Daiki Ueno <u...@gnu.org> writes:
> From: Daiki Ueno <du...@redhat.com>
>
> The ChaCha20 based header protection algorithm in QUIC requires a way
> to set the initial value of counter:
> https://quicwg.org/base-drafts/draft-ietf-quic-tls.html#name-chacha20-based-header-prote
>
> This will add a new function chacha_set_counter, which takes an
> 8-octet initial value of the block counter.
I've merged all three patches to master-updates. Two nits below:
> +void
> +chacha_crypt32(struct chacha_ctx *ctx,
> + size_t length,
> + uint8_t *c,
> + const uint8_t *m)
> +{
> + if (!length)
> + return;
> +
> + for (;;)
> + {
> + uint32_t x[_CHACHA_STATE_LENGTH];
> +
> + _chacha_core (x, ctx->state, CHACHA_ROUNDS);
> +
> + ++ctx->state[12];
> +
> + /* stopping at 2^70 length per nonce is user's responsibility */
Should be 2^38, not 2^70, right?
> +Nettle's implementation of ChaCha-Poly1305 follows @cite{RFC 8439},
> +where the ChaCha cipher is initialized with a 12-byte nonce and a 4-byte
> +block counter. This allows up to 256 gigabytes of data to be encrypted
> +using the same key.
Should be "same key and nonce"; the counter size limits the size of a
message, but the nonce allows for many messages using the same key.
I'll fix these.
It would be nice with a test case where the first 32 bits of the counter
wrap around, which is the only case where chacha_crypt and
chacha_crypt32 behave differently. Is that something you can look into?
Thanks!
/Niels
--
Niels Möller. PGP-encrypted email is preferred. Keyid 368C6677.
Internet email is subject to wholesale government surveillance.
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