is still in Moscow; he was hospitalized by security forces > >>> during a protest in the days after the war began. Yudin has long warned > >>> against Putin?s aggressive claim to power, which makes a military > >>> confrontation with NATO increasingly likely. In the interview, he > describes > >>> the power mechanisms by which Putin?s system is based, the rapid > >>> transformation of Russian society into a pre-fascist order and the > >>> prospects for the anti-war movement. > >>> Two days before the offical war started you were one of the few > >>> intellectuals to warn of a war of this scale. While a lot of leftists > still > >>> thought it is about the annexion of the Donbas, you predicted a war > that > >>> would be centred on Kiev, Kharkiv and Odessa. How did you come to this > >>> assessment? > >>> Greg Yudin: I have been warning about this war for two years. But I was > >>> certainly not alone to see it approaching ? initially there were > people who > >>> study Russian politics and later on the experts in Russian military > were > >>> ringing the bells, too. But many experts were dismissing or even > ridiculing > >>> the real chance of a major war, and the reason was not that they are > >>> somehow incompetent but that they proceeded from the wrong assumptions. > >>> Unfortunately, it doesn?t look like they are learning the lesson, for > today > >>> they are loudly ruling out nuclear escalation, working from the same > >>> erroneous premises. > >>> The main mistake was the assumption that Putin would definitely be > >>> worse off after invading Ukraine than he was before, and that this must > >>> influence his calculations. However, Putin weighed the cost of war > against > >>> the cost of inaction. It was pretty clear to him that he would very > soon > >>> find himself in a hopeless situation if he did not start this military > >>> operation now. > >>> Present-day Russia is a Bonapartist regime, very similar to the French > >>> regime of 1848?1870 famously described by Marx, but also to the inter > war > >>> Germany. It relies on plebiscites by benefiting from a sudden > introduction > >>> of universal suffrage and aggressively boosts resentment and > revanchism in > >>> society after a major defeat (in Russia?s case, after the Cold War). > Ruled > >>> by a leader with almost unlimited power, such regimes tend to > degenerate > >>> into electoral monarchies that repress all internal divisions and are > >>> hostile to their neighbors. They are economically stable, which helps > them > >>> depoliticise the masses, trading absolute civic disengagement for > relative > >>> well-being and supporting escapism into private life. All this leads > them > >>> to become militarily aggressive, externalising internal conflicts, > >>> overestimating threats from the outside and ending up bolstering strong > >>> military alliances against them. They are driven by suicidal > tendencies and > >>> are heading inevitably towards defeat ? but t > >>> hat comes at a high price for everyone, especially now, in the nuclear > >>> age. > >>> No price is too high for Putin to gain control of Ukraine, for he > >>> believes to be existentially endangered by what he calls an > ?anti-Russia? > >>> at his borders. > >>> After Putin turned Russia into a virtual monarchy with his > >>> constitutional referendum in 2020 and attempted to kill his only > political > >>> opponent, Alexei Navalny, it was clear to me that he was nurturing a > plan > >>> for a major war. Since the very existence of a large and culturally > close > >>> state nearby with a political regime that is backed militarily by the > >>> United States is seen by Putin as existentially threatening, it became > >>> obvious he would start a war to conquer Ukraine if he fails to subdue > it > >>> peacefully. No price is too high for Putin to gain control of Ukraine, > for > >>> he believes to be existentially endangered by what he calls an > >>> ?anti-Russia? at his borders. In addition, Putin was facing declining > >>> popularity at home, particularly amongst young people, and would likely > >>> have faced a resistance movement very soon. He needs to be sure he can > >>> suppress it at any cost. > >>> What can you say about the repression and the prospects of the > anti-war > >>> movement? > >>> The anti-war movement was successful in showing a split in Russian > >>> society. People who have protested in the streets or made public > statements > >>> against the war made it obvious that there is a significant part of > Russian > >>> society that rejects this war and considers it to be not only a crime > >>> against Ukraine but also a betrayal of Russia?s interests. In the early > >>> days when opinion polls still