Nicolas Williams wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 11, 2008 at 01:36:36PM -0700, Darren Reed wrote:
>   
>> Nicolas Williams wrote:
>>     
>>> On Tue, Mar 11, 2008 at 01:14:00PM -0700, Darren Reed wrote:
>>>       
>>>> Interesting, the use of ipsecconf to manage TCP MD5.
>>>>
>>>> Can I specify that my application will use TCP MD5
>>>> over an IPsec tunnel, all in the same .conf file?
>>>>         
>>> Also, why shouldn't any of the TCP security options not be socket
>>> options (or, better, new functions)?
>>>
>>> Making them system policy options might be a useful fallback, but
>>> providing APIs is even better.
>>>       
>> Seemingly the goal of this project is to encourage quick
>> adoption of TCP MD5.  Providing the means to specify
>> a new system policy that enforces this is a much better
>> boost to adoption than requiring people to modify their
>> applications.  In addition, it allows applications to
>> benefit from the inclusion of this feature where there
>> is no chance to use source code.  I can't see why what
>> is being offered can't be delivered first and the API
>> pieces delivered later.
>>     
>
> The problem is that if an application protocol spec says "use TCP MD5"
> then how does the application make sure that it's used?  To punt to the
> sysadmin and assume that the sysadmin did the right thing is not really
> safe.
>
> Remember, we have IP_SEC_OPT (ipsec(7P)).  No, IP_SEC_OPT is not nearly
> as useful as we'd all like it to be, but it's a heck of a lot more
> useful than not having it at all.
>
> If I were an ARC member I'd derail any fasttrack proposing only an
> administrative interface to TCP MD5.  I don't know that I'd find any
> members to back me up (and I don't want to be a member either, at least
> not yet).  The point is: I think this is extremely important.
>   

I concur, although I'm not *sure* I'd derail the case.  But I do think 
that it should be possible for an application to request greater 
security than perhaps the administrator has configured.

Having an administrative default or override is *great*, and perhaps the 
idea that this could be delivered ahead of the API (perhaps because 
standardization efforts around the socket API are still in progress), is 
totally acceptable.  But I think I'd still like to know that there is a 
long term plan at least, to offer some application access to this 
feature (at least to enable it -- application access to disabling it is 
probably of limited value.)

On another front, perhaps someone more familiar can answer this 
question:  If everyone basically acknowledges that MD5 has some known 
weaknesses, and that btw, it isn't acceptable for use in FIPS compliant 
products, then *why* haven't I heard about any effort to use one of the 
approved SHA algorithms?

    -- Garrett

> Nico
>   

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