made some sense (they no longer do when > one > >>> faces up to 20 years in prison for simply calling this ?special > military > >>> operation? a war), they suggested that up to 25 percent of Russians > opposed > >>> this military action. This, I think, is a considerable success. > >>> But the protests have stalled. It is not even the repression that is > >>> preventing them but rather the lack of organisation. Putin was smart > enough > >>> to destroy all political or civil organizations and networks before he > >>> started the war. It is incredibly difficult to organise here; you are > >>> immediately arrested by the police or beaten up by the state-sponsored > >>> thugs. The lack of organisation is demoralising. People are willing to > risk > >>> their lives, despite the new laws and increased police violence. But > it?s > >>> hard to do that when one sees no way to achieve something. Putin always > >>> wins by spreading helplessness. > >>> In an interview with Robin Celikates for taz < > >>> https://taz.de/Aktivist-ueber-Antikriegsproteste-in-Russland/!5838965/ > > > >>> you compared today?s situation with 1938, when Germany annexed > >>> Sudentenland. This comparison is highly controvercial since it feeds > into > >>> the narrative that puts Putin in line with Hitler, while George Bush > was > >>> never described in the same way when he invaded Iraq and killed > hundreds of > >>> thousands people. > >>> The Hitler comparison was unfortunate for many years and I never > >>> supported it. It was meant to scare the audience by identifying Putin > with > >>> radical evil. Putin was much closer to Napoleon III or perhaps to > Franco, > >>> if one wanted to emphasise his ruthlessness. This doesn?t mean that he > was > >>> ?not bad enough?, but rather that it was a different kind of repressive > >>> authoritarian regime. > >>> The situation in Russia has changed, and I am not sure everyone > outside > >>> Russia understands that. There is an ongoing shift from > authoritarianism to > >>> totalitarianism. > >>> But now the situation in Russia has changed, and I am not sure > everyone > >>> outside Russia understands that. There is an ongoing shift here from > >>> authoritarianism to totalitarianism. It is a question of how society is > >>> politically structured and what power relies on. In other words, it is > not > >>> a question of quantity, but of quality. And in this regard, yes, just > very > >>> recently there are clearly more similarities whith what is classically > >>> described as fascism. > >>> n Germany we have a very strict conceptualisation of fascism and > >>> nazism, the latter always linked to an eliminatory antisemitism. > >>> Intellectuals in Germany like Felix Jaitner rather analyse Putin?s > regime > >>> with Marx?s and Poulanzas?s framework of ?Bonapartism?, something > between > >>> military dictatorship and fascism. > >>> The obsession with the essence of the Ukrainian nation and its > >>> equivalence to the Russian nation is what stands out as a particularly > Nazi > >>> element rather than just a fascist one. As anecdotal evidence, I > should add > >>> that it was long known that there are a lot of admirers of Mussolini > among > >>> the Russian elites. I would also recommend to read Putin?s article in > the > >>> National Interest of 2020 < > >>> > https://nationalinterest.org/feature/vladimir-putin-real-lessons-75th-anniversary-world-war-ii-162982 > > > >>> in which he explains the causes of the Second World War. Try to find > how > >>> many times he blames Germany for this war in this article, compared to > >>> Poland. As for antisemitism, there is no explicit antisemitic element > in > >>> the regime right now. But there is a lot of tacit antisemitism in > Russia, > >>> and it is mostly concentrated in the secret services, which now have > the > >>> upper hand. > >>> Do you see the Z Movement as an indicator of the qualitative shift > >>> towards fascism? > >>> The Z sign was adopted from the Russian military vehicles in Ukraine > >>> (vehicles belonging to the Western military district have Z signs > because > >>> of the Russian word for the West ? ?Zapad?), it was promoted by state > >>> propagandists who certainly know that it looks like a half swastika. > Some > >>> older people were utterly terrified by this sign, which immediately > >>> reminded them of their childhood. Now the Z signs are found on the > doors of > >>> anti-war activists, along with threats, which indicates that there is a > >>> group of Nazis among the siloviki (members of secret police and > security > >>> forces; note ak), and they now have the backing to do such things. > >>> Even more chilling are the Z shaped installations that people all over > >>> Russia are forming with their bodies. Not only civil servants, but also > >>> children in schools and kindergartens are told to assemble in a Z > shape and > >>> hail Putin. At the sight of such a ?Z?, formed by terminally ill > children > >>> or by kneeling toddlers, it is hard not to think of Nazi Germany. > >>> Another troubling dynamic is the introduction of the outright > >>> propaganda in educational institutions, from universities to > kindergartens. > >>> Putin?s view of Ukrainian history is now being hammered into children?s > >>> heads. This was never the case before: despite some worrying > developments > >>> in history teaching, it was never required to share the official > judgment > >>> of history, let alone Putin?s delirious theories. > >>> The fascist mobilisation of society takes place primarily at the level > >>> of political symbolism? > >>> One must add the unleashed violence to this picture. Since the > >>> beginning of the anti-war protests, there is already numerous evidence > of > >>> beatings, torture and sexual assaults at police stations. While police > >>> violence is certainly not new to Russia, these developments indicate a > >>> possible shift to a new level. There is also a total crackdown on > >>> independent media now ? just on Monday the last independent journal > Novaya > >>> Gazeta, whose editor received the Nobel prize last year, closed, so > there > >>> are virtually no independent media anymore. Those that remain are > >>> inaccessible from Russia and officially labled either ?foreign agents? > or > >>> ?extremist organizations?. > >>> Finally, the most alarming element of this new potentially > totalitarian > >>> setup is the ideological turn Putin has taken since the first days of > war: > >>> his new narrative of the ?denazification? of Ukraine. The accusation > that > >>> the Ukrainian authorities are supporting the extreme right has been > >>> pervasive in Russian official discourse for some time ? and not > entirely > >>> unfounded. In February, however, it turned into purely essentialist > >>> rhetoric, implying that Ukrainian essence, which is allegedly Russian > by > >>> nature, has been contaminated by some Nazi element. Therefore, it is > the > >>> task of the Russian army to purge Ukraine from this Nazi element. The > >>> Russian Ministry of Defense is already talking about setting up > >>> ?filtration? procedures in the occupied territories. And since > Ukrainians > >>> are resisting stubbornly, the only possible explanation is that they > were > >>> even more ?nazified? than expected, which could easily lead to the > >>> conclusion that they deserve to be wiped out. The same ?purity? > narrativ > >>> e was used by Putin just a few days ago when he spoke of to the ?enemy > >>> within?, the so-called ?nation-traitors? who should be ?spit out like a > >>> moth? by the Russian society in order to preserve its health. > >>> Is it possible to quantify the Z movement? > >>> It depends on how you define it. The number of people who have > >>> participated in the public body installations, who wear the Z sign, > put it > >>> on their cars or use it on social media is huge. My educated guess is > that > >>> it could be close to 30 to 40 percent throughout all sectors of > society. > >>> However, to call them all one movement is not correct. Many of them > have > >>> been forced to show the sign by their ? often state ? employers. Many > are > >>> not happy about it, but I have heard people say: ?I will do whatever > they > >>> want me to do if it saves my job.? People who do it voluntarily are far > >>> less numerous. However, some of them are truly aggressive. > >>> To be clear, this is exactly where the line lies between the good old > >>> Putin authoritarianism and a new kind of totalitarian state. As long as > >>> this movement is mostly staged against the will of the people, the line > >>> remains uncrossed. However, the passivity of the masses is truly > limitless, > >>> they can be easily turned into an aggressive mob. > >>> We have seen the stock market plunge by 40 percent in two weeks but > the > >>> rouble has already recovered since mid-March. How long can a war > economy > >>> work out in Russia? Won?t the social consequences of the economic > downfall > >>> lead to great discontent? > >>> Putin will not remain idle and wait until the crisis hits hard enough > >>> for Russians to turn against him. He is well aware of the risk and will > >>> therefore most likely try to blame the crisis on the ?traitors? who are > >>> acting in concert with the West to harm Russia. However, if for some > reason > >>> Putin fails to set the terror in motion and loses momentum, the parts > of > >>> society that are now most severely hurt by the crisis are likely to > team up > >>> with the elites against him. This could happen relatively soon. > >>> What does Putin?s power base look like in economic terms? Is there a > >>> split within the economic elites into pro/contra war? > >>> Putin was able to build a strong and robust neoliberal economy by > >>> sticking to the 1990s model of the unchained market. In fact, the > >>> neoliberals who were in power under Yeltsin are still in charge of the > >>> economy under Putin, the key figure being Elvira Nabiullina, the head > of > >>> the Russian Central Bank. This neoliberal setup has some peculiarities, > >>> such as, for instance, the blending of private and public companies > like > >>> Gazprom or Rosneft, which theoretically belong to the state, but in > reality > >>> channel the revenues into the pockets of Putin?s cronies. This economic > >>> model secured impressive economic growth during Putin?s first decade in > >>> power and relative resilience to foreign sanctions in the second > decade. > >>> However, the growth resulted in huge inequality. Today, Russia is one > >>> of the most unequal countries in the world, rivaling the United States > in > >>> this regard: In 2019, 58 percent of wealth belonged to one percent of > the > >>> population, while the top 10 percent owned 83 percent of all wealth, > >>> according to the Swiss Bank. At the same time, Putin has built a > >>> trickle-down system similar to the one Ronald Reagan created in his > time. > >>> While the elites became insanely rich and bought endless luxurious > yachts > >>> and palaces, the general population was able to raise its standard of > >>> living through mortgages and consumer credit. Russia has > disproportionately > >>> high levels of private debt, with a significant part of poorer families > >>> spending half their income on interest payments to banks or > microfinance > >>> organisations. > >>> Putin has made both the super-rich and the technocrats vow they will > >>> never engage in politics, and they don?t dare to challenge his > decisions. > >>> Putin?s oligarchs can be divided into two groups. Some of them are > >>> Putin?s long-time friends from the KGB. They share his imperialist > >>> worldview and probably contributed to pushing him towards this war. > Another > >>> group consists of those people who became super-rich in the 1990s and > were > >>> able to multiply their fortunes under Putin. They are obviously unhappy > >>> with this war, and some even dare to say it publicly, albeit in a > subtle > >>> way. > >>> However, both the super-rich and the technocrats in charge of the > >>> Russian economy are completely devoid of any political subjectivity. > Putin > >>> has made them vow they will never engage in politics, and they don?t > even > >>> dare to challenge his decisions. They are afraid of him and accept that > >>> this war is the fate that they are going to share with their country > >>> simply. Actually, Nabiullina reportedly tried to step down after the > war > >>> started, but Putin threatened her family and forced her to stay. These > >>> people are quite comfortable being hostages. > >>> When we wrote before the conversation, you said that Putin will invade > >>> Poland next. If that happens, there are two options: Either the US/NATO > >>> will let Putin take control over Eastern Europe or we will possibly be > >>> heding for World War 3. I still have difficulties imagining such a > >>> scenario, since NATO?s military seems so much superior to that of > Russia. > >>> Putin?s goal is neither a war with Ukraine nor with Poland. For him, > >>> these countries are either non-existent or just puppets of the United > >>> States. In the eyes of the Russian military command, the war is a > defensive > >>> war against the US/NATO/West, these terms being used interchangeably. > The > >>> Ukrainian territory is only the first step in this major war. Russian > >>> troops in Transnistria (separatist region in Moldovia; note ak) are > already > >>> mobilised and waiting to establish a connection with the Russian army > if it > >>> takes Odessa, which would mean that an invasion of Moldova would become > >>> possible. The Baltic states and Poland are certainly medium-term > targets. > >>> It is no coincidence that Putin has demanded complete withdrawal of > NATO > >>> troops from the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. > >>> His military strategy is simple: threaten with nuclear weapons and > >>> seize territory. He believes the West to be fundamentally weak, > corrupt, > >>> and cowardly. This attitude is extremely popular in Russia, and Putin > >>> reinforces it. There is a deep conviction in Russia that the West will > >>> never risk a nuclear conflict with Russia over a country in the East, > be it > >>> Ukraine or Poland. What we are now seeing in Ukraine generally > confirms his > >>> assessment: it is enough for Putin to invoke nuclear conflict to make > >>> Western Europe reconsider what it is willing to do to help Ukraine. > >>> Putin also believes that right now he has a certain military advantage > >>> over the US in hypersonic weapons. He probably believes that this > would be > >>> enough to deter the US from entering a potential nuclear confrontation. > >>> According to the Russian army, it has already used hypersonic missiles > in > >>> Ukraine without any military need, which looks like a message to the > West. > >>> Importantly, Putin has repeatedly said that this advantage will not > last > >>> too long, for Americans would soon catch up. It means he has to > capitalise > >>> on it now. > >>> How can the left in Germany support the left in Ukraine and Russia in > >>> their current struggles? > >>> I honestly believe that the world is in great danger. We know this > >>> beast from the inside, and we have few illusions that it will stop on > its > >>> own. The left knows the importance of international movements during > big > >>> wars. Therefore, it should resist the framing of this conflict in > terms of > >>> nation-states, e.g. Russia and Ukraine, because that would only > strengthen > >>> the states and further weaken the people. It is only through > international > >>> solidarity that this beast can be stopped. And it should be stopped > now, > >>> before it is too late. > >>> One important thing to do now is to target the money of the > super-rich. > >>> This brutal aggression has made it clear that capital goes insane when > it > >>> is not subject to control. Putin?s success in corrupting political and > >>> economic elites around the world is due to his knowledge that greed and > >>> self-interest are the cornerstones of capitalism. He firmly believes > that > >>> money can buy it all. He knows that liberal democracy is a sham. Putin > is > >>> an ultra-neoliberal, he eviscerated all solidarity in Russia and > replaced > >>> it with unbridled cynicism. That is why he is sure that no one will > really > >>> interfere with his military plans and all sanctions will eventually be > >>> lifted, for capital only cares about profit. He has enough evidence of > >>> this, and Merkel?s Russia policy is a textbook example of how greed > >>> dominates political power in capitalism. > >>> > >>> Both pieces bwo Cecile L, with thanks. She also pointed out to this > >>> stories feed: > >>> > http://newfascismsyllabus.com/category/contributions/ukrainian-dispatches/ > >>> > >>> Sad times, very sad times ... > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -------------- next part -------------- > >>> An HTML attachment was scrubbed... > >>> URL: < > >>> > http://mx.kein.org/pipermail/nettime-l/attachments/20220404/3e1f73b5/attachment.html > >>> > > >>> > >>> ------------------------------ > >>> > >>> # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission > >>> # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, > >>> # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets > >>> # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l > >>> > >>> End of nettime-l Digest, Vol 175, Issue 2 > >>> ***************************************** > >>> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> Michael Benson > >> *Kinetikon Pictures * > >> michael-benson.net > >> kinpix2...@gmail.com > >> # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission > >> # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, > >> # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets > >> # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l > >> # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org > >> # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject: > > > > > > -- > Michael Benson > *Kinetikon Pictures * > michael-benson.net > kinpix2...@gmail.com > -------------- next part -------------- > An HTML attachment was scrubbed... > URL: < > http://mx.kein.org/pipermail/nettime-l/attachments/20220406/82073f64/attachment.html > > > > ------------------------------ > > # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission > # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, > # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets > # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l > > End of nettime-l Digest, Vol 175, Issue 6 > ***************************************** > > -- Michael Benson *Kinetikon Pictures * michael-benson.net kinpix2...@gmail.com
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